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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is comprised of three experimental studies that examine corporate tax
aggressiveness through an investigation of judgment and decision making in the corporate tax
environment. Studies 1 and 2 examine individual judgment involved in decision making (i.e.,
assessments of tax positions based upon tax scenario facts and tax authority). Study 1 examines
how advice from external tax advisors and a tax advisor’s association with the company’s audit
firm influences the aggressiveness of experienced in-house corporate tax decision makers. Study
2 examines how situational factors in the corporate tax environment interact with individual
traits to affect individual-level tax aggressiveness, focusing in greater depth upon the process of
individual judgment and decision making. Study 3 extends the investigation of situational factors
from individual-level decision making to a group-level analysis, examining individual-level and
group-level decision making in a tax setting (i.e., tax compliance decisions).
Overall, results reflect the complexity of the corporate tax environment. The effects of
the situational factors examined in the dissertation generally influence decision makers’ own
perceptions. For example, Study 1 results suggest that tax advisor identity influences how
corporate tax directors weight advice only if the advice is conservative and if the tax directors
agree with the advice. Additionally, in Studies 2 and 3, decision maker perceptions are found to
mediate the effects of manipulated situational factors. In Study 2, regulatory focus state
indirectly influences individual tax aggressiveness through the perception of the tax advisor’s
level of client advocacy. In Study 3 decision maker type, a situational factor, affects tax
compliance decision riskiness indirectly through feelings of responsibility for the possible
ii

outcomes of the decision. Collectively these studies contribute to the nascent literature on
decision making in a corporate tax environment, helping to lay the groundwork for future studies
in this area.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is comprised of three studies investigating judgment and decision
making in the corporate tax environment. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, p. 145) note that little is
known about who is making corporate tax decisions and how these decisions are made,
lamenting that “tax avoidance may be highly idiosyncratic and determined by a number of
factors and interactions, not all of which can be measured.” This complexity combined with the
fact that most experimental tax compliance research to date looks only at individual (rather than
corporate) taxpayer decision making suggests a need for investigating decision making in a
corporate tax setting.
Navigating the corporate tax environment requires tax decision makers to use
professional judgment to interpret complex tax authority (e.g., tax law, regulations, and court
cases) (Magro 1999; McGuire et al. 2012). Tax professionals may identify differing tax positions
that vary in how much they affect a taxpayer’s tax calculation, forming a range of possible tax
minimization opportunities (Slemrod 2007; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Lisowsky 2010). This
dissertation employs the relative term “tax aggressiveness” to describe where a tax position falls
along a range of possible tax minimization. More aggressive tax positions have weaker
underlying facts, are not clearly supported by relevant tax authority, and reduce taxes to a greater
extent than less aggressive tax positions (Cuccia et al. 1995; Roberts 1998; Hanlon and Heitzman
2010). This dissertation investigates corporate tax aggressiveness by examining both individual
judgment involved in decision making (i.e., assessments of tax positions based upon tax scenario
facts and tax authority in Study 1 and Study 2) as well as individual-level and group-level
decision making (i.e., tax compliance decisions in Study 3). The first study in this dissertation
1

examines the influence of external tax advisor recommendations on the tax aggressiveness of
decisions made by in-house corporate tax professionals (e.g., tax directors). The second study
focuses on the judgment and decision making processes of individuals in a corporate tax
environment, investigating how individual traits and contextual factors interact to affect
individual-level tax aggressiveness. The third study extends the investigation of contextual
factors from individual-level decision making to a group-level analysis, examining decision
making in individual and group tax compliance settings. The following subsections describe the
manner in which each study approaches the investigation of decision making in corporate
taxation. The final subsection contains the overall contribution of this dissertation.

Study One: Accounting Professionals, Tax Advice, and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness
The first study investigates corporate tax aggressiveness through an examination of
individual-level judgment and decision making, specifically the influence of advice on individual
tax aggressiveness. The primary individuals of interest in this study are corporate tax decision
makers, such as tax directors, that have authority to make tax compliance and planning decisions
on behalf of the corporation. The study draws upon social categorization theory and the beliefadjustment model to explore how tax advice may influence tax directors’ judgments differently
depending upon whether or not the tax advisor is from the corporation’s audit firm. I conduct an
experiment in which the identity of the tax advisor and the nature of tax advice are manipulated.
Experienced corporate tax directors are asked to make an assessment of a tax position based on
an ambiguous tax scenario. The external tax advisor is described within the scenario as either
from the accounting firm engaged to audit the corporation or from a different accounting firm.
Tax directors make their judgment about the tax position after receiving either conservative or
2

aggressive advice from the external tax advisor. Social categorization theory, client advocacy
roles, and the belief-adjustment model are used to interpret the influence of advice, leading to
predictions that the effect of advice depends upon the nature of the advice and the identity of the
tax advisor. Results suggest the nature of advice and tax advisor identity influence how tax
directors weight conservative advice when they are in agreement with the advice. However, the
nature of advice and tax advisor identity do not appear to influence the weight of advice when
tax directors agree with aggressive tax advice.

Study Two: Corporate Tax Aggressiveness: The Effects of Promotion and Prevention Focus on
Individual Decision Making
The second study investigates the tax aggressiveness of business entities through an
examination of individual-level judgment and decision making. The study draws upon
Regulatory Focus Theory to examine the process through which individuals make tax
compliance decisions on behalf of the corporation. Regulatory Focus Theory suggests that
individuals have two fundamentally different self-regulatory mindsets that influence the way in
which they pursue their goals: promotion regulatory focus (i.e., motivated to maximize
successful outcomes) and prevention regulatory focus (i.e., motivated to minimize failed
outcomes) (Higgins 1997; Higgins et al. 2001). Regulatory focus is exhibited as an individual
trait (i.e., trait promotion focus or trait prevention focus); however, situational factors in the
decision environment can activate a regulatory focus state (i.e., promotion state or prevention
state) (Higgins 2000). Corporate tax decision makers with a trait promotion focus are predicted
to be more tax aggressive than those with trait prevention focus. However, induced regulatory
focus state is predicted to moderate this relationship so that inducing a regulatory state may
3

amplify the effects of trait regulatory focus on the tax aggressiveness of corporate tax decision
maker judgment when trait and state align. I conduct an experiment in which participant trait
regulatory focus (promotion trait or prevention trait) is measured and state regulatory focus is
manipulated by framing corporate management’s view of the external tax advisor as either an
advocate (positive frame activating a promotion state) or an overseer (negative frame activating a
prevention state). Results do not support study hypotheses; however, supplemental analysis
suggests that regulatory focus state indirectly influences individual tax aggressiveness through
the perception of the tax advisor’s level of client advocacy. Decision makers perceive tax
advisors to be stronger client advocates when management views the tax advisor as an advocate
(promotion state) than when management views the tax advisor as an overseer (prevention state).
Furthermore, perceiving the tax advisor to be more of an advocate amplifies the influence of “fit”
between regulatory focus trait and state: compared to individuals with a lower trait promotion
focus, tax decision makers with a greater trait promotion focus react more strongly to the induced
promotion state.

Study Three: Self-Other and Multi-Agent Decision Making in Taxation
The third study investigates risky decisions made in different tax compliance contexts.
Prior research on taxpayer judgment and decision making has typically examined individual
taxpayer compliance; however, little is known about how components of the decision making
environment influence compliance in business tax settings. The study draws upon diffusion of
responsibility theory (i.e., how feelings of responsibility differ in individual and group decision
making) to examine the effect of the type of decision maker on the riskiness of tax compliance
decisions. Additionally, construal level theory and social value theory are used to explore how
4

self-other decision making (i.e., whether decisions are made for oneself or on behalf of others)
and decision maker type (i.e., individual or group decision maker) influence tax compliance. I
conduct an experiment in which decision makers are asked to make a tax compliance decision.
Decision maker type (individual or group) and decision target (self or other) are manipulated
through the structure of the tax compliance task. I use a compliance task with minimal context to
intentionally minimize the differences between conditions to determine the effect of only the
specific contextual factors of interest.
Taxpayers making decisions in a group are predicted to make riskier tax compliance
decisions than taxpayers making decisions individually. Self-other decision making is predicted
to influence tax compliance differently depending upon whether or not the decision is made
individually or in a group. Results do not support study hypotheses; however supplemental
analysis suggests decision maker type affects tax compliance decision riskiness indirectly
through feelings of responsibility for the possible outcomes of the decision. Group members
report feeling lower levels of personal responsibility than individual decision makers, and feeling
less personally responsible for the decision leads to riskier tax decisions.

Overall Contribution
Collectively these studies contribute to both the tax professional judgment and decision
making literature and taxpayer compliance research by examining decision making in a corporate
tax setting. Fair and objective evaluation of tax positions should reduce unmeasured tax risk.
Corporate tax decision makers should be made aware of how components of the decision making
environment (e.g., situational factors, dispositional characteristics, advice, and advisor
characteristics) influence interpretation of evidence and impact objectivity in the evaluation of
5

possible tax positions. Additionally, this dissertation also contributes to the corporate tax
avoidance/aggressiveness literature, given that these studies are some of the first to employ
experimental methods to examine why and how these specific components of the decision
making environment influence the tax aggressiveness of corporate tax director judgment. This
dissertation also has policy implications as policies designed to influence firm-level corporate tax
aggressiveness should be grounded in a solid understanding of the underlying judgment and
decision making processes of individuals acting on behalf of the corporation.

6
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STUDY ONE: ACCOUNTING PROFESSIONALS, TAX ADVICE, AND CORPORATE
TAX AGGRESSIVENESS
Introduction
Corporations are separate legal entities; however, given that corporations function based
upon decisions made by individuals, this study investigates the tax aggressiveness of business
entities through an examination of individual-level judgment and decision making. The primary
individuals of interest in this study are corporate tax decision makers, such as tax directors,1 that
have authority to make tax compliance and planning decisions on behalf of the corporation. Tax
rules are complex, particularly those for corporate taxation (Barney et al. 2012; Sullivan 2011).
Corporations have the option of conducting tax planning and compliance internally or engaging
external tax professionals (i.e., tax advisors2 such as public accounting firms) for assistance with
some or all of the tax work to achieve objectives while managing tax risk (Donohoe et al. 2014;
EY 2014).
Tax advisors provide corporate tax directors with additional resources and expertise
through the provision of tax advice. The decision to outsource some or all of the corporate tax
function to a tax advisor has been linked to a greater focus on tax planning than on tax
compliance (Dunbar and Phillips 2001). A corporation may have options for outsourcing tax
work. A corporation may engage its audit firm to provide tax services, subject to audit committee
approval for publicly traded companies, or the corporation may hire an alternate tax advisor

1

This study is focused on the judgment and decision making of individuals within the corporation that are involved
in corporate tax matters. These individuals are labeled as tax directors for purposes of this study. The term “tax
director” is intended to also represent individuals who could have other job titles such as CFO, controller, tax senior
manager, or tax manager.
2
The term “tax advisor” is used throughout this study to describe the individuals that assist taxpayers such as
corporations with their tax work. Tax advisors are accounting professionals, external to the corporation, engaged to
provide tax services to the corporation. “Tax advisor” is intended to encompass alternate terms such as tax preparer,
tax service provider, and tax consultant.
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(PCAOB 2014). Corporate tax aggressiveness3 appears to be associated with the party that signs
the corporate tax return. Corporations that sign their own tax returns or whose returns are signed
by an external non-auditor tax advisor are associated with more aggressive positions than
corporations whose returns are signed by an external auditor tax advisor (Klassen et al. 2015).
However, it is unclear if the identity of a corporation’s tax advisor shapes a corporate tax
director’s aggressiveness. If a corporation’s tax aggressiveness is influenced by the identity of
the tax advisor, as suggested by Klassen et al. (2015), does tax advisor identity influence how
advice affects internal corporate tax decision making? This study employs an experimental
design that enables controlled testing of targeted factors in this relationship. Specifically, the
purpose of this study is to draw upon social categorization theory and the belief-adjustment
model to investigate how tax advice may differentially influence corporate tax director judgment
depending upon both the identity of the tax advisor and the nature of the advice.
Social categorization is the cognitive process underlying how individuals perceive and
make sense of an overwhelming number of sensory inputs in a complex and ever-changing
environment (Hogg 2001). Corporate tax directors may categorize a tax advisor from the
accounting firm engaged to audit the corporation (“tax-audit” category) differently than a tax
advisor from an accounting firm that is not the audit firm (“tax-nonaudit” category). The “taxnonaudit” category may be more strongly associated with a tax advisor’s client advocacy4 role.
The different categorization may lead to differing perceptions about a tax advisor’s function and

3

As explained in more detail later, the present study considers tax aggressiveness to be a relative term used to
describe where a tax position falls along the range of possible tax minimization. Tax positions that are more
aggressive have weaker underlying facts and are not clearly supported by relevant tax authority (Cuccia et al. 1995;
Roberts 1998).
4
Mason and Levy (2001, 127) define client advocacy as “a state of mind in which one feels one’s primary loyalty
belongs to the taxpayer. It is exhibited by a desire to represent the taxpayer zealously within the bounds of the law,
and by a desire to be a fighter on behalf of the taxpayer.”
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expected behavior, which may influence corporate tax director judgment. This study predicts that
advice affects tax director judgment differently depending on both tax advisor identity and
whether or not the advice is surprising, given the tax advisor’s identity. In this study, advice is
considered to be surprising if incongruent with the tax advisor’s identity (i.e., conservative
advice from a non-auditor tax advisor or aggressive advice from an auditor tax advisor).
Specifically, the study predicts that aggressive advice from the audit firm tax advisor (i.e.,
surprising advice) will have a stronger effect on the corporate tax director’s judgment than
aggressive advice from the non-audit firm tax advisor (i.e., unsurprising advice). Likewise,
conservative advice from the non-audit firm tax advisor (i.e., surprising advice) is predicted to
have a stronger effect on the tax director’s judgment than conservative advice from the audit firm
tax advisor (i.e., unsurprising advice).
One hundred and nineteen experienced corporate tax professionals (Vice Presidents of
Tax, Tax Directors, and Tax Managers) are included in the study. As suggested by their job
titles, the vast majority have a great deal of tax experience and most are employed by multinational US-based corporations. An experimental design is used to examine how the identity of
the tax advisor and the nature of advice influence how corporate tax directors weight advice.
Participants are given a corporate tax scenario with ambiguous underlying case information and
relevant tax authority. The tax advisor’s identity is manipulated in the tax scenario information
as a tax advisor either from the audit firm or from a different accounting firm. Participants
receive advice from a tax advisor and then make a judgment about their likelihood of taking the
aggressive tax position. The advice is manipulated as either aggressive or conservative, which is
considered to be surprising or unsurprising based upon the identity of the tax advisor. The study
does not find evidence overall that nature of advice and tax advisor identity influence the weight
10

of advice. However, more interesting findings emerge when examining the weight of advice
when tax directors agree with the advice. The study finds that tax advisor identity influences the
weight of conservative advice when the tax director agrees with the conservative advice. Tax
directors in agreement with conservative tax advice weighted advice from the audit firm tax
advisor (“tax-audit”) more heavily than when advice came from a tax advisor from a different
firm (“tax-nonaudit”). However, when tax directors agree with aggressive advice, tax advisory
identity does not appear to influence the weight of advice.
The study contributes to both the tax professional judgment and decision making
literature and taxpayer compliance research by examining decision making in the corporate tax
environment. Corporate tax directors are sophisticated decision makers, attuned to many
components of the corporation’s overarching tax risk management (Donohoe et al. 2014;
Graham et al. 2014). As a component of the tax risk management process, corporate tax directors
should be made aware of how the identity of the tax advisor may affect their judgment and
evaluation of potential tax positions. Tax directors need to make unbiased risk assessments in
order to accurately align tax positions with a corporation’s tax risk appetite (COSO 2004;
Donohoe et al. 2014). Failure to accurately assess tax positions may expose the corporation to
unmeasured tax risk, which could have implications for tax compliance, accounting for income
taxes in financial reporting, and reputational concerns (Donohoe et al. 2014).
The study also contributes to the corporate tax avoidance/aggressiveness literature, as this
study is one of the first to employ an experimental design to investigate corporate tax
aggressiveness by examining the judgment and decision making of tax directors who make tax
decisions on behalf of corporations. An experimental design enables this study to examine why
particular factors influence aggressive tax behavior in a business entity context. The study uses
11

an experimental method to address this issue by isolating tax advisor identity and the nature of
advice to examine the effect on tax director judgment. Prior research on corporate tax
aggressiveness has examined firm-level characteristics of corporations that engage in aggressive
tax reporting behavior (Chen et al. 2010; Lisowsky 2010; Lanis and Richardson 2011; Rego and
Wilson 2012; Honaker 2013; Higgins et al. 2014; Klassen et al. 2015), as well as performance
measures and incentive structures for key decision makers (Phillips 2003; Robinson et al. 2010;
Armstrong et al. 2012; Gaertner 2014). Recently, studies have focused on key individuals to
investigate the association of individual-level characteristics with corporate tax aggressiveness
(Cleaveland et al. 2010; Dyreng et al. 2010; Chyz 2013; Honaker 2013; Koester et al. 2013;
Laws and Mills 2014). These studies have treated firm-level and individual-level characteristics
as determinants of aggressive tax reporting; however, as a result of using an archival
methodology, these studies are more appropriately described as showing an association between
these characteristics and the presumed outcomes of aggressive corporate tax decisions. Thus,
these prior studies provide information about corporations that are tax aggressive, but they do not
unravel the why behind the factors thought to influence aggressive corporate tax behavior.
The following section of this research study contains a review of the relevant literature
and development of the hypotheses. The second section describes the research method. The third
section presents results. The final section draws conclusions.

Theory and Hypotheses
Tax Risk Preferences and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness
Tax advisors use professional judgment to navigate the tax law (Magro 1999; McGuire et
al. 2012). Due to the complexity of the tax rules, a definitively “correct” tax position may not
12

always be determinable, so tax advisors may identify differing tax positions using the same set of
information (Slemrod 2007). These differing tax positions could vary in how much they affect a
taxpayer’s tax calculation; forming a range of possible tax minimization (Hanlon and Heitzman
2010; Lisowsky 2010). The present study considers tax aggressiveness to be a relative term used
to describe where a tax position falls along the range of possible tax minimization. Tax positions
that are more aggressive have weaker underlying facts and are not clearly supported by relevant
tax authority (Cuccia et al. 1995; Roberts 1998). Given any one issue, a more aggressive tax
position reduces taxes to a greater extent than a less aggressive tax position (Hanlon and
Heitzman 2010).
The corporate tax rules are complex and often ambiguous, creating uncertainty (Slemrod
2007; Barney et al. 2012). The current convention in practice is to refer to this uncertainty in
terms of managing tax risk5 (Donohoe et al. 2014). Borrowing from the COSO definition of
enterprise risk management, tax risk management can be equated to a corporation’s process of
identifying potential events with tax implications and managing risk to be within its “risk
appetite” (COSO 2004; Donohoe et al. 2014). For each individual corporation there is an optimal
level of tax aggressiveness that most benefits the shareholders (Armstrong et al. 2014).
Theoretically, after risk preference has been identified, the tax aggressiveness of tax director
judgment should be guided by the overarching tax risk preference. Thus, corporate tax
aggressiveness may be viewed as the operationalization of a corporation’s tax risk preference
(aka “risk appetite”).

5

Big 4 public accounting firms produce publications targeted at corporate tax risk and tax risk management. See for
example EY’s 2014 tax risk and controversy survey (EY 2014).
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Several factors have been shown to be associated with corporate tax aggressiveness. At
the organizational level, overall corporate business strategy has been linked to corporate tax
strategy (Higgins et al. 2014). Corporations that structure their business around a strategy of
innovation are more tax aggressive than corporations focused on stability and defending market
share (Higgins et al. 2014). Relatedly, evaluating the tax department as either a cost center or a
profit center is also associated with tax aggressiveness, with the latter having been shown to be
correlated with lower cash effective tax rates (ETR) (Robinson et al. 2010). Also, companies can
effectively incentivize the tax aggressiveness of decision makers through executive
compensation arrangements (Phillips 2003; Hanlon et al. 2005; Rego and Wilson 2012; Gaertner
2014). Recent studies have begun to examine associations between individual corporate decision
makers and tax aggressiveness. Tracking the movement of individual corporate executives
between companies suggests that tax aggressiveness may be attributable to individual decision
makers (Dyreng et al. 2010). Further, an executive’s personal tax aggressiveness may be
associated with corporate tax aggressiveness (Chyz 2013). Additionally, decision maker gender
appears to be related to corporate tax aggressiveness; female CFOs have been associated with
less tax aggressiveness than male CFOs (Francis et al. 2014). Management may choose to seek
corporate tax directors with likeminded tax risk preferences.
Top management and the corporate tax department are not the only individuals involved
in corporate tax decisions. Corporations may engage tax professionals from public accounting
firms to provide or assist the corporate tax function. The interactions of internal corporate tax
directors, tax advisors, and tax authorities collectively shape corporate tax aggressiveness
(Gracia and Oats 2012). Tax advisors perform an important function of serving as interpreters of
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tax rules by drawing upon firm-wide experiences interacting with tax authorities (Picciotto
2007).

Corporate Tax Advisors
Companies may choose whether or not to receive tax services from the same accounting
firm that is engaged to audit their financial statements. U.S. publicly traded companies must first
receive preapproval from their audit committee before the audit firm is engaged to provide tax
services; however, if preapproval is granted, even publicly traded corporations may engage their
audit firm for tax services (PCAOB 2014). The audit committee is specifically tasked with
oversight of financial reporting and disclosure (SOX 2002). The requirement for preapproval
from the audit committee stems from concerns that auditor independence could be threatened by
sizeable revenues from non-audit services that could unduly influence auditor judgment
(PCAOB 2014, SOX 2002).
The existence of publicly traded companies that continue to engage the same accounting
firm for both audit and tax services suggests that in some instances the benefits of this
arrangement outweigh the costs (Gleason and Mills 2011). Indeed, investors perceive the
benefits of enhanced financial reporting due to knowledge spillover from auditor-provided tax
services to be greater than the potential threat to auditor independence (Krishnan et al. 2013).
Collaborations between same-firm audit and tax functions can generate tax strategies for
optimizing outcomes for both tax reporting and financial reporting. McGuire et al. (2012) only
examine companies that engage the same accounting firm for both audit and tax services; they
find that companies engaging an audit firm with tax-specific industry expertise are linked to
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greater tax aggressiveness compared to other companies in their sample6 (McGuire et al. 2012).
The sample for the McGuire et al. (2012) study contains only companies that engage the same
accounting firm for both audit and tax services. Though companies may choose to engage the
same accounting firm for both audit and tax services, many companies do not (Klassen et al.
2015). Companies using their audit firm as their tax advisor are associated with less tax
aggressiveness than companies using non-auditor tax advisors (Klassen et al. 2015). Klassen et
al. (2015) use confidential IRS data to classify a company’s tax advisor as an auditor, a
nonauditor, or the internal tax department. The Klassen et al. (2015) study is able to observe the
association between tax advisor identity and tax aggressiveness through the use of confidential
IRS data, a relationship which had been previously inaccessible using only publicly available
information. However, the data in the Klassen et al. (2015) study do not reveal why using a tax
advisor from the audit firm is associated with less tax aggressiveness, more specifically if
knowing whether or not the tax advisor is from the company’s audit firm influences how advice
affects tax director judgment.
ASC 740 requires that companies evaluate tax positions for financial reporting purposes
(FASB 2009). A corporation’s tax accounts are included in the audit of the corporation’s
financial statements. Thus, a tax director may consider the financial reporting implications when
assessing potential tax positions. One perspective could be that corporate tax directors perceive a
tax advisor from the audit firm as more likely to favorably assess a tax position due to reduced
independence or a knowledge spillover effect. The knowledge spillover literature examines
whether auditor provided tax services impair independence (possibly impacting audit quality) or

6

The McGuire et al (2012) study uses the term tax avoidance, but I have consistently used the term tax
aggressiveness to avoid confusion generated by the use of multiple terms.
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whether using a tax advisor from the corporation’s audit firm allows knowledge to be transferred
between tax and audit functions, generating potential benefits such as increased audit
effectiveness and audit efficiency. Prior research has found support for the knowledge spillover
effect (Kinney et al. 2004; Gleason and Mills 2011; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2011). Joe and
Vandervelde (2007) examine knowledge transfer between audit tasks and nonaudit tasks, and
note that auditors performing both services display less professional skepticism.7 Choudhary et
al. (2015) also find reduced professional skepticism when a corporation’s auditor also provides
the corporation’s tax services.
Joe and Vandervelde (2007) and Choudhary et al. (2015) focus on the effects of the
provision of nonaudit services on auditor judgments. Tax services are one type of non-audit
services provided by auditors. Auditor-provided tax services may be associated with reduced
auditor skepticism. If auditor-provided tax services are associated with reduced auditor
skepticism, then the corporation’s tax director may view the option to use the same accounting
firm for both tax and audit services as an opportunity to lessen auditor scrutiny of the
corporation’s tax positions during the audit of the tax accounts. Consistent with a knowledge
spillover effect, the tax director may also expect a tax advisor from the audit firm to have greater
knowledge of the corporation. Thus, a tax director could expect a tax advisor from the audit firm
to be more comfortable with seemingly more aggressive tax positions than a tax advisor from a
different accounting firm. However, this inference is inconsistent with the Klassen et al. (2015)
study which finds that corporations using their audit firm as their tax advisor appear to engage in
less tax aggressiveness than corporation using non-auditor tax advisors. Rather than viewing a

7

Though the Joe and Vandervelde (2007) study examines knowledge transfer between audit and nonaudit tasks, the
particular nonaudit task examined in the study is not the provision of tax services.
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tax advisor from the audit firm as more likely to accept aggressive tax positons due to knowledge
spillover or reduced skepticism, corporate tax directors may perceive the differing professional
roles for tax and audit professionals to be more influential on tax advisor judgment, which may
lead the tax director to interpret evidence in accordance with a tax advisor’s professional role.
Tax advisors and auditors have differing objectives and responsibilities. A tax advisor has
the responsibility to act as an advocate on behalf of taxpayers when recommending a tax position
or preparing a tax return (AICPA 2009). Though a client advocate, a tax advisor is also required
to exercise due diligence in determining the accuracy of tax information furnished to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS 2014). Thus, a tax advisor has a dual role: taxpayer advocate and overseer
of tax information. Auditors have the responsibility to obtain reasonable assurance about whether
the financial statements are free of material misstatement (AICPA 1972a). Auditors are tasked
with maintaining a questioning mind and critically assessing evidence (AICPA 1972b).
This study draws upon social categorization theory to examine how differing professional
roles associated with the identity of the tax advisor (either from the audit firm or a different firm)
influence tax director judgments. As this study investigates the influence of advice from two
categories of tax advisors with differing professional roles, social categorization theory and
professional roles are used to interpret a tax director’s categorization of the tax advisor and how
this categorization may affect tax director judgment. Categorization is the cognitive process
through which individuals perceive and interpret stimuli in their surroundings (Hogg 2001).
Perception is accomplished via the categorization process (Bruner 1957). Individuals receive
stimuli input and unconsciously form mental categories based on defining attributes (Bruner
1957). Accumulated stimuli input is stored in memory and used to categorize subsequent input
by comparing the new input to stored individual exemplars or prototypes (Smith and Zarate
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1990). Categories function as mental shortcuts, enabling individuals to perceive their
surroundings and quickly process information to inform individual judgment and behavior (Hogg
2001). Within the broad concept of categorization, social categorization specifically involves the
categorization of individuals by a perceiver (Hogg 2001). The way in which a perceiver
categorizes an individual may lead to selective processing of relevant information, which
influences interpretation of evidence and ultimately biases judgment (Bodenhausen and Wyer
1985; Bodenhausen 1988).
The knowledge spillover/reduced skepticism perspective presented earlier involves
auditor judgment and the possible effects on audit quality; however, it does not consider the
impact of differing professional roles on the tax director’s perception of tax advisors. Corporate
tax directors may categorize a tax advisor from the audit firm (“tax-audit”) differently than a tax
advisor from an accounting firm that is not the audit firm (“tax-nonaudit”). The different
categorization of the tax advisor may lead to differing perceptions about a tax advisor’s function
and predicted behavior and may influence how tax directors interpret evidence in making
judgments about the likelihood that a corporation should take an aggressive tax position. When
the corporate tax director categorizes the tax advisor as “tax-audit,” this categorization may be
associated with the tax advisor’s obligation regarding the accuracy of tax information. The
corporate tax director may perceive a tax advisor in the “tax-audit” category as having more of
an oversight function due to the tax advisor’s affiliation with the audit firm engaged to attest to
the appropriateness of information reported in the corporation’s financial statements. Conversely,
when the corporate tax director categorizes the tax advisor as “tax-nonaudit,” an advisor in the
“tax-nonaudit” category may be more strongly linked to a client advocacy function than an
advisor in the “tax-audit” category. The corporate tax director may perceive a tax advisor in the
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“tax-nonaudit” category as more of a client advocate due to the absence of affiliation with the
corporation’s audit firm. The tax director’s categorization of a tax advisor as either “tax-audit” or
“tax-nonaudit” may affect the lens through which the tax director interprets a tax advisor’s
recommendation and how the advice influences tax director judgment.

The Influence of Advice
Little research has examined the influence of advice on professional decision making in
the accounting domain. Research on advice in the tax context is particularly sparse. The demand
for advice increases as uncertainty increases, which is compatible with a tax risk management
perspective (Beck et al. 1996). However, demand for advice does not necessarily translate into
utilization of advice (Beck et al. 1996). This study employs the belief-adjustment model to
examine the influence of advice received by corporate tax directors. The belief-adjustment model
posits that belief revision occurs through an anchoring-and adjustment process of evidence
evaluation (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). An anchor, the initial belief, is adjusted in response to
additional evidence, forming a new anchor, the revised belief (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). Each
piece of evidence adjusts the previous belief, forming a series of revised beliefs. Belief
adjustment depends upon both the level of the anchor and the direction of subsequent evidence
(Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). The level of the anchor (e.g., a larger anchor versus a smaller
anchor) is the strength of the initial belief regarding a hypothesis (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992).
For example, if in response to Hypothesis A, an individual believing that Hypothesis A is 80
percent likely to be true would have a larger anchor compared to an individual believing that
Hypothesis A is 20 percent likely to be true. The direction of subsequent evidence can be
positive or negative; subsequent positive evidence increases the degree of an individual’s initial
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belief and subsequent negative evidence decreases the degree of an individual’s initial belief
(Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). The model posits that a large anchor (initial belief) will have a
larger adjustment in response to negative evidence than in response to positive evidence. The
model also predicts the converse: a small anchor (initial belief) will have a larger adjustment in
response to positive evidence than in response to negative evidence (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992).
Thus, a recency effect is predicted such that the most recent evidence is more influential than
previous evidence when evidence is surprising (Ashton and Ashton, 1988; Hogarth and Einhorn
1992). Evidence is surprising when it is inconsistent with previous evidence (e.g., positive
evidence followed by negative evidence), and evidence is unsurprising when it is consistent with
previous evidence (e.g., positive evidence followed by positive evidence) (Ashton and Ashton,
1988; Hogarth and Einhorn 1992).
The present study is interested in how tax advisor identity and the nature of advice
influence tax director judgment due to input of both of these factors as evidence in the
anchoring-and-adjusting process. As agents of the corporation, tax directors should have a
default preference for tax minimizing positions. Social categorization theory suggests that tax
directors will perceive tax advisors differently, categorizing tax advisors from the audit firm as
“tax-audit” and tax advisors from a different firm as “tax-nonaudit.” The categorization of a tax
advisor as “tax-audit” may adjust the tax director’s default anchor towards a more conservative
tax position. Likewise, the categorization of a tax advisor as “tax-nonaudit” may adjust the tax
director’s default anchor towards a more aggressive tax position.
The amount of belief adjustment is determined by both the level of the anchor and the
direction of subsequent evidence (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). The level of the anchor is the
strength of the initial belief regarding a hypothesis, theoretically dichotomized as either a large
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anchor or a small anchor (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). Regarding the tax aggressiveness of
corporate tax director judgment, the hypothesis at issue concerns the likelihood that an
aggressive tax position is the appropriate position. Thus, a large anchor represents a greater
likelihood that an aggressive tax position is appropriate and a small anchor signifies a lesser
likelihood that an aggressive position is appropriate.
Advice received from the tax advisor is expected to act as a subsequent piece of evidence
in the tax director’s anchor-and-adjusting process. The belief-adjustment model describes a
contrast or surprise effect in which a large anchor will move more in response to negative
evidence than in response to positive evidence (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). Thus, a tax director
receiving advice from a tax advisor not from the audit firm (“tax-nonaudit” category) will have a
greater belief adjustment if the tax advisor gives conservative advice (negative evidence) than if
the tax advisor gives aggressive advice (positive evidence). Likewise, a tax director receiving
advice from a tax advisor from the audit firm (“tax-audit” category) will have a greater belief
adjustment if the tax advisor gives aggressive advice (positive evidence) than if the tax advisor
gives conservative advice (negative evidence). Consistent with the belief-adjustment model,
pairing either a large anchor with negative evidence or a small anchor with positive evidence
creates a surprise (Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). A recency effect is predicted such that the most
recent evidence is more influential than previous evidence when evidence is surprising (Ashton
and Ashton 1988; Hogarth and Einhorn 1992). Thus, a tax director receiving surprising advice
will be more heavily influenced by the advice than by the advisor; however, whether the advice
is surprising depends upon the identity of the tax advisor. Stated formally:
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H1a: Conservative advice from the non-audit firm tax advisor (i.e., surprising advice)
will have a stronger effect on the corporate tax director’s judgment than conservative
advice from the audit firm tax advisor (i.e., unsurprising advice).
H1b: Aggressive advice from the audit firm tax advisor (i.e., surprising advice) will have
a stronger effect on the corporate tax director’s judgment than aggressive advice from
the non-audit firm tax advisor (i.e., unsurprising advice).

Research Method
Participants
Corporate tax professionals with job titles such as VP Tax, Tax Director, Head of Tax,
etc. were contacted via email to request participation in the study.8 Email addresses were
obtained from an academic research database. Participants were recruited using a multi-contact
method (Dillman et al. 2009). As an incentive for participating, I offered to make a contribution
of $2 on behalf of each participant to one of three national-level charities. Screening questions
were used to insure that potential participants had adequate experience for inclusion in the study.
In order to be eligible to participate in the study, participants must have had experience making
in-house corporate tax decisions on behalf of a company. Screening questions assessed the
following types of experience: supervision of a company’s income tax return preparation and
filing, researching income tax matters on behalf of a company, conducting income tax planning

This study collects potentially sensitive information about a company’s tax aggressiveness; thus, corporate tax
executives were assured any responses would be anonymous (i.e., responses would not be linkable to their identity
or the identity of their corporate employer). I sent a recruitment email containing an anonymous link to the study to
4,579 email addresses. 269 emails were undeliverable. It is unclear how many emails may have been blocked by
company filters. 243 participants clicked the link to view information about the study; 139 actually completed the
study.
8
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on behalf of a company, and preparing or reviewing a company’s tax provision calculations. The
screening questions instructed potential participants to consider only their experience while they
were employed in-house by a company and not to consider any experience they may have had
working for a public accounting firm.
One hundred and nineteen experienced corporate tax professionals completed the
experiment, with 115 participants (96.7 percent) having more than seven years of experience in
taxation. Participants with more than seven years of experience were asked to specify total years
of experience; 96 responded with a mean (standard deviation) of 23.9 years (7.87). Participants
were primarily employed by multi-national US-based corporations (79.9 percent), with others
employed by domestic US multistate corporations (15.1 percent) and multi-national foreignbased (5.0 percent). The vast majority of participants indicated their corporation’s financial
statements were audited by a public accounting firm (99.2 percent). Regarding the percentage of
tax services outsourced (rather than conducted in-house), responses ranged from 0 percent to 100
percent with mean (standard deviation) of 33.0 percent (22.5). Additionally, some corporations
chose to outsource tax services to the same accounting firm that conducted their audit (43.7
percent) and other corporations used different accounting firms for tax and audit services (55.5
percent). Table 1 presents demographic data. Study 1 tables are presented in Appendix A.

Materials and Design
The experiment was computer-based and administered via Qualtrics software.
Participants were first provided with a link to begin the study. The opening screen of the
Qualtrics study presented the explanation of research (general study overview, estimated time to
complete, contact information for the experimenters, etc.). Individuals that agreed to participate
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proceeded to the next screen to answer screening questions before beginning the study.
Participants were asked to work independently and complete the study in one continuous sitting,
without outside interruptions.
The experimental materials consisted of five sections: background information and tax
scenario about a hypothetical corporation (Maylor Corp), select guidance relevant to the tax
scenario and the in-house tax staff opinion, a recommendation from Maylor Corp’s tax advisor
regarding the tax scenario, the participant’s response section, and demographics. See Figure 1 for
a diagram of the experimental procedures.

Background Information and Tax Scenario
(Tax Advisor Identity Manipulated:
Tax-Nonaudit or Tax-Audit)

Relevant Tax Authority and
In-House Staff Opinion

Tax Advisor's Recommendation
(Nature of Advice Manipulated:
Aggressive or Conservative)

Measure Tax Aggressiveness
(Likelihood)

Measure IRS Permits, Perceived Client
Advocacy, Tax Risk Preference, Agreement
with Advice, & Demographics

Figure 1: Diagram of Experimental Procedures
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Participants were presented with background information for a hypothetical scenario in
which they were asked to assume the role of Maylor Corp’s Tax Director. Each participant
received one of two possible variations of background information, differing only in who was
said to sign Maylor Corp’s tax returns and review research projects conducted in-house by
Maylor Corp’s tax department: tax professionals from an accounting firm that is not Maylor
Corp’s audit firm or tax professionals from Maylor Corp’s audit firm. After reading through the
background information for Maylor Corp, all participants then received the same tax scenario.
The tax scenario involved the Research and Development (R&D) Credit and the qualification of
certain research expenses for the R&D Credit. Specifically, participants were told that Maylor
Corp had incurred costs for supplies related to a new research and development project and
provided with facts about the new project. The tax scenario was derived from an actual court
case on the proper treatment of supplies for the R&D Credit.9
Following the tax scenario, participants were provided with relevant information from the
Internal Revenue Code and Regulations. The potential classification of the supplies as “qualified
research expenses” for the R&D Credit was a matter of judgment as it was not directly addressed
in the tax guidance provided in the experimental materials.10 Participants were informed that
Maylor Corp’s in-house tax department staff had compiled the tax authority and provided a
preliminary opinion that, should Maylor Corp include the supplies in the R&D Credit
calculation, there was a 60% likelihood that the position would be successfully upheld. The
purpose of the 60% likelihood was to anchor the participants on the same starting point prior to
receiving advice from Maylor Corp’s external tax advisors.

9

Union Carbide Corp. TCM 2009-50.
Despite recent legislative activity, the tax rules for claiming the R&D Credit for supplies remain complex and
ambiguous (Frank et al. 2010).
10
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After participants had read the relevant tax authority and the preliminary opinion of
Maylor Corp’s tax department staff, they were given advice from the party designated as Maylor
Corp’s tax advisor in the background information. Participants were provided with either a
recommendation that Maylor Corp should include the supplies in the R&D credit calculation
(aggressive advice) or that Maylor Corp should not include the supplies in the R&D credit
calculation (conservative advice). After receiving the tax advisor’s recommendation, participants
were asked the likelihood of including the supplies as qualified expenses for the R&D Credit.
The study also included an adapted measure of client advocacy, a measure of tax risk preference,
manipulation checks, and demographic information. Experimental materials are included as
Appendix B.

Independent Variables
Tax Advisor Identity
Tax advisor identity is manipulated within the background information for Maylor Corp
that participants receive early in the experiment. The experimental materials indicate that Maylor
Corp’s tax advisors are either tax professionals from an accounting firm that is not the same as
Maylor Corp’s audit firm (Tax-Nonaudit) or tax professionals from Maylor Corp’s audit firm
(Tax-Audit). The materials state that research projects are often conducted in-house by Maylor
Corp’s tax department and then reviewed by Maylor Corp’s tax advisor. After participants read
through the tax scenario about Maylor Corp’s research and development and view the tax
department staff’s preliminary opinion and relevant tax authority, participants view the tax
advisor’s recommendation on the appropriate tax treatment. In both the Tax-Nonaudit and TaxAudit conditions, the accounting firm is described as a Big 4 public accounting firm.
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Nature of Advice
Maylor Corp’s tax advisor provides a recommendation about the treatment of the supplies
for purposes of the R&D credit. The materials indicate that the tax advisor’s recommendation is
based upon analysis of the facts and interpretation of the same relevant tax authority that was
provided earlier in the study. The relevant tax authority is inconclusive regarding the appropriate
treatment of the supplies for the R&D Credit, representing a grey area in the tax law. The tax
advisor’s recommendation is either a Conservative or an Aggressive position. In the
Conservative position, Maylor Corp’s tax advisor recommends that Maylor Corp should not
include the supplies in the R&D credit calculation. In the Aggressive position, Maylor Corp’s tax
advisor recommends that Maylor Corp should include the supplies in the R&D credit calculation.
The nature of the advice (Conservative or Aggressive) is surprising or unsurprising given
the identity of the tax advisor. Surprising tax advice is either conservative advice from a nonauditor tax advisor or aggressive advice from an auditor tax advisor. Unsurprising tax advice is
either aggressive advice from a non-auditor tax advisor or conservative advice from an auditor
tax advisor. See Figure 2 for a diagram of surprising and unsurprising advice given the 2x2
design manipulating the nature of advice and the identity of the tax advisor.

Tax Advisor Identity

Nature of Tax Advice
Conservative
Aggressive
Surprising
Unsurprising
Unsurprising
Surprising

Tax-Nonaudit
Tax-Audit

Figure 2: Diagram of Surprising and Unsurprising Advice
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Additional Measures
IRS Permits
IRS Permits is a measure of the perceived likelihood that the IRS will permit the position
that the UltraX supplies are qualified research expenses for Maylor Corp’s Research and
Development credit. IRS Permits is measured with an eleven-point scale with labeled points
ranging from 0% “Not At All Likely” to 100% “Extremely Likely.” A lower perceived
likelihood that the IRS would permit the tax position of including the expenses represents greater
perceived riskiness of the tax position. A participant’s assessment of the likelihood that the IRS
will permit the position is expected to covary with the dependent variable, Weight of Advice.
Perceived Client Advocacy
A nine item scale was adapted from the Mason and Levy (2001) measure of client
advocacy. Similar to Stephenson (2007), the instructions were modified so that participants are
asked to answer the questions as they think a corporation’s external tax professionals would
respond. Specifically, participants in the Tax Advisor Identity – Tax-Nonaudit condition are
asked to “please answer the following items as you think a corporation’s external tax
professionals would respond in arrangements such as this when the corporation’s external tax
professionals are not from the audit firm.” Participants in the Tax Advisor Identity – Tax-Audit
condition are asked to “please answer the following items as you think a corporation’s external
tax professionals would respond in arrangements such as this when the corporation’s external tax
professionals are from the audit firm.”
The original Mason and Levy (2001) items were worded to measure a participant’s client
advocacy. The items used for this study have been rephrased so that each item measures
participants’ perceptions of how a corporation’s external tax professionals would respond. Client
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Advocacy is expected to help explain how participants are differentially influenced by the
identity of the corporation’s tax advisor and how they respond to aggressive versus conservative
tax advice from auditor and non-auditor tax advisors.
Tax Risk Preference
Tax Risk Preference is a tax risk measure of how certain an individual would want to be
of his or her tax position within the experimental scenario. Participants are asked “how certain
would you want to be of your tax position before including the UltraX supplies as qualified
research expenses for the R&D Credit?” Tax Risk Preference is measured with an eleven-point
scale ranging from 0% “Not At All Certain” to 100% “Extremely Certain.” An individual who
prefers a higher degree of certainty is considered to have a lower tax risk preference. Thus,
responses are reverse coded such that a greater score reflects a greater tax risk preference. Tax
Risk Preference is measured for use as a possible control variable.
Agreement with Advice
Agreement with Advice is measured as the extent to which a participant agrees with the
advice provided by Maylor Corp’s tax advisor in the scenario. Specifically, participants are
asked, “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the recommendation of the external tax
professionals?” Agreement with Advice is measured on a seven-point Likert-type scale with
labeled points ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree.” Responses are
dichotomized based upon the mid-point of the scale into High or Low Agreement with Advice;
the mid-point 4 “Neither Agree nor Disagree” is categorized as Low. The extent to which a
participant agrees with the advice is expected to influence the weight of the advice.
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Dependent Variable
The tax aggressiveness of tax director judgment is operationalized as the likelihood of
taking an aggressive tax position (Likelihood). The aggressive tax position is the likelihood of
including the cost of specific supplies (described in the tax scenario) as qualified research
expenses for the Research and Development (R&D) credit calculation. The authoritative
guidance provided in the experimental materials is ambiguous as to the appropriate tax treatment
of supplies for the R&D credit.11 Including the supplies in the R&D credit calculation would be
advantageous for tax purposes. Thus, a greater likelihood of including the cost of supplies in
R&D credit research expenses reflects more aggressive tax reporting.
Likelihood is used to calculate Weight of Advice. Weight of Advice is calculated as the
absolute value of the difference between the 60% anchor from the in-house tax department and
Likelihood, divided by the absolute value of the difference between the tax advisor’s
recommendation and the 60% anchor.12 Weight of Advice is used to evaluate how much the tax
advisor’s recommendation influenced the participant’s likelihood of taking an aggressive tax
position.

11

The tax scenario in this study was intentionally designed such that the appropriate tax treatment is ambiguous.
Conversations with a senior manager from a national firm suggest that, as anticipated, the tax scenario does not
generate a clear-cut solution. Additionally, a few of the experienced corporate tax professionals contacted me after
participating in the study to share their thoughts and opinions. Feedback suggests the tax treatment is subject to
interpretation (i.e., ambiguous) and the case had sufficient detail and realism to engage the experienced corporate tax
professionals.
12
The weight of advice (WOA) is calculated as follows: WOA = |(Likelihood – Initial Anchor)| / |(Recommendation
– Initial Anchor)| (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). Initial Anchor equals 60%. In the Conservative Nature of Advice
condition, Recommendation equals 0%. In the Aggressive Nature of Advice condition, Recommendation equals
100%. WOA values for Likelihood assessments falling outside the range bounded by the tax advisor’s
recommendation and the initial anchor are adjusted to zero.
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Results
Manipulation Checks
The manipulation of Tax Advisor Identity was presented in the background information,
which was provided to the participants before they read the tax scenario. The manipulation check
was conducted at the end of the experimental materials to provide assurance that the participants
were aware of facts vital to the successful manipulation of the variable. To verify the
manipulation of tax advisor source, participants were asked, “Which best describes the party that
reviewed your decision about the UltraX supplies?” Participants were asked to specify whether
Maylor Corp’s tax advisors were “tax professionals at Firm A, which is also Maylor Corp’s audit
firm” or “tax professionals at Firm A, which is not Maylor Corp’s audit firm.”
Additionally, there was a manipulation check to verify that participants knew the nature
of the advice that Maylor Corp’s tax advisor provided: Maylor Corp should not include the
supplies in the calculation (Conservative Tax Advice) or should include the supplies in the R&D
credit calculation (Aggressive Tax Advice). To be included in the study, participants had to pass
both manipulation check questions. A total of 119 participants are included in the study.13

Tests of Hypotheses
This study predicts that advice affects tax director judgment differently depending on
whether or not the advice is surprising, which is based upon the nature of the advice and the
identity of the tax advisor. H1a predicts that conservative advice from the non-audit firm tax
advisor (Tax-Nonaudit) will have a stronger effect on the corporate tax director’s judgment than

13

139 participants completed the experimental materials. 18 participants failed manipulation check questions and
are excluded. Additionally, two participants are excluded because their current job titles indicate they switched from
taxation and currently work in audit (“VP, Internal Audit” and “Former Tax Director, currently Director of Audit”).
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conservative advice from the audit firm tax advisor (Tax-Audit). H1b predicts that aggressive
advice from the audit firm tax advisor (Tax-Audit) will have a stronger effect on the corporate tax
director’s judgment than aggressive advice from the non-audit firm tax advisor (Tax-Nonaudit).
H1a and H1b are tested with an ANOVA measuring the effect of Nature of Advice and Tax
Advisor Identity on Weight of Advice. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and the
results of the ANOVA (Panel B). Nature of Advice is significant in the model (F1, 115 = 12.987, p
< 0.000). Tax Advisor Identity (F1, 115 = 0.012, p = 0.912) and the interaction of Nature of Advice
x Tax Advisor Identity (F1, 115 = 0.149, p = 0.700) are not significant in the model. H1a and H1b
are tested using a simple effects analysis (Table 2, Panel C). Tax Advisor Identity is not
significant in the “conservative advice” (F = 0.129, p = 0.720) condition or the “aggressive
advice” condition (F = 0.036, p = 0.849); thus, H1a and H1b are not supported.

Supplemental Analysis – Weight of Advice
Due to participants’ considerable experience in corporate taxation, they may have formed
their own strong opinions about the tax scenario. As such, participants were possibly less
affected than intended by the anchor provided in the experimental materials via the tax
department staff opinion. Thus, additional analysis is conducted to examine the influence of
Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity on Weight of Advice when the participant’s agreement
with the advice is high separately from when agreement with advice is low.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and the results of an ANOVA (Panel B)
measuring the effect of Tax Advisor Identity on Weight of Advice and includes only participants
who are categorized as “high” in Agreement with Advice. Nature of Advice is not significant in
the model (F1, 73 = 0.079, p = 0.779). However, Tax Advisor Identity (F1, 73 = 4.750, p = 0.033) is
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significant and the interaction of Nature of Advice x Tax Advisor Identity (F1, 73 = 3.568, p =
0.063) is found to be marginally significant in the model.
A simple effects analysis is conducted to further examine the effect of the interaction on
Weight of Advice for those who agreed with the advice. Tax Advisor Identity is significant in the
“conservative advice” condition (F = 6.277, p = 0.014); Weight of Advice for those in the TaxNonaudit condition has a mean (standard deviation) of 0.461 (0.406) and has a mean (standard
deviation) of 0.800 (0.270) for those in the Tax-Audit condition. This indicates that conservative
advice was given more weight when it came from a tax advisor who was also the auditor.
Conversely, Tax Advisor Identity is not significant in the “aggressive advice” condition (F =
0.062, p = 0.804). Weight of Advice in the Tax-Nonaudit condition has a mean (standard
deviation) of 0.595 (0.356) and a mean (standard deviation) of 0.619 (0.281) in the Tax-Audit
condition.
Descriptive statistics for participants categorized as “low” in Agreement with Advice are
presented in Table 4. As shown in Table 4, few participants disagreed with aggressive advice.
This finding is particularly evident in the Tax-Nonaudit condition, in which only one participant
disagreed with the aggressive advice. Of the 57 participants in the Aggressive advice condition,
50 agreed with the advice (87.7 percent) and only 7 disagreed with the advice (12.3 percent). No
further analysis is conducted for low Agreement with Advice due to the small number of
participants who disagreed with aggressive advice.

Supplemental Analysis – Likelihood
The main analysis in this study examines the effect of Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor
Identity on Weight of Advice. The Weight of Advice dependent variable incorporates the initial
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anchor provided in the experimental materials via the tax department staff opinion. As previously
discussed, participants may have formed their own strong opinions about the tax scenario. To
address potential concerns about the effectiveness of the initial anchor, supplemental analysis is
conducted using Likelihood as the dependent variable. Table 5 presents ANOVA results of the
effect of Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity on Likelihood. Nature of Advice is significant
in the model (F1, 115 = 28.965, p < 0.000). Tax Advisor Identity (F1, 115 = 0.139, p = 0.710) and the
interaction of Nature of Advice x Tax Advisor Identity (F1, 115 = 0.095, p = 0.758) are not found to
be significant in the model. However, the analysis is more informative when split by whether
Agreement with Advice is high or low.
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics and the results of an ANOVA measuring the effect
of Tax Advisor Identity on Likelihood and includes only participants who are categorized as
“high” in Agreement with Advice. Nature of Advice (F1, 73 = 143.865, p < 0.000) and Tax Advisor
Identity (F1, 73 = 4.155, p = 0.045) are significant. Additionally, the interaction of Nature of
Advice x Tax Advisor Identity (F1, 73 = 7.021, p = 0.010) is significant. A simple effects analysis
is conducted to further examine the effect of the interaction on Likelihood. Tax Advisor Identity
is significant in the “conservative advice” condition (F = 8.335, p = 0.005). When agreement
with conservative advice is high, the mean (standard deviation) of Likelihood is 0.353 (0.285) in
the Tax-Nonaudit condition and 0.120 (0.162) in the Tax-Audit condition. Meanwhile, Tax
Advisor Identity is not significant in the “aggressive advice” condition (F = 0.274, p = 0.602).
Likelihood has a mean (standard deviation) of 0.817 (0.207) in the Tax-Nonaudit condition and
0.848 (0.112) in the Tax-Audit condition. Descriptive statistics for participants categorized as
“low” in Agreement with Advice are presented in Table 7. Again, due to the small number of
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participants who disagreed with aggressive advice, no further analysis is conducted on this
group.

Conclusion
The study targets actual corporate tax decision makers, such as tax directors, and is one
of the first studies to employ an experimental design to examine corporate tax aggressiveness.
The study draws upon social categorization theory and the belief-adjustment model to explore
how tax advisor identity and the nature of tax advice may affect how tax advice influences
corporate tax director judgment. The process of tax risk management entails that potential
corporate tax risks should be identified and assessed as part of the process of optimizing tax risk
(COSO 2004; Donohoe et al. 2014). Assessment of competing tax positions should be as
unbiased as possible in order to appropriately synchronize a corporation’s tax positions with
overall corporate tax risk preference.
The study predicts that the influence of tax advice on corporate tax director judgment
may differ depending on the nature of the advice and whether the tax advisor is from the audit
firm or from a different firm. Findings suggest that when tax directors are provided with
conservative tax advice (i.e., advised not to take a client-favorable tax position not clearly
supported by the tax authority) and they agree with the conservative advice, the identity of the
tax advisor influences the weight given to the advice. Tax directors in agreement with
conservative tax advice weighted advice from the audit firm tax advisor (“tax-audit”) more
heavily than when advice came from a tax advisor from a different firm (“tax-nonaudit”). As
such, tax directors that agreed with conservative advice indicated a smaller likelihood of taking
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the position when the tax advisor was from the audit firm than when the tax advisor was from a
different firm.
Though findings do not align with the study’s predictions, the results may still be
interpretable through the Belief-Adjustment model and social categorization theory. Perhaps the
true “surprise” was not incongruence of the nature of advice provided given the identity of the
tax advisor. Rather, the larger “surprise” for the tax directors in this study may have been
receiving tax advice that did not align with the client-favored position (i.e., conservative tax
advice). Thus, the more important context for the weight of advice may be the effect of tax
advisor identity when advise is contrary to overall expectations (i.e., when advice is
conservative). After the initial shock of receiving conservative advice, the weight of advice may
then be influenced by tax advisor identity via differing professional roles. The categorization of a
tax advisor as “tax-audit” may adjust the tax director’s anchor towards an even more
conservative tax position, compounding the belief adjustment from surprising conservative
advice. Conversely, the categorization of a tax advisor as “tax-nonaudit” may adjust the tax
director towards a more aggressive tax position, mitigating to some extent the belief adjustment
from the surprising conservative advice. Ultimately, corporate tax directors should be made
aware that the identity of the tax advisor may influence their interpretation of advice and
evaluation of potential tax positions in the tax risk management process.
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STUDY TWO: CORPORATE TAX AGGRESSIVENESS: THE EFFECTS OF
PROMOTION AND PREVENTION FOCUS ON INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING
Introduction
Regulatory agencies, such as the IRS and the SEC appear to be concerned about the
aggressive tax reporting of business entities as evidenced by the shift towards increased
disclosure of book-tax differences and uncertain tax positions. The introduction of Schedule M-3
(Net Income Reconciliation), Form 8886 (Reportable Transaction Disclosure Statement), and
Schedule UTP (Uncertain Tax Position Statement) reflect the IRS’s growing interest in the
transparency of potentially aggressive tax reporting. Likewise, ASC 740 requires analysis of
uncertain tax positions and reporting of unrecognized tax benefits in the tax footnote to the
financial statements (FASB 2009). Not only is the IRS concerned with aggressive tax behavior
of business entities, both financial accountants and auditors should be as well, given the
complexity and risk associated with tax accounts in a corporation’s financial statements.
Corporate tax aggressiveness14 research has examined characteristics of corporations that
engage in aggressive tax reporting behavior (Phillips 2003; Chen et al. 2010; Lisowsky 2010;
Robinson et al. 2010; Lanis and Richardson 2011; Armstrong et al. 2012; Rego and Wilson
2012). These studies have linked corporate characteristics to the outcomes of aggressive tax
behavior; however prior research has not examined the underlying individual judgment
component of corporate tax behavior. Entity-level measures of corporate tax aggressiveness (tax
shelter involvement, low effective tax rates, etc.) are a cumulative result of individual-level
decisions made by corporate tax decision makers. Individuals make tax decisions that determine

14

As discussed in more detail later, the present study uses tax aggressiveness as a relative term describing where a
tax position falls along the range of possible tax minimization. More aggressive tax positions have weaker
underlying facts and lack clear support by relevant tax authority (Cuccia et al. 1995; Roberts 1998).
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corporate tax aggressiveness, thus this study uses an experimental method to investigate the tax
aggressiveness of business entities through an examination of individual-level judgment and
behavior. The purpose of the study is to draw upon regulatory focus theory to examine how both
the individual disposition of the corporate tax decision maker15 and contextual factors of the tax
decision environment influence the tax aggressiveness of corporate tax decision makers.
Regulatory focus theory refers to the manner in which individuals pursue the goals that
they wish to achieve (Higgins 1997). Individuals with a promotion focus are motivated to
achieve goals by maximizing successful outcomes, and individuals with a prevention focus are
motivated to achieve goals by minimizing failed outcomes (Higgins 1997; Higgins et al. 2001).
Regulatory focus theory is consistent with the view that an individual’s trait16 regulatory focus, a
dispositional characteristic, may influence tax aggressiveness such that trait promotion-focused
individuals will make more aggressive tax decisions than trait prevention-focused individuals
(Higgins 1997).
Regulatory focus is exhibited as an individual trait; however, situational factors in the
decision environment can activate a regulatory focus state (i.e., promotion state or prevention
state) (Higgins 2000). This study also examines the influence of the framing of the external tax
advisor17 role (a situational factor) on an individual’s regulatory focus state,18 predicting that the
corporate tax decision maker’s perception of the external tax advisor’s function will influence

In this study, the term “corporate tax decision maker” is intended to represent individuals such as the CFO, tax
director, controller, tax senior manager, tax manager, or tax staff that make tax decisions inside the corporation.
16
This study defines “trait” as a distinguishing personal quality. A trait is considered to be a chronic, personal
characteristic.
17
The term “tax advisor” is used throughout this study to describe the individuals that are engaged to assist
taxpayers such as corporations with their tax work and is intended to encompass alternate terms such as external tax
professional, tax preparer, tax service provider, and tax consultant. Tax advisors are not employees of the
corporation; tax advisors are public accounting professionals.
18
This study defines “state” as a mode or condition of being. A state is considered to be inducible.
15
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the tax aggressiveness of decisions made on behalf of the corporation. Corporate management’s
view of the external tax advisor as an advocate (i.e., positive frame inducing promotion state) is
expected to increase the tax aggressiveness of tax decision makers within the business entity.19
Viewing the external tax advisor as an overseer (i.e., negative frame inducing prevention state) is
expected to decrease decision maker tax aggressiveness. This study applies regulatory fit theory
which suggests matching between the dispositional trait regulatory focus of the corporate tax
decision maker and external tax advisor role framing (i.e., induced regulatory focus state) may
amplify the effects of regulatory focus trait (promotion and prevention) on tax aggressiveness. A
mismatch between regulatory focus trait and the framing of the external tax advisor may allow
regulatory focus state to overshadow trait regulatory focus depending upon the relative strength
of both state and trait, providing a possible avenue to reduce the tax aggressiveness of corporate
tax decisions made by promotion-focused individuals (Lisjak et al. 2012).
To test the hypotheses, I conduct an experiment in which participant trait regulatory focus
is measured and regulatory focus state is manipulated through whether management views the
external tax advisor’s role as more of an advocate (i.e., inducing a promotion state) or an
overseer (i.e., inducing a prevention state). Study participants are recruited from graduate tax
courses at two public universities. Based upon the responses of 58 graduate students, results
suggest that tax advisor role may not directly affect decision maker tax aggressiveness as
hypothesized. However, tax advisor role does affect judgment indirectly through the decision
maker’s perception of the tax advisor’s client advocacy. Decision makers perceive a company’s
tax advisor to have significantly stronger client advocacy attitudes when management views the
When tax rules are ambiguous, an external tax advisor functioning as an “advocate” would seek to justify a tax
minimizing position whereas an “overseer” would be more likely to adhere to a more conservative position favoring
the taxing authority.
19
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tax advisor as an advocate, compared to when management views the tax advisor as an overseer.
Perceiving the tax advisor to be more of an advocate (i.e., a stronger promotion state) amplifies
the influence of regulatory fit for trait promotion-focused decision makers. Compared to
individuals with a lower trait promotion focus, tax decision makers with a greater trait promotion
focus react more strongly to a situationally induced promotion focus state.
The present study contributes to research on tax compliance and decision making and
also to the corporate tax avoidance/aggressiveness literature. Additionally, by examining the
framing of the external tax advisor, this study begins to unravel how a tax advisor’s dual role, as
both an advocate and an oversight check-point, may influence decision making within a business
entity (AICPA 2009). In particular, policy makers may be interested in how perceptions of
external tax advisors as advocates of tax compliance have policy implications for corporate tax
aggressiveness.
The following section of this research study contains a review of the relevant literature
and development of the hypotheses. The subsequent section describes the research method. The
third section presents results, and the final section draws conclusions.

Theory and Hypotheses
Corporate Tax Aggressiveness
The U. S. tax rules are comprised of various sources of authority, each of which may be
vague and contradictory. Navigating tax law requires an in-depth analysis, which must be
constrained to a specific set of facts in order to interpret the rules; however, the corporate tax
rules are complex and often ambiguous, which makes interpretation difficult (Slemrod 2007).
The complexity and ambiguity in the corporate tax environment can lead to various potential tax
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positions with differing levels of tax minimization (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Lisowsky 2010).
The present study considers tax aggressiveness to be a relative term describing where a tax
position falls along the range of possible tax minimization. More aggressive tax positions have
weaker underlying facts and lack clear support by relevant tax authority (Cuccia et al. 1995;
Roberts 1998). Several metrics have been used to evaluate corporate-level tax aggressiveness
(Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). One of the measures most commonly used in the tax literature is
the effective tax rate (ETR).20 Lower ETRs are associated with greater tax aggressiveness.
Several prior studies, primarily based upon archival data, have sought to identify
determinants of corporate tax aggressiveness. Most prior work links aggressive tax behavior to
firm-level characteristics. Tax shelter involvement and firm ownership structure are broad firmlevel characteristics that have been shown to be associated with tax aggressiveness (Lisowsky
2010; Chen et al. 2010). Additionally, incentive structures such as equity risk incentives, board
of director compensation, and tax director incentive-based compensation are also linked to more
aggressive tax reporting (Rego and Wilson 2012; Lanis and Richardson 2011; Armstrong et al.
2012; Phillips 2003). Robinson, Sikes, and Weaver (2010) analyze tax department structure,
another firm-level variable, and find evidence that profit centers (i.e., tax departments evaluated
by contribution to financial income) are associated with more aggressive behavior than cost
centers (i.e., tax departments evaluated on cost minimization). Additionally, Graham, Hanlon,
Shevlin, and Shroff (2014) survey corporate executives, finding that company reputational
concerns as well as the potential for negative financial statement effects may influence the
likelihood of engaging in tax planning. Together, these studies suggest a link between corporate

20

The effective tax rate is book tax expense divided by book income. The effective tax rate should not to be confused
with the statutory tax rate (from the tax rules), which is generally 35% for corporations.
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tax decision maker incentives and tax aggressiveness; however, little is understood about the
judgment of individuals making tax decisions on behalf of the corporation. The present study
draws upon regulatory focus theory to investigate individual-level decision making in the
corporate tax environment.

Regulatory Focus
The foundation of regulatory focus theory originates in Higgins’s (1997) examination of
approach-avoidance motivation. Higgins critically analyzes motivation, reasoning that there must
be a richer psychological explanation of the forces motivating individual goal pursuit than the
simplistic concept that individuals seek to procure pleasure and avoid pain (Higgins 1997;
Higgins et al. 2001). Rather, Higgins (1997) posits that individuals have two fundamentally
different strategic ways of pursuing their goals (i.e., different self-regulatory mindsets or foci):
promotion regulatory focus and prevention regulatory focus. Promotion focus reflects concern
with maximizing successful attempts and ensuring against errors of omission for advancement
purposes (Brockner and Higgins 2001; Crowe and Higgins 1997). Individuals with a promotion
focus pay attention to the presence or absence of positive outcomes (Higgins et al. 2001).
Prevention focus is characterized by attention to minimizing failed attempts and ensuring against
errors of commission for safety and security purposes (Brockner and Higgins 2001; Crowe and
Higgins 1997). Individuals with a prevention focus are concerned with the presence or absence
of negative outcomes (Higgins et al. 2001). As an example, suppose two individuals have the
same goal of advancing from supervisor to manager. If one has a promotion focus and the other a
prevention focus, they would adopt dissimilar approaches to reach this goal. The individual with
a promotion focus would likely display eagerness to learn more, attempting to achieve more
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success. The individual with a prevention focus may choose to adhere to the job description of
the desired manager position, attempting not to make any mistakes. A predisposition toward
either a promotion or prevention focus represents a trait that impacts an individual’s decisions.
When applied to a corporate tax setting, regulatory focus theory suggests that a corporate
tax decision maker’s regulatory focus may influence decision making. Promotion-focused
decision makers seek to maximize successful attempts and ensure against errors of omission (i.e.,
avoid missed opportunities) (Brockner and Higgins 2001; Crowe and Higgins 1997). Thus, in a
corporate tax setting, decision makers with a predisposition toward a promotion focus may
concentrate on maximizing tax opportunities, leading judgment to be more tax aggressive on
behalf of the corporation. Conversely, prevention-focused decision makers endeavor to minimize
failed attempts and ensure against errors of commission (i.e., avoid mistakes) (Brockner and
Higgins 2001; Crowe and Higgins 1997). Corporate tax decision makers with a predisposition
toward a prevention focus may concentrate on minimizing exposure in the event of tax authority
scrutiny, leading judgment to be less tax aggressive. Hypothesis 1 is stated formally as follows:
H1: Corporate tax decision makers will make more (less) aggressive tax compliance
decisions when they have a trait promotion (prevention) focus.
Prior literature has viewed regulatory focus as both an individual trait and a decisionmaking state (Higgins 2000; Lanaj et al. 2012; Lisjak et al. 2012). As noted above, regulatory
focus is an individual trait in that some individuals are generally more inclined to have a
promotion focus or a prevention focus (Higgins 2000). However, situational factors in the
decision task can activate either a promotion or prevention focus state (Higgins 2000). Indeed,
different tasks may trigger either a promotion or prevention focus state depending upon the type
of task (Van Dijk and Kluger 2011; Dimotakis et al. 2012). Prior research in persuasive
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communication and management has examined how inducible regulatory focus state may be
used to influence decision making and behavior (Zhu and Meyers-Levy 2007; Lanaj et al. 2012).
Once induced, a regulatory focus state leads individuals to interpret information via underlying
cognitive processes that are distinct for promotion focus versus prevention focus (Zhu and
Meyers-Levy 2007). A promotion focus leads individuals to make connections between
information items, clustering information into themes. Conversely, a prevention focus brings
about attention to specific items and salience of distinct features of each specific item of
information (Zhu and Meyers-Levy 2007).21
Though induced regulatory focus state has much the same effect on decision making as
individual regulatory focus trait, the state may not completely cloak the influence of the trait
(Lisjak et al. 2012). Rather, regulatory focus traits have persistent influence, creating interference
with induced regulatory focus state when induced state differs from an individual’s predominant
regulatory focus trait (Lisjak et al. 2012). Thus, the overall influence of regulatory focus may
depend upon both an individual’s trait regulatory focus and situationally-induced regulatory
focus state. Congruity between an individual’s trait regulatory focus and situationally induced
regulatory focus state leads to increased task engagement (Cesario et al. 2008). Incongruity
between trait regulatory focus and induced regulatory focus state increases cognitive demands
and negatively impacts performance (Lisjak et al. 2012).

21

Regulatory focus is distinct from risk propensity and risk perception. Risk propensity describes how individuals
respond to risk in general, whereas trait regulatory focus differentiates two ways in which individuals may approach
goal achievement, explaining individual differences in risk seeking propensity (Bryant and Dunford). The framing
of information through either a positive or negative goal frame induces situational regulatory focus state, affecting
risk perception. Promotion and prevention foci differentially affect an individual’s perception of omission risk and
commission risk (Bryant and Dunford 2008).
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Regulatory Fit
Regulatory focus theory relates to how an individual’s regulatory focus influences
motivation, decision making, and behavior. Regulatory fit theory extends regulatory focus
theory, positing that “fit” (i.e., alignment) between an individual’s promotion or prevention
regulatory focus and the way in which a goal is framed increases motivation in goal pursuit
(Higgins 2000; Higgins 2005). Goals may be framed as “ideal” goals (i.e., a positive frame) to
align with a promotion focus or as “ought” goals (i.e., a negative frame) to align with a
prevention focus (Shah et al. 1998; Higgins 2000). Comparison of oneself to one’s ideal goals
represents a positive goal frame as attention is directed at ensuring the presence of positive
outcomes in maximizing advancement to the “ideal” self. Conversely, comparing oneself to how
one ought to be is a negative goal frame as the individual seeks to minimize discrepancies with
the “ought” self (Higgins 2000). Regulatory fit occurs when a promotion-focused individual’s
task has a positive goal frame and when a prevention-focused individual’s task has a negative
goal frame (Higgins 2000; Higgins 2005). Regulatory fit between a decision maker’s regulatory
focus and goal framing may enhance the perceived value of the decision, improving goal
motivation, task engagement, and task performance (Shah et al. 1998; Higgins 2000). Figure 3
presents a conceptual model of regulatory fit, which was developed based upon Lanaj et al.
(2012).
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Figure 3: Conceptual Model of Regulatory Fit

Regulatory fit has been used in a tax setting to examine the effect of fit between taxpayer
regulatory focus and the framing of information campaigns on taxpayer compliance (Hollar et al.
2008; Leder et al. 2010). If the tax authority’s goal is to increase compliance, the tax authority
may attempt to do so either by emphasizing the benefits of high tax compliance (i.e., positive
goal frame) or warning against the detriments of low tax compliance (i.e., negative goal frame)
(Hollar et al. 2008). In either case the goal is to increase tax compliance; however, whether
positive or negative goal framing is more effective for a particular individual depends upon the
individual’s regulatory focus. Positive goal framing is more effective for individuals with a
promotion focus and negative goal framing is more effective for individuals with a prevention
focus (Hollar et al. 2008). The Hollar et al. (2008) study examined goal framing from the tax
authority’s perspective. The present study examines goal framing from the corporate tax decision
maker’s perspective.

52

Tax Professionals
A tax professional working inside a corporate tax department may be a certified public
accountant (CPA). A CPA has a dual role as both a client advocate and a regulatory entity. The
AICPA’s (2009) Statements on Standards for Tax Services state that tax professionals should act
as advocates22 on behalf of their clients. Tax professionals are also obligated to practice due
diligence with regards to the accuracy of client information presented to the IRS (AICPA 2009).
Thus, the potential for conflict exists between these two roles. Corporate tax decision makers
within a corporation (e.g., a corporate tax department) may be assisted by tax advisors external to
the corporation. External tax advisors are CPAs, and as such corporate management may view
the tax advisor role as an advocacy or oversight function. Management’s belief about the nature
of the external tax advisor’s role is predicted to influence corporate tax decision making such
that framing as an overseer (i.e., negative goal frame) is expected to be associated with less
aggressive tax behavior than framing as an advocate (i.e., positive goal frame).
H2: Corporate tax decision makers will make less (more) aggressive tax compliance
decisions when the external tax advisor is presented as an overseer (advocate).
The present study applies regulatory fit to the context of individual-level decision making
within the corporate tax environment. Regulatory fit theory indicates that a good “fit” between
the framing of the external tax advisor as an advocate (positive frame) or an overseer (negative
frame) and the regulatory focus of the corporate tax decision maker should result in increased
motivation for goal pursuit. In the corporate tax environment, complexity and ambiguity make
the corporate tax rules difficult to interpret (Slemrod 2007). Thus, the corporate tax environment

Mason and Levy (2001, 127) define client advocacy as “a state of mind in which one feels one’s primary loyalty
belongs to the taxpayer. It is exhibited by a desire to represent the taxpayer zealously within the bounds of the law,
and by a desire to be a fighter on behalf of the taxpayer.”
22

53

may provide few situational cues about the nature of the task to influence decision maker
regulatory focus state, and individual regulatory focus traits may dominate absent additional cues
from top management. However, the way in which management views the function of the
corporation’s external tax advisors may introduce situational cues, inducing a regulatory focus
state. Situationally-induced regulatory focus state and trait regulatory focus may together
determine the overall influence of regulatory focus on an individual’s judgment. Congruity
between an individual’s inherent trait regulatory focus and situationally induced regulatory focus
state is predicted to amplify the effect of trait regulatory focus on the tax aggressiveness of
individual judgment. Incongruity between trait regulatory focus and induced regulatory focus
state is expected to diminish the influence of trait regulatory focus on judgment. Stated formally:
H3: Congruence between trait regulatory focus and regulatory focus state will amplify
the effect of regulatory focus on the tax aggressiveness of corporate tax decision maker
judgment.

Research Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from graduate tax courses at two public universities using a
multi-contact method (Dillman et al. 2009). The study was first announced in class, after which
students received an email containing study information and a link to the study. Students also
received a reminder about the opportunity to participate in the study. Students who elected to
participate received extra credit in their graduate tax class. Fifty-eight graduate students
completed the experiment and are included in the analysis. The majority of the participants are
male (56.9 percent). Most participants are between 21-25 years old (63.8 percent), with others
54

age 26-30 (24.1 percent), age 31-35 (6.9 percent), and over age 35 (5.2 percent). The majority of
the participants indicate having experience in public accounting (58.6 percent); 34.5 percent
indicate public accounting experience specifically in tax. All participants have taken tax classes.
Most have taken one to two classes (67.2 percent), some have three to four tax classes (13.8
percent) and five or more tax classes (19.0 percent). Participants are asked about the preparation
of their most recent personal tax return. The majority prepared their own personal tax return
(63.8 percent). Others hired a paid preparer (20.7 percent), received assistance from a friend or
relative (12.1 percent), or did not need to file (3.4 percent). Table 9 presents demographic data.
Study 2 tables are presented in Appendix C.

Materials and Design
The experiment is computer-based and administered via Qualtrics software. Participants
are free to complete the study at their convenience; however, they are asked to work
independently and to complete the study in one sitting without outside interruptions. All
participants are first provided with a link to begin the study in a study recruitment email. The
opening screen of the Qualtrics study presents the explanation of research and the study
overview. Individuals that agree to participate proceed to the next screen to begin the study.
The experimental materials consist of five sections: background information and a tax
scenario about a hypothetical corporation (Sullivan-Reed Corp), select tax authority guidance
relevant to the tax scenario, a participant response section, demographics, and a final response
section measuring trait regulatory focus. See Figure 4 for a summary of the experimental
procedures.
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Background Information and Tax Scenario
(Manipulated Tax Advisor Role:
Advocate or Overseer)

Relevant Tax Authority

Measure Likelihood (DV), Perceived Client
Advocacy, IRS Permits, and Tax Risk
Preference

Demographics

Measure Trait Regulatory Focus

Figure 4: Diagram of Experimental Procedures

Participants are presented with background information for a hypothetical scenario in
which they are asked to assume the role of a tax department staff member employed by a
company named Sullivan-Reed Corp. The background information describes Sullivan-Reed Corp
(e.g., publicly traded manufacturing company, headquartered in the U.S., etc.) and the duties and
responsibilities of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s in-house tax department. Additionally, the materials
discuss external, third-party tax professionals hired by the company and their role in the
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company’s tax function. The materials note that research projects are often conducted in-house
and then reviewed by the external tax professionals. Each participant received one of two
possible variations of background information. The two variations differed only in the reason
why Sullivan-Reed Corp’s management hired the external tax professionals. Participants are told
that Sullivan-Reed’s CFO has stated that “the primary objective of hiring the external tax
professionals at Firm A” is either to “help Sullivan-Reed Corp find the most advantageous tax
opportunities” (advocate tax advisor role) or to “make sure Sullivan-Reed Corp follows the tax
rules” (overseer tax advisor role).
After reading through the background information, all participants receive the same tax
scenario. The tax scenario involves the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD) and
the eligibility of certain activities for the DPAD. Specifically, the scenario indicates that
Sullivan-Reed Corp has introduced a new product line consisting of hot cocoa sets containing
gourmet, prepackaged items artfully arranged in decorative mugs. Participants are assigned the
task of determining if the activities associated with assembling the hot cocoa product set line are
eligible for the DPAD. The tax scenario presented in this study is based upon actual court cases
on the eligibility of activities for the DPAD.23 Participants are provided with relevant portions of
tax authority (the Internal Revenue Code, Treasury Regulations, and court cases). The potential
classification of the hot cocoa set product line activities as eligible for the DPAD is a matter of
judgment as the treatment is not clearly resolved by the tax authority provided in the
experimental materials. Thus, participants need to evaluate the scenario facts and tax authority to
determine their opinion about the appropriate treatment for tax purposes.

23

United States v. Dean. 945 F. Supp 2d 1110 (U.S. District Court, C.D. Cal. May 7, 2013); Precision Dose, Inc. v.
United States, No. 3:12-cv-50180 (U.S. District Court, N.D. Ill.. September 24, 2015).

57

After reviewing the relevant tax authority, participants are asked “What is the likelihood
that you would recommend that Sullivan-Reed Corp include the hot cocoa set product line in the
Domestic Production Activities Deduction?” The instrument also includes an adapted measure of
client advocacy, a measure of tax risk preference, a manipulation check, and demographic
information. Following the demographics, the instrument collects a measure of trait regulatory
focus. Experimental materials are included as Appendix D.

Independent Variables
Tax Advisor Role
Tax Advisor Role is intended to induce a participant’s regulatory focus state by
manipulating the participant’s perception of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax advisors (via Perceived
Client Advocacy). Tax Advisor Role is manipulated within the background information that the
participants receive about the tax scenario. The materials state that the corporation has external
tax professionals from a Big 4 public accounting firm that prepare the corporate tax return and
that work done in-house (i.e., by the participant and other corporate tax decision makers) is sent
to them for review. The external tax advisor is either characterized as an Advocate or an
Overseer. Participants in the Advocate condition are informed that “the CFO of Sullivan-Reed
Corp states that ‘the primary objective of hiring the external tax professionals at Firm A is to
help Sullivan-Reed Corp find the most advantageous tax opportunities in achieving our 30
percent target effective tax rate.’ ” Participants in the Advocate condition also learn that the CFO
continues to use the firm’s tax services “primarily due to the Firm’s eagerness and
resourcefulness in seeking optimal tax outcomes.”
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Participants in the Overseer condition are informed that “the CFO of Sullivan-Reed Corp
states that ‘the primary objective of hiring the external tax professionals at Firm A is to make
sure Sullivan-Reed Corp follows the tax rules in achieving our 30 percent target effective tax
rate.’ ” Additionally in the Overseer condition, the materials state that the CFO continues to use
the firm’s tax services “primarily due to the Firm’s vigilance and attention to detail in
maintaining tax compliance.”
Trait Regulatory Focus
Trait Regulatory Focus is measured with an eighteen item scale developed by Lockwood
et al. (2002) to measure an individual’s chronic, trait-like regulatory focus.24 The measure is
comprised of two sub-scales, with nine items measuring promotion focus and nine items
measuring prevention focus. The promotion sub-scale items address individual hopes and
aspirations and the prevention items assess safety and responsibility (Lockwood et al 2002).
Each of the items uses a seven-point Likert-type scale with labeled points ranging from 1
“Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree.” Trait Regulatory Focus is a continuous measure
calculated as the sum of the promotion focus items, less the sum of the prevention focus items.
Cronbach’s alpha for the Trait Regulatory Focus scale is 0.765. Factor analysis indicates that,
although Eigenvalues exceed 1 for multiple factors, the scree plot reveals the 18 item measure
predominately captures two factors. Factor loadings suggest one factor consists primarily of
promotion items and the other is comprised primarily of prevention items.

24

Though regulatory focus may be situationally induced, trait regulatory focus is a stable trait with persistent
influence that creates interference with induced regulatory focus state (Lisjak et al. 2012).
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Additional Measures
Perceived Client Advocacy
A nine item scale is adapted from the Mason and Levy (2001) measure of client
advocacy. Cronbach’s alpha for the Perceived Client Advocacy scale is 0.788. Factor analysis
indicates that, although Eigenvalues exceed 1 for multiple factors, the scree plot reveals that the
nine item measure predominately captures a single factor. Both the instructions for the scale and
the scale items have been modified for use in this study. Similar to Stephenson (2007), the
instructions are modified so participants are asked to answer the questions as they think SullivanReed Corp’s external tax advisors would respond. The original Mason and Levy (2001) items are
worded to measure an individual’s client advocacy attitude; however, the Perceived Client
Advocacy items are rephrased so that each item measures participants’ perceptions of how a
corporation’s external tax advisors would respond. Perceived Client Advocacy is expected to
help explain how presentation of the external tax advisor as an advocate or an overseer may
influence the tax aggressiveness of corporate tax decision maker judgment.
Manipulating the tax advisor role as either an advocate or an overseer should create a
promotion or prevention regulatory focus state, and it should do this by affecting participants’
perceptions of the client advocacy attitudes of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax advisors (i.e., Perceived
Client Advocacy). Thus, Perceived Client Advocacy is intended to be a situational factor in the
corporate tax environment in which the participant is making his or her judgment. The
perception of the tax advisor’s client advocacy attitudes is expected to situationally induce a
regulatory focus state. An “advocate” tax advisor role should lead to the perception that the tax
advisor has strong client advocacy, a situational factor expected to induce a promotion focus
state. An “overseer” tax advisor role should lead to the perception that the tax advisor has weak
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client advocacy, inducing a prevention focus state. Perceived Client Advocacy is thus expected
to mediate the effect of Tax Advisor Role on the dependent variable, Likelihood.
IRS Permits
IRS Permits is a measure of the perceived likelihood that the IRS will permit the position
evaluated in the tax scenario. IRS Permits is measured by asking participants, “In your opinion,
if this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS would uphold the
position that Sullivan Reed Corp’s hot cocoa set product line qualifies for the Domestic
Production Activities Deduction?” IRS Permits is measured on an eleven-point scale with
labeled points ranging from 0% “Not At All Likely” to 100% “Extremely Likely.” IRS Permits is
presented as a percentage. Lower perceived likelihood that the IRS would permit the tax position
of including the expenses represents greater perceived riskiness of the tax position. IRS Permits
is expected to covary with the dependent variable, Likelihood.
Tax Risk Preference
Tax Risk Preference is a measure of how certain an individual would want to be of his or
her tax position. Tax Risk Preference is measured by asking, “as Sullivan-Reed’s tax department
staff, how certain would you want to be of your tax position before including the hot cocoa set
product line in the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?” The level of certainty is obtained
using an eleven-point scale ranging from 0% “Not At All Certain” to 100% “Extremely Certain.”
Tax Risk Preference is presented as a percentage. An individual desiring a higher degree of
certainty is considered to have a lower tax risk preference. Responses are reverse coded so that a
greater score reflects preference for greater tax risk. Personal Tax Risk Preference is measured as
a possible control variable.
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Dependent Variable
The tax aggressiveness of decision maker judgment is operationalized as the participant’s
likelihood of taking an aggressive tax position (Likelihood). The aggressive tax position is the
determination of certain activities (described in the tax scenario) as eligible for the Domestic
Production Activities Deduction (DPAD). The authoritative guidance provided in the
experimental materials is ambiguous as to the appropriate tax treatment of the activities for the
DPAD. Considering the activities to be eligible for the DPAD would be advantageous for tax
purposes. Thus, a greater likelihood of including the activities in the DPAD reflects greater tax
aggressiveness. Likelihood is measured by asking, “What is the likelihood that you would
recommend that Sullivan-Reed Corp include the hot cocoa set product line in the Domestic
Production Activities Deduction?” Likelihood is measured using an eleven-point scale with
labeled points ranging from 0% “Not At All Likely” to 100% “Extremely Likely.” Likelihood is
presented as a percentage. Greater likelihood of including the expenses represents greater tax
aggressiveness.

Results
Manipulation Check
The manipulation of tax advisor role is presented in the background information, which is
provided to the participants before they read the tax scenario. The manipulation check is
conducted later in the experimental materials to provide assurance that the participants are aware
of facts vital to the successful manipulation of the variable. To verify the manipulation of tax
advisor role, participants are asked, “Based upon the tax scenario, which of the following more
accurately describes the primary function of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s external tax professionals at
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Firm A?” Participants are asked to specify whether the primary function is either to “find the
most advantageous tax opportunities for Sullivan-Reed Corp” or to “make sure Sullivan-Reed
Corp follows the tax rules.” Participants had to pass the manipulation check question to be
included in the study. A total of 58 participants are included in the study.25

Descriptive Statistics
Table 10 presents descriptive statistics by Tax Advisor Role for the dependent variable
Likelihood, the continuous predictor variable Trait Regulatory Focus, the possible mediator
Perceived Client Advocacy, and the possible covariates IRS Permits and Tax Risk Preference.
Participants in the Advocate condition report a mean (standard deviation) Likelihood of 57.81
percent (31.90), which is greater than the Likelihood of participants in the Overseer condition
mean (standard deviation) of 50.77 percent (31.74); however, the difference is not significant (p
= 0.406). Trait Regulatory Focus has a mean (standard deviation) of 14.28 (11.63) in the
Advocate condition and 17.00 (9.59) in the Overseer condition, a difference which is not
significantly different. Though the Trait Regulatory Focus measure could theoretically range
from -56 to + 56, Trait Regulatory Focus for participants in the sample was predominately
positive, having an overall mean (standard deviation) of 15.50 (10.76) and ranging from -10 to
+38, indicating that few participants had a prevention trait. As expected, Perceived Client
Advocacy is significantly greater in the Advocate condition than in the Overseer Condition with
mean (standard deviation) of 43.13 (8.79) and 37.73 (5.69), respectively (p = 0.007). Neither IRS

25

83 participants completed the experimental materials. 25 participants failed the manipulation check question and
are excluded from the analysis.
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Permits nor Tax Risk Preference differs significantly between the Advocate and Overseer
conditions.

Tests of Hypotheses
Correlation coefficients are presented in Table 11. Significant correlations exist between
Tax Advisor Role and Perceived Client Advocacy, as well as between the dependent variable
Likelihood and the covariate IRS Permits. Due to the presence of a continuous predictor
variable, Trait Regulatory Focus, hypotheses are tested using regression. Table 12 reports the
preliminary regression results with Likelihood as the dependent variable. The regression model
is statistically significant at p < 0.000, with an adjusted R2 of 0.278. However, the regression
model does not find support for study hypotheses as none of the variables in the model are
statistically significant, with the exception of the covariate, IRS Permits, at p < 0.000. Although
the study hypotheses do not include the mediator Perceived Client Advocacy, the Tax Advisor
Role manipulation is designed to induce a regulatory focus state by influencing a participant’s
perception of the tax advisor’s client advocacy (i.e., Perceived Client Advocacy). Perceived
Client Advocacy may help explain how presentation of the external tax advisor as an advocate or
an overseer influences the tax aggressiveness of corporate tax decision maker judgment. Thus,
additional analysis incorporates mediation analysis of Perceived Client Advocacy into the model.

Supplemental Analysis
The mediation model is tested using the SPSS PROCESS script (Hayes 2013). Variables
in the model include the dependent variable Likelihood, a manipulated binary independent
variable Tax Advisor Role, a continuous predictor variable Trait Regulatory Focus, the mediator
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Perceived Client Advocacy, and a covariate IRS Permits. The mediation model is presented in
Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Mediation Model
Notes: Tax Advisor Role is the causal variable [X], Perceived Client Advocacy is the mediator
[Mj], and Likelihood is the outcome [Y]. a, b1j, b2, b3j, and c’ are the regression coefficients in
the estimation models of Perceived Client Advocacy and Likelihood; and eMj and eY are errors in
the estimates of Perceived Client Advocacy and Likelihood, respectively. The indirect effect of
Tax Advisor Role on Likelihood through Perceived Client Advocacy is ab1j. The direct effect of
Tax Advisor Role on Likelihood after considering ab is c’. The figure is modified from Hayes
(2013, 450) by insertion of variable names into the model.
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Table 13 shows the results of the mediation analysis. The analysis includes two
regressions and a test of the indirect effect of the manipulated variable on the dependent variable.
Panel A presents the first regression, which shows that Tax Advisor Role is significantly related
to the mediator Perceived Client Advocacy (p = 0.009) with R2 = 0.115. Panel B presents the
second regression, which shows that Likelihood is a function of IRS Permits and is significantly
related to Trait Regulatory Focus (p = 0.039) and the interaction of Perceived Client Advocacy
and Trait Regulatory Focus (p = 0.013) with R2 = 0.413. The indirect effect of Tax Advisor Role
on Likelihood, presented in Panel C, is significant (p < 0.05) at Trait Regulatory Focus values of
15.5000 (mean) and 26.2593 (mean plus one standard deviation) based on a 95 percent
bootstrapped confidence interval using 1,000 iterations. Additionally, Panel D presents the index
of moderated mediation; the moderation of the indirect effect of Tax Advisor Role on Likelihood
by Trait Regulatory Focus is significant (p < 0.05) based on a 95 percent bootstrapped
confidence interval using 1,000 iterations.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that corporate tax decision makers will make more (less)
aggressive tax compliance decisions when they have a trait promotion (prevention) focus. Trait
Regulatory Focus is significant in Panel B of the mediation model; however, since there is a
significant interaction between Trait Regulatory Focus and Perceived Client Advocacy, the
interpretation of this coefficient is unclear. Hypothesis 2 predicts that corporate tax decision
makers will make less (more) aggressive tax compliance decisions when the external tax advisor
is presented as an overseer (advocate). Although not formally hypothesized, Perceived Client
Advocacy may theoretically mediate the effect of Tax Advisor Role on the dependent variable,
Likelihood. Presenting the external tax advisor as an overseer is expected to induce a prevention
regulatory focus state. Presenting the external tax advisor as an advocate is expected to induce a
67

promotion regulatory focus state. Tax Advisor Role is an indicator variable equal to 0 in the
Overseer condition and equal to 1 in the Advocate condition. As indicated in Panel D of Table
13, the indirect effect of Tax Advisor Role on Likelihood is significant with a positive
coefficient.
The final hypothesis predicts an interaction between trait regulatory focus and regulatory
focus state (induced by tax advisor role: overseer or advocate). Specifically, Hypothesis 3 states
that congruence between trait regulatory focus and regulatory focus state will amplify the effect
of regulatory focus on the tax aggressiveness of corporate tax decision maker judgment.
Although Perceived Client Advocacy was not included in study hypotheses, Perceived Client
Advocacy may essentially function as a measure of regulatory focus state, theoretically
mediating the effect of Tax Advisor Role and interacting with Trait Regulatory Focus to
influence the dependent variable, Likelihood. Table 13 Panel A indicates a significant positive
relationship between Tax Advisor Role and Perceived Client Advocacy and Panel B shows that
the interaction of Perceived Client Advocacy Role and Trait Regulatory Focus has a significant
positive effect on the dependent variable Likelihood. Thus, Tax Advisor Role and Trait
Regulatory focus interact through the mediator, Perceived Client Advocacy, to influence
Likelihood. As indicated in Panel C of Table 13, the indirect effect of Tax Advisor Role on
Likelihood is significant with a positive coefficient at higher values of Trait Regulatory Focus.
Figure 6 presents the nature of the interaction’s effect on Likelihood using a median split for the
continuous variables Perceived Client Advocacy and Trait Regulatory Focus. Given that Trait
Regulatory Focus is predominately positive (i.e., most participants had a promotion focus) in the
study sample, this finding provides partial support for H3.
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Figure 6: Presentation of Continuous Predictor Variables Split upon Median Values: Effect of
Perceived Client Advocacy (Induced Regulatory Focus State) and Trait Regulatory Focus on
Dependent Variable Likelihood
Conclusion
This study examines the underlying individual judgment component of corporate tax
aggressiveness. The study draws upon regulatory focus theory to explore how individual-level
judgment may be influenced both by individual trait regulatory focus and also by regulatory
focus state (via situational cues in the corporate tax environment). Regulatory focus theory
involves an individual’s manner of goal pursuit (i.e., the lens through which an individual views
goals and the means to obtain them). Thus the theory may be particularly relevant in the
corporate tax setting as differing regulatory foci may influence a tax decision maker’s judgment
in the application of ambiguous tax authority to complex corporate tax scenarios.
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The study predicts that trait regulatory focus and regulatory focus state influence the tax
aggressiveness of individual-level judgment. Specifically, a promotion focus is predicted to lead
to greater tax aggressiveness than a prevention focus. The study also investigates the “fit”
between trait and regulatory focus state. Dependent on “fit,” regulatory focus state is predicted to
amplify or mitigate the influence of trait regulatory focus (e.g., management’s presentation of the
external tax advisor as an overseer (prevention state) is expected to counter the tax
aggressiveness of trait promotion-focused corporate tax decision makers). Study findings do not
support these hypotheses; however, supplemental analysis suggests that perceived client
advocacy (i.e., the degree to which the decision maker perceives the tax advisor to be a client
advocate) mediates the influence of tax advisor role on decision maker judgment. Although tax
advisor role may not directly affect decision maker tax aggressiveness, tax advisor role does
affect judgment indirectly through the decision maker’s perception of the tax advisor’s client
advocacy. Decision makers perceive a company’s tax advisor to have significantly stronger
client advocacy when management views the tax advisor as more of an advocate than when
management views the tax advisor as an overseer. Furthermore, perceiving the tax advisor to be
more of an advocate (i.e., a stronger promotion state) amplifies the influence of regulatory fit for
trait promotion-focused decision makers. Compared to individuals with a lower trait promotion
focus, tax decision makers with a greater trait promotion focus react more strongly to
situationally induced promotion focus state. This finding suggests that promotion-focused
individuals may be particularly susceptible to the influence of situational factors in what should
be an unbiased evaluation of tax positions.
Interpretation of results is subject to the following limitations. First, it is possible that the
nature of the tax task influenced the regulatory state of study participants. Participants were
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provided with tax authority and asked to determine if certain activities described in the tax
scenario were eligible for a deduction. The task of determining if the company was allowed to
take the deduction based upon guidance in the tax authority may have activated a prevention
focus state, lessening the influence of the manipulated tax advisor role on regulatory focus state.
However, to the extent this was the case, it would have diluted the manipulation, biasing the
study against finding differences in the tax aggressiveness of decision maker judgment in
promotion focus and prevention focus states. Another possible limitation is that study
participants were graduate tax students rather than practitioners. Though they were not currently
corporate tax professionals, many had experience in public accounting. Additionally, the
experimental task involved forming a preliminary recommendation as a tax department staff and
was designed to be appropriate for graduate student participants that may be similarly employed
in the near future.
Given the importance of judgment in the corporate tax setting, decision makers should be
made aware of how situational factors such as management’s views may influence underlying
interpretation in the evaluation of tax positions. Perhaps a constructive approach would be to
structure tasks as neutrally as possible to reduce bias (i.e., unmeasured tax risk) so tax decisions
may be made based upon an objective interpretation of tax authority, particularly regarding stafflevel corporate tax decision makers. Thus, when staff work is later reviewed, tax risk preferences
may be consciously applied by a more senior tax decision maker within the company.
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STUDY THREE: SELF-OTHER AND MULTI-AGENT DECISION MAKING IN
TAXATION
Introduction
Accounting decisions are often made based upon input from multiple decision makers.
Corporations and other business entities typically employ groups or teams of individuals to make
accounting decisions. With respect to tax in particular, prior experimental studies have primarily
examined these decisions from the perspective of individual decision makers, neglecting the
potential influence of group decision making. Additionally, many tax decisions in practice are
made on behalf of others (e.g., employees within corporate tax departments making tax decisions
on behalf of the corporation). Most experimental studies that examine taxpayer decision making
and compliance focus on how individual taxpayers make their own compliance decisions. Few
studies have examined how the target of the decision (the decision maker or another entity)
influences compliance. The purpose of this study is to extend research on tax decision making to
the corporate tax setting by examining the effects of decision maker type (individual versus
group) and decision target (making a decision for oneself versus making a decision on behalf of
others) on a decision maker’s tax compliance behavior.
The study draws upon diffusion of responsibility theory, which suggests that the presence
of the group in group decisions diffuses felt responsibility between group members (Dion et al.
1970). Decreased felt responsibility in group decisions leads groups to make riskier decisions
than when decisions are made individually (Mathes and Kahn 1975). As such, this study predicts
that tax compliance decisions made in a group will be riskier than tax compliance decisions
made individually. The study also relies upon construal level theory and social value theory to
investigate the effects of self-other decision making. Construal level theory posits that increased
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social distance between oneself and others influences how decision makers evaluate and interpret
information (Trope et al. 2007; Trope and Liberman 2010). Increased social distance between
oneself (a more concrete construal) and others (a more abstract construal) affects how decisions
are made differently on behalf of others (Pronin and Ross 2006; Pronin et al. 2008). Decision
makers are less loss averse when deciding for others than for themselves (Beisswanger et al.
2003; Polman 2012b). Reduced loss aversion may lead to more objective decision making on
behalf of others, the effect of which may depend upon prevailing social values. Social value
theory is used to interpret the way in which decision riskiness differs for oneself versus on behalf
of others. Social values affect risk taking in groups more than in individual decisions (Stone and
Allgaier 2008). Thus, the study predicts that the influence of self-other decision making on tax
compliance decision riskiness depends upon whether decisions are made individually or in a
group. Tax compliance decisions made individually are predicted to be riskier for oneself than
for others. Tax compliance decisions made in a group are predicted to be riskier for others than
for oneself.
A lab experiment is used to investigate how decision maker and decision target influence
the riskiness of tax compliance decisions. Fifty-one undergraduate accounting students are
endowed with income and asked to make a reporting decision. The type of decision maker is
manipulated in the task by having participants make the reporting decision either individually or
in a group. The target of the decision is manipulated by having the outcome of the decision affect
the cash payout of either the decision maker or an entity other than the decision maker. The
amount of income decision makers choose to report corresponds to the riskiness of their tax
compliance decisions. Reporting less income (i.e., a higher unreported income) indicates a riskier
decision. Contrary to predictions, findings suggest that decision maker type does not directly
76

influence the riskiness of tax compliance decisions; however, decision maker type does affect
riskiness indirectly through feelings of responsibility for possible outcomes of the decision.
Feelings of personal responsibility are significantly lower for group members than for individual
decision makers. Feeling less personally responsible is associated with riskier tax compliance,
suggesting that decision maker type influences decision riskiness through feelings of
responsibility.
The study contributes to the sparse literature on decision making within the corporate tax
environment by examining factors that differ between the individual and corporate tax decision
making contexts. Hanlon and Heitzman (2010, p. 145) note that little is known about who is
making corporate tax decisions and how these decisions are made, mentioning that “tax
avoidance may be highly idiosyncratic and determined by a number of factors and interactions,
not all of which can be measured.” This complexity combined with the fact that most
experimental tax compliance research to date looks only at individual (rather than corporate)
taxpayer decision making suggests a need for investigating decision making in a corporate tax
setting. The present study is one of the first to examine both tax decision making by oneself
versus with others and decision making for oneself versus for others. Additionally, this study
contributes to tax policy by showing how individual and corporate taxpayer decisions may differ.
The following section of this research study contains a review of the relevant literature
and development of the hypotheses. The subsequent section describes the research method. The
third section presents results, and the final section draws conclusions.
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Theory and Hypotheses
Group Decision Making and the Diffusion of Responsibility
Diffusion of responsibility theory suggests increasing the number of decision makers
involved in a decision decreases the responsibility felt by each, reducing fear of failure and
leading groups to make riskier decisions than individual decision makers (Dion et al. 1970). The
concept of responsibility diffusion stems from bystander intervention research examining how
group size affects observers’ behavior in emergency situations (Darley and Latane 1968). The
presence of multiple observers reduces each observer’s felt responsibility and lengthens the
response time of observers who decide to help someone in need of emergency assistance (Darley
and Latane 1968). The effect of a group on felt responsibility persists in virtual environments and
in computer-mediated communication such as emails addressed to a group (Markey 2000; Blair
et al. 2005). When others are perceived as available to help, an observer feels less responsibility
to help (Fleishman 1980). Diffusion of responsibility theory incorporates the concept of felt
responsibility from the bystander intervention literature and focuses on the influence of groups
on risk preferences in judgment and decision making (Mathes and Kahn 1975).
Differing levels of felt responsibility between individual decision makers and group
members may be motivated by blame avoidance (Mynatt and Sherman 1975). An attribution
effect has been observed in which self-attribution of responsibility decreases when the outcome
of a group decision is unfavorable (Mynatt and Sherman 1975). Additionally, group size
influences perceptions of how responsibility should be assigned to group members (Teigen and
Brun 2011). Compared to a sole individual decision maker, assessed responsibility is lower for
each member of a group regardless of group size; however, as group size increases, total
assigned responsibility exceeds 100 percent, suggesting that group size distorts perceptions of
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responsibility (Teigen and Brun 2011). Decision makers may be concerned with how responsible
they are perceived to be if an unfavorable outcome can be linked back to the decision.
Concern with external responsibility assessments may influence decision maker risk
preferences. Decision makers in a group are less risk averse (i.e., they have a greater risk
preference) (Brunette et al. 2015). Group decision makers may be willing to make riskier
decisions than individual decision makers because some of the blame from an unfavorable
outcome may be deflected to other group members involved in the decision. Congruence with
perceived norms for risky decision making may also influence riskiness. Group decisions are
more risky when widely-held values are perceived to favor risk and group members consider
themselves to be riskier than the average decision maker (Stoner 1968). Though most prior
research finds groups to make riskier decisions than individuals, group decisions may actually be
less risky (than individual decisions) when widely-held values are perceived to favor caution and
group members consider themselves to be relatively more cautious (Stoner 1968).
In a tax setting, prior research suggests that individual taxpayers are generally more
compliant than they should be based upon economic models of rational behavior (Alm and
Torgler 2011). However, prior research has not examined tax compliance decision making in a
corporate tax setting, namely how group decision making might affect corporate tax decision
makers. Carnes et al. (1996) examine tax professional decision making and find evidence of a
group polarization effect, a finding consistent with the Stoner (1968) study. Ambiguous tax
scenarios that were rated independently by tax advisors as client-favorable were rated as even
more favorable after a group discussion, and client-unfavorable ambiguous scenarios were rated
as even more unfavorable after group discussion (Carnes et al. 1996). The Carnes et al. (1996)
study investigates the influence of group decision making; however, the study does not examine
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tax compliance decisions made by taxpayers in a group setting as in the present study. The
present study makes the following prediction about the influence of decision maker type on the
riskiness of tax compliance decisions:
H1: Decision makers will make riskier tax compliance decisions when decisions are
made in a group than when decisions are made individually.

Self-Other Decision Making
Prior research suggests that decision riskiness may also differ for decisions made for
oneself versus made on behalf of others. On the surface, the effect of self-other decision making
does not appear to be consistent across prior studies. In some studies decisions for self are riskier
than decisions on behalf of others (McCauley et al. 1971; Teger and Kogan 1975; FernandezDuque and Wifall 2007); however, studies have also found that decisions on behalf of others are
riskier (Beisswanger et al. 2003; Wray and Stone 2005). Additionally, Stone et al. (2002) found
no evidence of a self-other effect. The present study draws upon construal level theory and social
value theory to disentangle the effects of self-other decision making.
Construal level theory is a broad theory about how individuals think about events and
entities across four dimensions of psychological distance (temporal, spatial, social, and
hypotheticality) in comparison to their own egocentric view (Trope and Liberman 2010). As
psychological distances increases, an individual thinks about events/entities at a more abstract
level, which influences how an individual evaluates and interprets information as well as
individual decision making and behavior (Trope et al. 2007; Trope and Liberman 2010).
Increasing distance in any of the four dimensions increases psychological distance, moving the
construal level from more concrete to more abstract (Trope and Liberman 2010). In particular,
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the social dimension of psychological distance pertains to self-other decision making examined
in the proposed study. See Weisner (2015) for a review of construal level theory literature
pertaining to the accounting domain.
Psychological distance is greater for “other” than for “self” (Pronin and Ross 2006;
Pronin et al. 2008). Increasing psychological distance through an increase in social distance
between oneself and others increases the construal’s level of abstraction in mental accounting:
“self” is more concrete and “other” is more abstract (Hsee and Weber 1997; Polman 2012a).
Construal level affects loss aversion26 such that decision makers are less loss averse when
deciding for others (i.e., more abstract construal) than when deciding for themselves (i.e., more
concrete construal) (Beisswanger et al. 2003; Polman 2012b). Thus, reduced loss aversion for
“other” decisions may lead decisions on behalf of others to be less susceptible to this cognitive
bias than decisions for oneself; however, the effect on risk preference (whether or not risk
preference is greater for others than for oneself) may depend upon prevailing social values 27
(Stone and Allgaier 2008). Indeed, social values for risk influence decisions on behalf of others
more than decisions for oneself (Stone and Allgaier 2008). When risk taking is valued, a decision
is more risky on behalf of others than for oneself, but when risk aversion is valued, a decision is
less risky on behalf of others than for oneself (Stone et al. 2013).
Social values may influence decisions differently in the individual and corporate tax
settings. Cohen et al. (2013) manipulated whether the prevailing social norm was for a more
aggressive (i.e., more risky) or conservative (i.e., less risky) tax treatment and examined taxpayer

26

Loss aversion is the tendency of decision makers to weight possible losses more heavily than equivalent possible
gains, preferring to avoid losses more than to acquire gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1984).
27
This study considers social values to be beliefs about what people would deem to be desirable. Social values
influence social norms for behavior (Stone and Allgaier 2008).
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decision making for self versus on behalf of a group containing self and others. When the social
norm was for aggressive tax treatment, a tax decision maker was more aggressive on behalf of
others than for self (Cohen et al. 2013). Similarly, Brink and White (2014) also examine taxpayer
decision making for oneself versus on behalf of a group containing self and another individual,
finding that taxpayers in an individual decision-making setting are less likely to evade taxes on
behalf of a group containing themselves than when making the evasion decision for only
themselves. The present study targets not only individual self-other decision making, as in the
Cohen et al. (2013) and Brink and White (2014) studies, but also group self-other decision
making.
Few studies have examined both the effect of the decision maker (individual or group)
and self-other decision making in a single study. Wallach et al. (1964) investigate some of the
possible configurations of individual/group and self-other decision making through examination
of choice shift. Choice shift is measured by the difference in a decision maker’s risk taking in
one condition compared to that same decision maker’s risk taking in a different condition. An
increase in risk taking between conditions is termed a risky shift and a decrease in risk taking
between conditions is termed a conservative shift (Wallach et al. 1964). Wallach et al. (1964)
find that compared to an individual decision on behalf of oneself, an individual decision on
behalf of others displayed a conservative shift and group decisions on behalf of self or others
displayed a risky shift. Similarly, Zaleska and Kogan (1971) also examine choice shift and find a
conservative shift for decisions made individually on behalf of others and a risky shift for group
decisions on behalf of self or others. Group decisions on behalf of the decision making group
(i.e., self) had a stronger risky shift than group decisions on behalf of another group (i.e., others)
(Zaleska and Kogan 1971). These studies suggest that the influence of self-other decision making
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on decision riskiness may differ when the decision maker is an individual or a group; however,
research to date has not examined both of these components in a single tax compliance setting.
Tax law may be more complex and ambiguous in the corporate tax setting (Slemrod
2007; Barney et al. 2012). When faced with ambiguous tax law, a corporate tax decision-making
group may substitute the group consensus in place of undeterminable widely-held social values
(i.e., group think effect). Indeed, this polarization effect is evident in the Carnes et al. (1996)
study in which tax professionals made decisions individually on behalf of hypothetical others.
The present study predicts that decision riskiness differs when tax compliance decisions are
made for oneself than when decisions are made on behalf of others; however, the direction of the
difference (more or less risky) depends upon whether the decisions are made individually or in a
group. Stated formally:
H2a: When tax compliance decisions are made individually, decisions made for oneself
will be riskier than decisions made on behalf of others.
H2b: When tax compliance decisions are made in a group, decisions made on behalf of
others will be riskier than decisions made for oneself.

Research Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from an undergraduate tax class at a public university using a
multi-contact method (Dillman et al. 2009). The lab experiment was conducted on campus in a
behavioral laboratory to maintain a controlled experimental environment; thus, students who
elected to participate were required to do so in person during one of several offered sessions. The
study was first announced in class, after which students received an email containing study
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information and a link to register for a study session. Students also received a reminder about the
opportunity to participate in the study. Students who elected to participate received extra credit
in their undergraduate course. In addition to receiving extra credit, participants were eligible to
receive a cash payout based upon their decisions in the lab experiment task. Cash payouts ranged
from $0 to $12.50 in US dollars with an average cash payout of $6.31.
Fifty-one undergraduate students completed the experiment and are included in the
analysis. The majority of the participants are female (56.9 percent). Most participants are
between 21-25 years old (64.7 percent), with others age 18-20 (13.7 percent), age 26-30 (9.8
percent), age 31-35 (3.9 percent), and over age 35 (5.9 percent). One participant elected not to
provide age. Some of the participants have experience in public accounting (13.7 percent);
however, most of the participants do not yet have experience in public accounting (86.3 percent).
The majority of participants intend to take the CPA exam in the future (88.2 percent). Most
participants have taken one to two tax classes (98.0 percent). The majority of participants
prepared their most recent personal tax return (51.0 percent). Others hired a paid preparer (23.6
percent), received assistance from a friend or relative (11.7 percent), or did not need to file (13.7
percent). Table 14 presents demographic data. Study 3 tables are presented in Appendix E.

Materials and Design
The design of the experimental task is inspired by the Allingham and Sandmo (1972)
model of income tax evasion.28 The income tax evasion model is structured as a tax system in
which reported income is subject to a tax rate, unreported income is subject to a penalty in

Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model a tax compliance decision as E[𝑈] = (1−𝑝) 𝑈(Y) + 𝑝 𝑈(Z), where E[𝑈] is
the expected utility of the reported income for a probability 𝑝 that the report will be inspected. Y represents post-tax
income if not inspected and Z represents post-tax income if inspected.
28
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addition to the regular tax rate, and only a percentage of reports are examined by the taxing
authority (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). The income tax evasion model suggests that a
taxpayer should maximize expected utility, which is a taxpayer’s optimal amount of reported
income based upon personal risk preferences and risk aversion under uncertainty, given a fixed
tax rate, penalty rate, and probability of examination (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). In the
present study, the experimental task involves endowing participants with Francs and asking them
to decide how much to report. The Allingham and Sandmo (1972) income tax evasion model was
used to select values for tax rate, penalty rate, and probability of examination that would result in
equal expected value29 calculations for all levels of reported/unreported income in the
experimental task. Thus, participants’ decisions about how much income to report should not be
driven by differences in the expected value of the income reporting options. Instead, reported
income should be linked to risk preference via changes in the range in possible post-tax net
income (i.e., a mean-preserving spread): the maximum possible post-tax net income (report not
selected for inspection) and the minimum possible post-tax net income (report selected for
inspection). The range in possible post-tax net income increases as unreported income increases;
thus, the risk taking in the tax compliance decision increases as unreported income increases.
Figure 7 presents calculations of the expected value and range of possible post-tax net income
for the reported income options.
The computer-based experiment is administered with Qualtrics software in the controlled
environment of a behavioral laboratory. The experimental procedure consists of six sections: task

29

Expected value is the optimal amount of taxable income to report to a taxing authority as calculated
mathematically based upon the probability of inspection given a fixed tax rate and penalty rate. Expected value is
the same for all decision makers. Expected utility incorporates personal risk preferences and risk aversion under
uncertainty and other items that may be included in a decision maker’s utility function such as ethical values and
social norms, in addition to expected value. Thus, expected utility theoretically differs among decision makers.
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instructions, income reporting task, covariate questionnaire, notification of inspection,
demographic questionnaire, and participant payouts. See Figure 8 for a diagram of the
experimental procedure. Complete experimental materials are presented in Appendix F.
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Reported Income
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Calculation of Expected Value:
Taxes
Penalties
Income if Inspected
Income if Not Inspected
Expected Value

5,000
0
5,000
5,000
5,000

4,500
1,000
4,500
5,500
5,000

4,000
2,000
4,000
6,000
5,000

3,500
3,000
3,500
6,500
5,000

3,000
4,000
3,000
7,000
5,000

2,500
5,000
2,500
7,500
5,000

2,000
6,000
2,000
8,000
5,000

1,500
7,000
1,500
8,500
5,000

1,000
8,000
1,000
9,000
5,000

500
9,000
500
9,500
5,000

0
10,000
0
10,000
5,000

Calculation of Range of
Possible Net Income:
Maximum Possible Net Income
Minimum Possible Net Income
Range of Possible Net Income

5,000
5,000
0

5,500
4,500
1,000

6,000
4,000
2,000

6,500
3,500
3,000

7,000
3,000
4,000

7,500
2,500
5,000

8,000
2,000
6,000

8,500
1,500
7,000

9,000
1,000
8,000

9,500
500
9,000

10,000
0
10,000

Taxes = Reported Income x Tax Rate;
Penalties = Unreported Income x Penalty Rate;
Income if Inspected = Reported Income – Taxes – Penalties;
Income if Not Inspected = Reported Income – Taxes;
Expected Value = (Income if Inspected x Inspection Probability) + (Income if Not Inspected x (1 – Inspection Probability));
Maximum Possible Net Income = Income if Not Inspected;
Minimum Possible Net Income = Income if Inspected;
Range of Possible Net Income = Maximum Possible Net Income - Minimum Possible Net Income.
a
Participants will be given 10,000 Francs (experimental currency) and the following rates will be use for the experimental task: Tax rate = 50%, Penalty rate (includes tax rate) = 100%, and Audit
rate = 50%.

Figure 7: Expected Value and Range of Possible Net Income by Reported Income
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Task Instructions
ManipulationsDecision Maker: Individual or Group
Decision Target: Self or Other

Qualtrics - Reporting Task
Dependent Variable: Unreported Income

Envelope 1
Covariate Questionnaire

Qualtrics - Inspection Notification

Envelope 2
Demographic Questionnaire

Participant Payouts

Figure 8: Diagram of Experimental Procedures
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The experiment uses task instructions to convey the parameters of the reporting task.
Prior to beginning the task, the study administrator read the task instructions aloud to the
participants. The task instructions inform participants that they will be given Francs (units of
experimental currency) and will be asked to make a decision about how much of the Francs they
wish to report on a form. The income reporting task is presented in this intentionally generic
context to minimize contextual differences between conditions to avoid confounding the
deliberately manipulated variables (decision maker and decision task) as this study seeks to
investigate only these two key differences in individual and corporate tax settings. The task
instructions indicate that after participants have made their reporting decision, they will be
notified about whether or not their form was selected for inspection. Francs reported on the form
are subject to a 50 percent fee. Francs not reported on the form are not subject to a fee unless the
form is selected for inspection. If the form is selected for inspection, the amount of Francs
reported is compared to the initial amount of Francs provided, and any Francs not reported on the
form are subject to a 100% fee. Thus, fees will not be assessed on unreported amounts unless the
report is selected for inspection. The task instructions state that forms have a 50 percent chance
of being selected for inspection and that inspections are determined completely at random and do
not depend on the participant’s decisions or the decisions of others. Net Francs remaining after
the inspection period are calculated at the decision maker level as the initial Francs provided, less
total fees. The task instructions indicate that Net Francs will be converted into dollars using a
positive conversion rate and participants will be paid at the conclusion of the task. Additionally,
participants in the group condition are instructed that payouts will be divided equally between
group members.
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The manipulations of decision maker (individual or group) and decision target (self or
other) occur within the task instructions.30 Decision maker type is manipulated by having
participants make the reporting decision either individually or in groups of two. Each participant
in the Individual condition makes the reporting decision alone as the sole decision maker.
Participants in the Group condition make the reporting decision together within their twomember group. Decision target is manipulated through who is affected by the reporting decision.
The instructions indicate the reporting decision affects either the decision maker’s own cash
payout (i.e., Self) or the payout of others not involved in making that reporting decision (i.e.,
Other).31 The manipulation of decision maker (individual or group) and decision target (self or
other) results in four versions of the task instructions: Individual-Self, Individual-Other, GroupSelf, and Group-Other. Each participant receives only one version of the task instructions.
After hearing the task instructions, participants begin the income reporting task. Decision
makers (as either individuals or groups) are endowed with Francs and asked to decide how much
they wish to report.32 Decision makers may report an amount from zero Francs up to the total
amount of endowed Francs. Greater unreported income reflects greater risk taking.
Individual decision makers are endowed with 10,000 Francs. Each individual decision
maker is asked to share his or her thought process (via a text box in Qualtrics) when deciding
how much to report. Decision makers in the Individual condition report any amount from 0

30

Prior studies such as Wallach et al. (1964) and Zaleska and Kogan (1971) have employed a choice shift design;
however, a choice shift design creates order effects such that decision making first for self and then on behalf of
others has a stronger shift than other-self, complicating the effects of self-other decision making (McCauley et al.
1971). Thus, the present study uses a between-participant design.
31
To prevent reciprocity from influencing decision making in the Other condition, participants are informed that
assignment is completely random and that they should assume the person (or group) deciding on their behalf is not
the same person (or group) for whom they are deciding.
32
Endowing participants with Francs (rather than having participants earn Francs) is an experimental design choice
made in consideration of the corporate tax environment, which is the primary focus of the present study.
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Francs to 10,000 Francs in increments of 1,000 Francs. In the Group condition, a two-member
group of decision makers is endowed with 20,000 Francs.33 Group members are asked to
communicate electronically (i.e., type back and forth within a text box in Qualtrics) to reach a
consensus on how much the group wishes to report. Groups are asked not to discuss aloud to
keep their conversation private. No time limit is placed upon reaching a group consensus. One
group member is randomly assigned to input the group’s decision. Groups may report any
amount from 0 Francs to 20,000 Francs in increments of 2,000 Francs.
After completing the reporting task, participants individually complete a paper-based
questionnaire measuring potential covariates. After completing the covariate questionnaire,
participants return to the Qualtrics survey for notification of whether or not their report was
selected for inspection and learn the amount of Net Francs after inspection. Net Francs are
calculated as the initial Francs less the total fees. If selected for inspection, total fees are
calculated as 50 percent of the amount reported on the form, plus 100 percent of the amount not
reported on the form. If not selected for inspection, total fees are simply 50 percent of the
amount reported on the form.
Following the inspection notification, all participants complete a paper-based
demographics questionnaire. While participants are completing the demographics questionnaire,

33

Upon entering the laboratory, participants are randomly assigned to a group rather than self-selecting.
Additionally, to increase identification within the group, groups are assigned a group name that is a color. The
experimental materials include two different paper-based questionnaires per person, enclosed in separate envelopes,
which are provided to participants at the beginning of the experiment. In the group condition, envelope labels are
printed using paper that matches the group name color. For example, members of the Blue group receive envelopes
with labels printed on blue paper.
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the study administrator converts Net Francs into dollars to determine cash payout amounts.34 The
experiment concludes with cash payouts to participants.

Independent Variables
Decision Maker
The decision maker is manipulated by structuring the decision to be made by either one
decision maker (Individual) or by a group of decision makers (Group). Each participant in the
Individual condition makes the reporting decision alone as the sole decision maker. Participants
in the Group condition make the decision after reaching a group consensus.
Decision Target
The target of the decision is manipulated as whether the decision is made on behalf of the
decision maker (Self) or on behalf of a different entity (Other). The experimental materials
inform participants that the reporting decision will result in a net amount of experimental
currency, which will be converted to dollars and paid to the decision target. In the Self condition,
the decision maker is the decision target and receives any payout from the decision task. In the
Other condition, another participant(s) (not the decision maker) is the decision target and
receives any payout from the decision task. Participants in the Other condition are compensated
based upon random assignment as targets for other participants in the same condition.
Assignments avoid reciprocal pairs, and this design feature is communicated to participants so
that reciprocity concerns do not influence decision making.

34

The cash payouts are calculated using a conversion rate of 800 Francs to 1 US dollar. Cash payouts are rounded
up to the next $0.25 increment.
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Manipulating both Decision Maker and Decision Target creates four conditions:
Individual-Self, Individual-Other, Group-Self, and Group-Other. In the Individual-Self
condition, a participant is making a decision individually for oneself. Individual-Self aligns with
a tax context in which an individual taxpayer is making decisions for his or her own personal tax
return. In the Individual-Other condition, a participant is making a decision individually for
another individual. This condition represents a single decision maker such as a sole tax decision
maker in a corporation making tax decisions on behalf of the corporation. Participants in the
Group-Self condition communicate electronically to make a unanimous group decision, the
outcome of which affects the decision-making group. Group-Self aligns with a group of owners
making tax decisions for their pass through business entity such as a partnership or Scorporation. In the Group-Other condition, participants communicate electronically to make a
unanimous group decision that will affect a group other than the decision-making group. GroupOther corresponds to a corporate tax context in which a corporate tax department is making tax
decisions on behalf of the corporation. The alignment of the experimental manipulations with tax
decision-making contexts is summarized in Figure 9.

Decision Target:
Self

Other

Decision Maker:
Individual
Group
Individual making decision for self
Group making decision for self
(An individual taxpayer making tax
(A group of owners making tax
decisions for own personal tax return)
decisions for their pass through
business entity)
Individual making decision on behalf Group making decision on behalf of
of other
other
(A corporation’s sole tax decision
(A corporate tax department making
maker making tax decisions on behalf
tax decisions on behalf of a
of a corporation)
corporation)

Figure 9: Alignment of Experimental Manipulations with Tax Decision-Making Contexts
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Additional Measures
Felt Responsibility
Felt Responsibility is a measure of how personally responsible a decision maker feels for
possible outcomes of the decision (Hackman and Oldham 1974; Mathes and Kahn 1975). Felt
Responsibility is assessed before participants discover the outcome of their decision (i.e.,
whether or not they were inspected) to avoid the potential influence of hindsight bias on their
responses. Following Hackman and Oldham (1974), Felt Responsibility is initially measured
using a four item scale presented in Appendix G. Each item uses a seven-point Likert-type scale
with labeled points ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree.” Confirmatory
factor analysis shows the four items do not load on a single factor and Cronbach’s alpha for the
Felt Responsibility scale is 0.685 when including all four items. Thus, Item 1 was dropped from
the scale to obtain a single factor with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.743 for the remaining three-item
measure of Felt Responsibility.
Diffusion of responsibility theory suggests that decision makers in a group will feel less
responsible for their decisions than individual decision makers as the presence of the group
reduces self-attribution of responsibility. As such, the manipulation of Decision Maker is
expected to influence how personally responsible participants feel for possible outcomes of their
decisions. The “group” decision maker condition should lead to lower felt responsibility than the
“individual” decision maker condition. Felt Responsibility is expected to help explain how tax
compliance riskiness differs in individual versus group decisions; participants in the “group”
condition should make riskier decisions than those in the “individual” condition. Felt
Responsibility is thus expected to mediate the effect of Decision Maker on the dependent
variable, Unreported Income.
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Relative Perceived Risk
Relative Perceived Risk is a measure of a decision maker’s self-perceived riskiness
compared to other individuals and is designed to capture a decision maker’s perception of
widely-held social values. Participants are asked “Compared to the average person, how risky
was the decision you just made?” Relative Perceived Risk is measured on a seven-point scale
ranging from 1 “Much less risky than average” to 7 “Much more risky than average.” Self-rating
as less risky than others signifies a perception that the socially-valued position is to be less risky.
Self-rating as more risky than others signifies a perception that the socially-valued position is to
be more risky. Social values for risk influence decisions on behalf of others more than decisions
for oneself (Stone and Allgaier 2008); as such, Relative Perceived Risk is expected to help
explain how tax compliance riskiness differs for self-other decisions based upon whether the
decision is an individual or group decision. Thus, Relative Perceived Risk may help explain the
moderating effect of Decision Maker on the influence of Decision Target on the riskiness of tax
compliance decisions.
Fear of Negative Outcome
Fear of Negative Outcome is a measure of how concerned a decision maker is about the
possibility of the report being selected for inspection. Participants are asked “When deciding
how many Francs to report on the form, how concerned were you about the possibility that the
report would be inspected?” The measure uses a five-point Likert-type scale with labeled points
ranging from 1 “Not At All Concerned” to 5 “Extremely Concerned.” Fear of Negative
Outcome is expected to covary with the dependent variable, Unreported Income, and is measured
as a possible control variable.
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Risk Attitude
Risk Attitude is a four item scale adopted from the Weber et al. (2002) measure of risk
attitude in the gambling domain, a subscale in the domain-specific risk attitude scale, which is
presented in Appendix G. Cronbach’s alpha for the Risk Attitude scale is 0.919. Participants
indicate their likelihood of engaging in different activities or behaviors; each item is measured on
a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “Very Unlikely” to 7 “Very Likely.” Risk Attitude is
measured as a potential control variable.

Dependent Variable
Participants in the experimental task are provided with experimental currency and then
asked, “How much of the 10,000 [20,000 for two-member groups] Francs would you like to
report?” Decision riskiness is operationalized as the amount of experimental currency that a
decision maker decides to report. Reported income is measured on an 11-point scale; an
individual decision maker may decide to report amounts from zero to 10,000 Francs in
increments of 1,000 and a group may decide to report amounts from zero to 20,000 Francs in
increments of 2,000. Reporting less income reflects greater risk taking. Reported income is
reverse coded so that greater Unreported Income reflects greater risk taking.
The expected value is the same for each of the reporting options; however, the range
between the maximum and minimum possible net income differs for the reporting options.
Reported income reflects risk taking because a decision to report less income generates a larger
gap between the possible maximum and minimum outcomes. The range for each option is
determined by calculating net income if not selected for inspection (i.e., the maximum possible
net income) and by calculating net income if selected for inspection (i.e., the minimum possible
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net income). For example in the Individual condition, a participant reporting all 10,000 Francs
would have the smallest range of possible outcomes, receiving the same net income whether or
not selected for inspection. Conversely, reporting zero income would generate the largest range
between the possible maximum and minimum net income outcomes; a participant reporting zero
net income would have zero net income if selected for inspection but would have all 10,000
remaining if not inspected. Thus a participant deciding to report zero net income would display
the greatest risk taking.

Results
Manipulation Checks
Decision Maker and Decision Target are manipulated through the structure of the income
reporting task, which is conveyed to participants through the task instructions. Manipulation
checks are conducted to measure whether participants were cognizant of task information
important to the successful manipulation of the variables. To verify the manipulations,
participants are asked, “Which best describes how your payment is determined for this study?”
Participants are asked to select one of the following options: “Based on a reporting decision I
made” (Individual-Self), “Based on a reporting decision that someone else made” (IndividualOther), “Based on a reporting decision that my group made” (Group-Self), or “Based on a
reporting decision that another group made” (Group-Other). Participants had to pass the
manipulation check question to be included in the study.
A total of 123 participants completed the experimental materials as follows: IndividualSelf = 18 participants, Individual-Other = 21 participants, Group-Self = 21 two-member groups
(42 participants), and Group-Other = 21 two-member groups (42 participants). Analysis of the
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manipulation check question suggests that although the Decision Maker manipulation was
generally successful, the Decision Target manipulation (self-other) was not successful for the
majority of the participants. Of the 63 participants originally in the Decision Target-Other
condition, 35 participants failed the manipulation check, a failure rate of 55.6 percent. The
manipulation check proved to be even more stringent in the group conditions as both members of
each group were required to pass the manipulation check for the group to be included in the
study. Due to the high failure rate of the Decision Target-Other manipulation, all 63 participants
in the Self-Other and Group-Other conditions are excluded from the analysis; thus, H2 cannot be
tested. 35 Of the 60 remaining participants in the Decision Target-Self condition, 9 participants
failed the manipulation check as follows: Individual-Self 1 participant and Group-Self 4 twomember groups (8 participants). Thus, a total of 51 participants are included in the study.

Descriptive Statistics
Table 15 presents descriptive statistics by Decision Maker (Individual or Group) for the
dependent variable Unreported Income, the mediator Felt Responsibility, and the possible
covariates Relative Perceived Risk, Fear of Negative Outcome, and Risk Attitude. Participants in
the Group condition report a mean (standard deviation) Unreported Income of 3.71 (2.97), which
is not statistically different than the Unreported Income of participants in the Individual
condition mean (standard deviation) of 3.12 (3.52). As expected, Felt Responsibility is
significantly greater in the Individual condition than in the Group Condition with mean (standard
deviation) of 15.94 (3.29) and 13.44 (2.94), respectively (p = 0.026). Neither Relative Perceived
35

After removing participants that failed the manipulation check, participants per condition were as follows:
Individual-Self = 17, Individual-Other = 8, Group-Self = 17 two-member groups, Group-Other = 6 two-member
groups. As discussed above, the manipulation of Decision Target was unsuccessful in the “Other” conditions, thus
those participants are excluded from the study.
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Risk, Fear of Negative Outcome, nor Risk Attitude differs significantly between the Individual
and Group conditions.

Tests of Hypotheses
Correlation coefficients are presented in Table 16. Significant correlations exist between
Decision Maker and Felt Responsibility, as well as between Felt Responsibility and the
dependent variable Unreported Income. Additionally, the dependent variable Unreported
Income is significantly correlated with the covariates Relative Perceived Risk and Risk Attitude,
which are also significantly correlated with each other.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that decision makers will make riskier tax compliance decisions
when decisions are made in a group than when decisions are made individually. Table 17 reports
the ANCOVA results with Unreported Income as the dependent variable, Decision Maker as the
independent variable and Relative Perceived Risk as the covariate. The model is statistically
significant at p < 0.000, with an adjusted R2 of 0.396. However, the ANCOVA model does not
find support for H1 as only the covariate Relative Perceived Risk is statistically significant (p <
0.000).36 Decision Maker is not significant in the model (p = 0.989).37 Although the study
hypotheses do not include the mediator Felt Responsibility, Felt Responsibility theory suggests
that decision maker type should affect feelings of personal responsibility, which may influence
the riskiness of decision maker judgment. Thus, additional analysis incorporates mediation
analysis of Felt Responsibility into the model.

36

Risk Attitude (measured as a possible control variable) is excluded from the ANCOVA model as the variable is
not statistically significant when the covariate Relative Perceived Risk is included in the model (p = 0.867).
37
H2a and H2b cannot be tested because all participants in the Decision Target-Other conditions were excluded.
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Supplemental Analysis
The mediation model is tested using the SPSS PROCESS script (Hayes 2013). Variables
in the model include the dependent variable Unreported Income, a manipulated binary
independent variable Decision Maker, the mediator Felt Responsibility, and a covariate Relative
Perceived Risk. The mediation model is presented in Figure 10.

Felt
Responsibility

Decision
Maker

Unreported
Income

eM

Covariate:
Relative
Perceived
Risk

Felt
Responsibility

a
b

Decision
Maker
c'

Unreported
Income

eY

Figure 10: Mediation Model
Notes: Decision Maker is the causal variable [X], Felt Responsibility is the mediator [M], and
Unreported Income is the outcome [Y]. a, b, and c’ are the regression coefficients in the
estimation models of Felt Responsibility and Unreported Income; and eM and eY are errors in the
estimates of Felt Responsibility and Unreported Income, respectively. The indirect effect of
Decision Maker on Unreported Income through Felt Responsibility is ab. The direct effect of
Decision Maker on Unreported Income after considering ab is c’. The figure is modified from
Hayes (2013, 445) by insertion of variable names into the model.
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Table 18 shows the results of the mediation analysis. The analysis includes two
regressions and a test of the indirect effect of the manipulated variable on the dependent variable.
Panel A presents the first regression, which shows that Decision Maker is significantly related to
the mediator Felt Responsibility (p = 0.026) with R2 = 0.146. Panel B presents the second
regression, which shows that Unreported Income is a function of Relative Perceived Risk and is
significantly related to Felt Responsibility (p = 0.048) with R2 = 0.503. The indirect effect of
Decision Maker on Unreported Income, presented in Panel C, is significant (p < 0.05) based on a
95 percent bootstrapped confidence interval using 1,000 iterations.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that decision makers will make riskier tax compliance decisions
when decisions are made in a group than when decisions are made individually. Although not
formally hypothesized, Felt Responsibility may theoretically mediate the effect of Decision
Maker on the dependent variable, Unreported Income. Felt Responsibility theory suggests that
Decision Maker should influence Felt Responsibility (i.e., how responsible participants
personally feel for possible outcomes of their decisions), leading a “group” decision maker to
feel less responsible for the decision than an “individual” decision maker. As such, participants
in the “group” condition should make riskier decisions than those in the “individual” condition.
Decision Maker is an indicator variable equal to 0 in the Individual condition and equal to 1 in
the Group condition. Table 18 Panel A indicates a significant negative relationship between
Decision Maker and Felt Responsibility, signifying that Felt Responsibility is significantly lower
in the Group condition than the Individual condition. Table 18 Panel B shows that Felt
Responsibility has a significant negative effect on the dependent variable Unreported Income,
signifying that Unreported Income is significantly greater when Felt Responsibility is lower. As
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indicated in Panel C of Table 18, the indirect effect of Decision Maker on Unreported Income is
significant with a positive coefficient, thus providing partial support for H1.38

Conclusion
This study examines the effect of decision maker type (whether an individual is the sole
decision maker or a group is making the decision) on the riskiness of tax compliance decisions.
The study draws upon diffusion of responsibility theory, which suggests that the presence of the
group in group decisions diffuses felt responsibility between group members (Dion et al. 1970).
Decreased felt responsibility in group decisions leads groups to make riskier decisions compared
to when decisions are made individually (Mathes and Kahn 1975). This study predicts that tax
compliance decisions made in a group will be riskier than tax compliance decisions made
individually. Supplemental analysis suggests that although decision maker type does not directly
influence the riskiness of tax compliance decisions, decision maker type does affect riskiness
indirectly through feelings of responsibility for possible outcomes of the decision. Group
members report significantly lower levels of felt responsibility than individual decision makers.
Furthermore, lower levels of felt responsibility lead to riskier tax compliance. The study’s
findings suggest that a group of decision makers, such as a tax department, may actually make
riskier tax compliance decisions together than when compliance decisions are made individually,
as merely sharing the decision may decrease each group member’s feelings of personal
responsibility.
Interpretation of the results is subject to the following limitations. It is possible that the
abstract nature of the task may limit the ability of the results to generalize to the different tax

38

H2a and H2b cannot be tested because all participants in the Decision Target-Other conditions were excluded.
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decision-making contexts. However, the study examines one specific factor that differs between
tax decision-making contexts: decision maker type. As such, a key strength of this study is the
controlled nature of the experimental design. The experimental procedure is designed to be as
rigid as possible (e.g., conducted in a behavioral lab using a script, includes detailed task
instructions with minimal context), differing only for the manipulated variables. My reason for
avoiding overly contextual tax language in this study (e.g., “placing” participants into a role
within a tax scenario) is that factors such as the social value placed upon risky tax compliance
decisions may differ in an individual tax context compared to other tax contexts, namely the
corporate tax context. Thus, using more contextual tax language could have confounded the
intended manipulation. Given the vast differences between individual and business tax
environments, I chose a clean, minimal design to intentionally minimize the differences and
sought only to determine the effect of the specific contextual factors of interest.
This study was also intended to examine the combined effect of decision maker type and
decision target on the riskiness of tax compliance decision, predicting that decision maker type
will moderate the effect of decision target on riskiness. Individual decision makers are predicted
to make riskier decisions for themselves than on behalf of others, and groups are predicted to
make riskier decisions for other groups than for their own group. However, these hypotheses
could not be tested because all participants in the Decision Target-Other conditions were
excluded. Future research should examine the influence of decision target on decision riskiness
as theory suggests this factor may be important to our understanding of decision making in
different tax contexts.
The study attempts to make inroads into the emerging area of behavioral corporate tax
research, furthering our understanding of how tax compliance decisions may differ in the
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business tax environment compared to individual tax. Due to the complexity and ambiguity of
the corporate taxation, few corporate tax decisions may be made by only one individual without
input from others such as in corporate tax departments. As such this study contributes to the
groundwork for future studies in this area by isolating one of the primary differences between
individual and corporate tax decision makers: the type of decision maker.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
The three studies in this dissertation examine corporate tax aggressiveness at the decision
maker level. The first two studies focus on the individual judgment involved in making decisions
on behalf of a corporation. Specifically, these two studies examine individual assessments of tax
positions based upon tax scenario facts and tax authority. The first study examines the influence
of external tax advisor recommendations on the tax aggressiveness of decisions made by inhouse corporate tax professionals. The second study examines the judgment and decision making
processes of individuals in a corporate tax environment, investigating how individual traits and
situational factors interact to affect individual-level tax aggressiveness. The third study extends
the investigation of situational factors from individual-level decision making to a group-level
analysis, examining decision making in individual and group tax compliance settings.
In the first study, I conduct an experiment with corporate tax directors with a great deal
of experience making decisions for their company. Study 1 uses an experiment to create an
exchange between two key actors in corporate tax decision making: the in-house corporate
decision maker (e.g., tax director) and the third-party external tax advisor. This study
investigates the influence of tax advisors on tax directors’ judgments, specifically whether the
nature of the advice and the identity of the tax advisor (whether from the company’s audit firm
or a different firm) affect how tax directors weight the advice. Corporate tax directors review a
tax scenario, receive a recommendation from the company’s tax advisor, and are subsequently
asked to provide their assessment of the tax position. Findings suggest that when tax directors are
provided with conservative tax advice (i.e., advised not to take a client-favorable tax position not
clearly supported by the tax authority) and they agree with the conservative advice, the identity
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of the tax advisor influences the weight given to the advice. Tax directors in agreement with
conservative tax advice weight advice from the audit firm tax advisor (“tax-audit”) more heavily
than when advice comes from a tax advisor from a different firm (“tax-nonaudit”). As such, tax
directors that agree with conservative advice indicate a smaller likelihood of taking the position
when the tax advisor is from the audit firm than when tax advisor is from a different firm.
Overall, findings suggest that even experienced corporate tax decision makers may be influenced
by not only by the nature of advice, but also by the identity of the tax advice, a situational factor
in the decision environment under corporate management’s control.
The second study continues the examination of individual-level judgment in corporate
taxation by delving into the processes underlying evidence evaluation. As Study 1 conveys that
advice may directly influence the judgment of high-level corporate tax decision makers, Study 2
continues to examine the influence of the tax advisor, a situational factor, on evaluations made
by less experienced decision makers acting as tax department staff within the experiment’s tax
scenario. Study 2 also includes an examination of an individual dispositional trait, trait
regulatory focus. Study 2 finds that “fit” occurs indirectly between the regulatory focus state
induced by the tax advisor role (i.e., advocate or overseer) and the decision maker’s trait
regulatory focus, through the decision maker’s perceptions of client advocacy. Thus, perceived
client advocacy (i.e., the degree to which the decision maker perceives the tax advisor to be a
client advocate) mediates the influence of tax advisor role on decision maker judgment. Decision
makers perceive a company’s tax advisor to have significantly stronger client advocacy when
management views the tax advisor as more of an advocate than when management views the tax
advisor as an overseer, and perceiving the tax advisor to be more of an advocate (i.e., a stronger
promotion state) amplifies the influence of regulatory fit for trait promotion-focused decision
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makers. Compared to individuals with a lower trait promotion focus, tax decision makers with a
greater trait promotion focus react more strongly to situationally induced promotion focus state.
In addition to findings from Study 1 that tax advisors and advice influence high-level
decision makers, Study 2 findings suggest that preliminary evaluations made by staff-level
decision makers may be influenced by their superior’s view of the tax advisors. Junior staff-level
decision makers conduct preliminary evaluations of tax positions given to higher-level decision
makers within the corporation, potentially introducing additional unmeasured risk into the tax
function. Studies 1 and 2 examine the judgment of decision makers in isolation. Participants in
the Study 1 and 2 experiments are provided with a detailed tax scenario and are asked to
immerse themselves into assigned roles in which they either receive a recommendation from
another person (e.g., Study 1) or prepare to send a preliminary recommendation to another
person (e.g., Study 2). Decision makers in neither of these two studies are actually interacting
with other decision makers. Thus Study 3 of this dissertation extends the investigation of
corporate tax decision making to a group-level analysis. Additionally, corporate tax
aggressiveness has been primarily examined by archival studies which typically calculate tax
aggressiveness using corporate level metrics obtained from company financial statements. Thus
these studies are largely unable to distinguish decision maker intentions from subjective
professional judgment in measures of corporate tax aggressiveness. Study 3 employs a tax
reporting task with minimal context and explicitly presented reportable income to examine the
riskiness of tax decisions. Removing the judgment element (i.e., evaluation of the tax scenario
and tax authority evidence) allows Study 3 to examine the intentional noncompliance decision
element of tax aggressiveness.
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Findings from Study 3 suggest that decision maker type (i.e., individual decision maker
or group decision maker) affects riskiness indirectly through feelings of responsibility for
possible outcomes of the decision. Group members report significantly lower levels of felt
responsibility than individual decision makers. Lower levels of felt responsibility lead to riskier
tax compliance. Thus, a group of decision makers, such as a tax department, may actually make
riskier tax compliance decisions together than when compliance decisions are made individually,
as merely sharing the decision may decrease each group member’s feelings of personal
responsibility.
Results reported in this dissertation collectively suggest that both situational factors in the
corporate tax environment and individual characteristics influence the tax aggressiveness of
individual-level tax judgment and decision making. Corporate tax decision makers that wish to
reduce unmeasured risk should consider how components of the decision making environment
(e.g., situational factors, dispositional characteristics, advice, and advisor characteristics)
influence interpretation of evidence, potentially impacting objectivity. This dissertation contains
studies which are some of the first to employ experimental methods to examine why these
specific components of the decision making environment influence the tax aggressiveness of
decision maker judgment. Future research should continue to bridge the primarily archival
corporate tax literature with other literature streams such as psychology-based behavioral
research to further examine the underlying judgment and decision making processes of
individuals acting on behalf of the corporation.
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APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 TABLES
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Table 1: Demographics
(n = 119)
Job Title
Vice President, Tax
Tax Director
Tax Manager
Work Experience in Taxation
More than 7 years*
5 – 7 Years
3 – 5 Years
No Response

n

%

33
51
35

27.7
42.9
29.4

115
1
1
2

96.7
0.8
0.8
1.7

*Participants with more than 7 years of experience were asked
to specify total years of experience. 96 participants responded
with a mean (standard deviation) of 23.9 years (7.87).
Experience in Public Accounting
Yes – Big 4 Public Accounting Firm
Yes – Other Public Accounting Firm
No
No Response

77
11
29
2

64.7
9.2
24.4
1.7

Current Employer Company Type
Multinational (US-Based)
Multinational (Foreign-Based)
Domestic US (Multistate)
Domestic US (Single State)

95
6
18
0

79.9
5.0
15.1
0.0

118
0
1

99.2
0.0
0.8

66
52
1

55.5
43.7
0.8

Public Accounting Firm Audits Company’s
Financial Statements
Yes
No
No Response
Company’s Provision of Tax Services
Different Firms for Tax and Audit Services
Same Firm for Tax and Audit Services
No Response
Company’s Percentage of Tax Services
Outsourced (Not Conducted In-House)
118 participants responded with a mean
(standard deviation) of 33.0 percent (22.54).
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(n = 119)
Gender
Male
Female
No Response

n

%

78
37
4

65.5
31.1
3.4

5
30
38
36
4
6

4.2
25.2
31.9
30.3
3.4
5.0

Age
Less than 35
35 – 44
45 – 54
55 – 64
65 and over
No Response
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Table 2: Main Analysis
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity: Means (Standard Deviation)

N
Percent Include
Likelihood
Weight of Advice
IRS Permits
Perceived
Client Advocacy
Tax Risk Preference
Agreement with
Advice

Conservative Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
Total
29
33
62
51.7%
60.6%
56.5%
0.503
0.500
0.502
(0.310)
(0.354)
(0.331)
0.293
0.328
0.312
(0.387)
(0.432)
(0.409)
0.386
0.409
0.398
(0.212)
(0.220)
(0.215)
42.17
38.58
40.26
(7.06)
(9.31)
(8.46)
4.66
4.36
4.50
(1.79)
(1.37)
(1.57)
0.586
0.303
0.435
(0.501)
(0.467)
(0.500)

Aggressive Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
Total
30
27
57
93.3%
88.9%
91.2%
0.807
0.770
0.789
(0.212)
(0.254)
(0.231)
0.575
0.556
0.566
(0.366)
(0.335)
(0.349)
0.567
0.489
0.530
(0.167)
(0.217)
(0.195)
41.27
41.63
41.44
(8.33)
(8.50)
(8.34)
4.17
4.07
4.12
(1.02)
(1.27)
(1.14)
0.967
0.778
0.877
(0.183)
(0.424)
(0.331)

All Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
59
60
72.9%
73.3%
0.658
0.622
(0.304)
(0.339)
0.436
0.431
(0.400)
(0.405)
0.478
0.445
(0.209)
(0.220)
41.71
39.95
(7.68)
(9.01)
4.41
4.23
(1.45)
(1.32)
0.780
0.517
(0.418)
(0.504)

Panel B: Results of ANOVA: Effect of Tax Advisor Identity on Weight of Advice
Source of Variation
Nature of Advice
Tax Advisor Identity
Nature of Advice x Tax Advisor Identity
Error

Sum of Squares
1.918
0.002
0.022
16.985

df
1
1
1
115

Mean Square
1.918
0.002
0.022
0.148

F
12.987
0.012
0.149

p
< 0.000
0.912
0.700

Sum of Squares
0.019
0.005

df
1
1

Mean Square
0.019
0.005

F
0.129
0.036

p
0.720
0.849

Panel C: Simple Effects for Weight of Advice
Source of Variation
Conservative (H1a): Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit
Aggressive (H1b): Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit

Notes: See Table 8 for variable definitions. All p-values are two-tailed.
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Total
119
73.1%
0.639
(0.321)
0.433
(0.400)
0.461
(0.215)
40.82
(8.39)
4.32
(1.38)
0.647
(0.480)

Table 3: Supplemental Analysis of Weight of Advice when Agreement with Advice is High
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics by Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity: Means (Standard Deviation)

N
Percent Include
Likelihood
Weight of Advice
IRS Permits
Perceived
Client Advocacy
Tax Risk Preference

Conservative Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
Total
17
10
27
23.5%
0%
14.8%
0.353
0.120
0.267
(0.285)
(0.162)
(0.269)
0.461
0.800
0.586
(0.406)
(0.270)
(0.393)
0.300
0.230
0.274
(0.226)
(0.170)
(0.207)
42.24
33.30
38.93
(6.63)
(9.76)
(8.91)
4.18
3.70
4.00
(1.91)
(1.77)
(1.84)

Aggressive Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
Total
29
21
50
96.6%
100%
98.0%
0.817
0.848
0.830
(0.207)
(0.112)
(0.173)
0.595
0.619
0.605
(0.356)
(0.281)
(0.324)
0.579
0.552
0.568
(0.154)
(0.181)
(0.165)
41.76
42.81
42.20
(8.02)
(8.78)
(8.28)
4.14
4.14
4.14
(1.03)
(1.24)
(1.11)

All Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
46
31
69.6%
67.7%
0.646
0.613
(0.327)
(0.369)
0.545
0.677
(0.377)
(0.286)
0.476
0.448
(0.227)
(0.232)
41.93
39.74
(7.46)
(10.02)
4.15
4.00
(1.40)
(1.41)

Panel B: Results of ANOVA: Effect of Tax Advisor Identity on Weight of Advice
Source of Variation
Nature of Advice
Tax Advisor Identity
Nature of Advice x Tax Advisor Identity
Error

Sum of Squares
0.009
0.548
0.412
8.425

df
1
1
1
73

Mean Square
0.009
0.548
0.412
0.115

Sum of Squares
0.724
0.007

df
1
1

Mean Square
0.724
0.007

F
0.079
4.750
3.568

p
0.779
0.033
0.063

Panel C: Simple Effects for Weight of Advice
Source of Variation
Conservative: Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit
Aggressive: Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit
Notes:
See Table 8 for variable definitions. All p-values are two-tailed.
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F
6.277
0.062

p
0.014
0.804

Total
77
68.8%
0.632
(0.342)
0.598
(0.347)
0.465
(0.228)
41.05
(8.59)
4.09
(1.40)

Table 4: Supplemental Analysis of Weight of Advice when Agreement with Advice is Low
Descriptive Statistics by Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity: Means (Standard Deviation)

N
Percent Include
Likelihood
Weight of Advice
IRS Permits
Perceived
Client Advocacy
Tax Risk Preference

Conservative Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
Total
12
23
35
91.7%
87.0%
88.6%
0.717
0.665
0.683
(0.204)
(0.277)
(0.253)
0.056
0.123
0.100
(0.192)
(0.311)
(0.275)
0.508
0.489
0.494
(0.108)
(0.194)
(0.168)
42.08
40.87
41.29
(7.93)
(8.30)
(8.08)
5.33
4.65
4.89
(1.37)
(1.07)
(1.21)

Aggressive Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
Total
1
6
7
0.0%
50.0%
42.9%
0.500
0.500
0.500
(0.000)
(0.415)
(0.379)
0.000
0.333
0.286
(0.000)
(0.438)
(0.419)
0.200
0.267
0.257
(0.000)
(0.197)
(0.181)
27.00
37.50
36.00
(0.00)
(6.44)
(7.10)
5.00
3.83
4.00
(0.00)
(1.47)
(1.41)

All Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
13
29
84.6%
79.3%
0.700
0.631
(0.204)
(0.309)
0.051
0.167
(0.185)
(0.343)
0.485
0.441
(0.134)
(0.211)
40.92
40.17
(8.67)
(7.97)
5.31
4.48
(1.32)
(1.18)

Total
42
81.0%
0.652
(0.280)
0.131
(0.305)
0.455
(0.190)
40.40
(8.09)
4.74
(1.27)

Notes:
See Table 8 for variable definitions.
Participants receiving aggressive advice were more likely to agree with the aggressive advice than disagree. No further analysis conducted for Agreement with Advice = Low due
to cell size in the Aggressive Advice condition.
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Table 5: Supplemental Analysis of Likelihood
Panel A: Likelihood by Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity: Means (Standard Deviation)

N
Likelihood

Conservative Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
Total
29
33
62
0.503
0.500
0.502
(0.310)
(0.354)
(0.331)

Aggressive Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
Total
30
27
57
0.807
0.770
0.789
(0.212)
(0.254)
(0.231)

All Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
59
60
0.658
0.622
(0.304)
(0.339)

Panel B: Results of ANOVA: Effect of Tax Advisor Identity on Likelihood
Source of Variation
Nature of Advice
Tax Advisor Identity
Nature of Advice x Tax Advisor Identity
Error

Sum of Squares
2.434
0.012
0.008
9.665

df
1
1
1
115

Mean Square
2.434
0.012
0.008
0.084

F
28.965
0.139
0.095

p
< 0.000
0.710
0.758

Sum of Squares
0.000
0.019

df
1
1

Mean Square
0.000
0.019

F
0.002
0.023

p
0.963
0.638

Panel C: Simple Effects for Likelihood
Source of Variation
Conservative: Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit
Aggressive: Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit
Notes:
See Table 8 for variable definitions.
All p-values are two-tailed.
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Total
119
0.639
(0.321)

Table 6: Supplemental Analysis of Likelihood when Agreement with Advice is High
Panel A: Likelihood by Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity: Means (Standard Deviation)

N
Likelihood

Conservative Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
Total
17
10
27
0.353
0.120
0.267
(0.285)
(0.162)
(0.269)

Aggressive Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
Total
29
21
50
0.817
0.848
0.830
(0.207)
(0.112)
(0.173)

All Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
46
31
0.646
0.613
(0.327)
(0.369)

Panel B: Results of ANOVA: Effect of Tax Advisor Identity on Likelihood
Source of Variation
Nature of Advice
Tax Advisor Identity
Nature of Advice x Tax Advisor Identity
Error

Sum of Squares
5.897
0.170
0.288
2.992

df
1
1
1
73

Mean Square
5.897
0.170
0.288
0.041

F
143.865
4.155
7.021

Sum of Squares
0.342
0.011

df
1
1

Mean Square
0.342
0.011

F
8.335
0.274

p
< 0.000
0.045
0.010

Panel C: Simple Effects for Likelihood
Source of Variation
Conservative: Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit
Aggressive: Tax-Nonaudit vs. Tax-Audit
Notes:
See Table 8 for variable definitions.
All p-values are two-tailed.
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p
0.005
0.602

Total
77
0.632
(0.342)

Table 7: Supplemental Analysis of Likelihood when Agreement with Advice is Low
Likelihood by Nature of Advice and Tax Advisor Identity: Means (Standard Deviation)

N
Likelihood

Conservative Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
Total
12
23
35
0.717
0.665
0.683
(0.204)
(0.277)
(0.253)

Aggressive Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
Total
1
6
7
0.500
0.500
0.500
(0.000)
(0.415)
(0.379)

All Advice
TaxTaxNonaudit
Audit
13
29
0.700
0.631
(0.204)
(0.309)

Total
42
0.652
(0.280)

Notes:
See Table 8 for variable definitions.
Participants receiving aggressive advice were more likely to agree with the aggressive advice than disagree. No further analysis conducted for Agreement with Advice = Low due
to cell size in the Aggressive Advice condition.
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Table 8: Variable Definitions
Nature of
Advice

Tax Advisor
Identity

Percent
Include

Likelihood

Weight of
Advice

IRS Permits

Perceived
Client
Advocacy

Nature of Advice is manipulated as the type of tax position recommended
by Maylor Corp’s tax advisor. In the Conservative condition, Maylor
Corp’s tax advisor recommends that the company should not include the
supplies in the R&D credit calculation. In the Aggressive condition,
Maylor Corp’s tax advisor recommends that the company should include
the supplies in the R&D credit calculation.
Tax Advisor Identity is manipulated by describing the corporation’s tax
advisor as either from the same public accounting firm that audits the
corporation’s financial statements (Tax-Audit) or from a different public
accounting firm (Tax-Nonaudit).
Participants are asked, “What do you think Maylor Corp should do?”
Percent Include is measured as the percentage of participants that indicate
that “Maylor Corp should include the UltraX supplies as qualified research
expenses in the R&D Credit calculation.”
Likelihood is measured by asking, “What is the likelihood that you would
include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses for Maylor
Corp’s Research & Development Credit?” Likelihood uses an eleven-point
scale with labeled points ranging from 0% “Not At All Likely” to 100%
“Extremely Likely.” Greater likelihood of including the expenses
represents greater tax aggressiveness.
Weight of Advice = |(Likelihood – Initial Anchor)| / |(Recommendation –
Initial Anchor)|. Initial Anchor is the 60% tax department staff preliminary
opinion. Recommendation is 100% for aggressive advice and 0% for
conservative advice. Weight of Advice values for Likelihood assessments
falling outside the range bounded by the tax advisor’s recommendation
and the initial anchor are adjusted to zero.
IRS Permits is measured by asking participants, “If this position was
examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS would permit the
position that the UltraX supplies are qualified research expenses for
Maylor Corp’s Research & Development Credit?” IRS Permits uses an
eleven-point scale with labeled points ranging from 0% “Not At All
Likely” to 100% “Extremely Likely.” Lower perceived likelihood that the
IRS would permit the tax position of including the expenses represents
greater perceived riskiness of the tax position.
Client Advocacy is measured as the sum of a nine item scale adapted from
the Mason and Levy (2001) measure of client advocacy. Greater Client
Advocacy scores reflect a stronger belief that the tax advisor in the
experimental scenario is a client advocate.
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Tax Risk
Preference

Agreement
with Advice

Tax Risk Preference is measured by asking “How certain would you want
to be of your tax position before including the UltraX supplies as qualified
research expenses for the R&D Credit?” The item uses an eleven-point
scale with labeled points ranging from 0% “Not At All Certain” to 100%
“Extremely Certain.” Responses are reverse coded such that a greater
score reflects a greater risk preference (i.e., a preference for more
uncertainty).
Agreement is measured by asking participants, “To what extent do you
agree or disagree with the recommendation of the external tax
professionals?” Agreement uses a seven-point Likert-type scale with
labeled points ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree.”
Responses are dichotomized into High or Low Agreement with Advice.
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APPENDIX B: STUDY 1 EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
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Condition 1: Tax-Nonaudit / Conservative
[SCREEN 1]
Explanation of Research
Title of Project: Corporate Tax Decision Makers
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold
You are being invited to take part in a research project conducted by Bonnie Brown, Doctoral
Candidate, and Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor. You will be asked to answer questions
that will take about 20 minutes of your time. The purpose of this research is to examine
judgments by corporate tax decision makers. You will be asked to read a tax scenario involving a
hypothetical corporation. You will then be provided with some tax authority guidance and be
asked to answer questions about the tax scenario.
Please note that participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses will be
completely anonymous. If you decide to participate, you have the right to withdraw your consent
or discontinue participation at any time. There are no anticipated potential risks associated with
this study. You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints you may contact: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral
Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407)
823-1478 or by email at bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor,
Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, at (407) 823-3192
or by email at vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.
Since this research involves human participants, it has been reviewed and approved by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida. For information about the
rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University
of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite
501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901.

By clicking ">>" you are indicating that you wish to participate in this study.
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[SCREEN 2]
[Screening Questions]
Before we get started, please answer a few questions about yourself. These questions relate
to your experiences while employed in-house by a company. Please note these questions are
not asking about any experience you may have had working for a public accounting firm.

Do you have experience making in-house tax decisions for a company?
Yes
No
Have you been responsible for the in-house supervision of a company’s income tax return
preparation and filing?
Yes
No

Have you researched income tax matters on behalf of a company for which you worked?
Yes
No

Have you conducted tax planning on behalf of a company for which you worked?
Yes
No
Have you prepared or reviewed a company’s tax provision calculations while you were
employed in-house by that company?
Yes
No
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[SCREEN 3]
YOUR TASK
As a participant in this study, you will be asked to read a hypothetical tax scenario and then
respond to questions related to the scenario, share your attitudes and opinions in general, and
provide demographic information. We ask that you place yourself into the role of an in-house
Tax Director employed by a hypothetical corporation, Maylor Corp. Over the next several
screens you will read background information about Maylor Corp, your role as Maylor Corp’s
Tax Director, and a hypothetical tax research project. We anticipate it will take about 10 minutes
to read through this information. We sincerely appreciate receiving input from individuals with
your level of expertise, and your responses are very important to us. Thank you in advance for
your time!
Please note that the first few screens will require reading. The remaining screens will be
mostly questions.
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen.
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[SCREEN 4]
MAYLOR CORP & TAX DIRECTOR ROLE
Maylor Corp is a publicly traded manufacturing company with headquarters in the United States.
The company has operations in six U.S. states and also in a few other countries; consequently,
the company files tax returns with numerous taxing authorities. Over the past several years,
Maylor Corp has averaged annual gross revenue of around $200 million. Maylor Corp
historically has had taxable income, and it does not have any net operating loss carryforwards.
The GAAP effective tax rate generally hovers around 30 percent.
Again, please envision yourself in the role of Maylor Corp’s Tax Director. You have worked as
Maylor Corp’s Tax Director for three years. As Tax Director, you lead tax planning and tax
compliance for Maylor Corp and manage a team of dedicated staff. You work on matters related
to the company’s federal, international, and state income tax returns, as well as franchise, use,
and property taxes. In addition to tax compliance responsibilities, a significant portion of your
time is spent on tax planning, tax authority audits of federal and state income tax filings, and
accounting for income taxes for financial statement purposes. You are satisfied with your work
environment at Maylor Corp and feel that the company provides you with the resources
necessary to meet your job responsibilities. Further, your opinion appears to be valued within the
company and you currently have no plans to leave Maylor Corp.
You report to the CFO and work with both the management team within Maylor Corp as well as
third-party tax professionals external to Maylor Corp. For the last eight years, Maylor Corp’s tax
returns have been prepared and signed by Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm. Sizable research
projects are often conducted in-house by Maylor Corp’s tax department and then reviewed
by the external tax professionals at Firm A. Maylor Corp’s financial statements are audited
by Firm B, a different Big 4 accounting firm.

After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen.
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[SCREEN 5]
CURRENT PROJECT
You are presently working on a project to review the methods that have been used in Maylor
Corp’s Research and Development (R&D) Credit calculations. Maylor Corp currently takes the
R&D Credit, but the calculation is based upon an analysis conducted several years ago. After
consultation with the CFO, it was decided that the R&D Credit calculations should be updated.
In particular, you are considering how Maylor Corp should treat supplies related to a research
and development project conducted during the current tax year for UltraX, a new prototype
product.
ULTRAX SUPPLIES
Maylor Corp has spent $4.2 million on a project to develop a new prototype product, called
UltraX. Included in this amount is $950,000 of supplies. Maylor Corp had originally purchased
the supplies for production of the old model product, but later allocated these supplies to the
UltraX project. Maylor Corp has not capitalized or depreciated the cost of these supplies. The
supplies were used in the development of UltraX; however, none of the supplies were damaged
by the development process and thus were available for reuse during subsequent production of
UltraX. Following successful testing, Maylor Corp manufactured UltraX and is now selling it to
customers. Including the cost of the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation would
be advantageous for tax purposes. You need to determine if the UltraX supplies can be
included as qualified research expenses in the R&D Credit calculation.
You assign the task of gathering relevant tax authority to Maylor Corp’s tax department staff.
Once you review the preliminary opinion of your tax department staff, you will send this
information to the tax professionals at Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm which is not Maylor
Corp’s audit firm, and they will provide their recommendation on the treatment of UltraX
supplies for the R&D credit calculation. You will then evaluate the treatment of UltraX
supplies for the R&D credit calculation and make your decision.

After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen.
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[SCREEN 6]
TAX DEPARTMENT STAFF PRELIMINARY OPINION
The tax department staff has evaluated whether or not the UltraX supplies should be included as
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit. After considering the internal revenue code,
regulations, and other authority, Maylor Corp’s tax department staff concludes that the primary
uncertainty regarding the treatment of the supplies relates to whether the supplies were “used in
the conduct of qualified research.” They estimate that, should Maylor take the position that
the supplies are a qualified research expense, there is a 60% likelihood that the position
would be successfully upheld. The relevant authority related to whether supplies were “used” or
not is briefly summarized below:
Internal Revenue Code Section 41 indicates that qualified research expenses can include inhouse research expenses, including any amount paid or incurred for supplies used in the conduct
of qualified research. Regulation §1.41-2(b) says that supplies are used in the conduct of
qualified research if they are used in the performance of qualified services by an employee of the
taxpayer; however, expenditures for supplies that are indirect research expenditures or general
and administrative expenses do not qualify. The rules do not define indirect research
expenditures. The IRS has adopted the position that “used” means consumed, though nowhere in
the tax rules is used defined as consumed. The courts have thus far largely remained silent on the
definition of “used.” Instead, courts have focused on identifying the specific business component
for which the company is conducting qualified research, and then determining if supplies are
used in that specific business component or a different business component.
After receiving this information from your tax department, you next confer with your external
tax advisor, Firm A. Please click below to continue to the next screen to receive Firm A’s
recommendation.
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[SCREEN 7]
RECOMMENDATION FROM EXTERNAL TAX PROFESSIONALS
Thank you for asking us for advice regarding your R&D Credit. We always appreciate the
opportunity to provide tax services to Maylor Corp. We have read through the information that
your tax department staff compiled regarding the UltraX supplies and the calculation of Maylor
Corp’s R&D Credit. In evaluating the possibility of including the UltraX supplies as qualified
research expenses for the R&D Credit, it may be helpful to consider the potential disclosure
requirements both for tax and financial statement purposes. Generally, disclosure is required in
the tax return if a tax position has a reasonable basis but not substantial authority; however, in
this case disclosure (on Schedule UTP) would be required if a reserve is recorded in the financial
statements for taking the new tax position. Essentially, the disclosure threshold for including the
UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit would be the more-likely-than-not threshold for both tax and
financial statement purposes.
There is a great deal of ambiguity in the tax rules on the topic of supplies as qualified research
expenses for the Research and Development Credit, thus the decision regarding the UltraX
supplies should depend in part upon your interpretation of the risk involved and your comfort
level. Given the facts that you provided, it appears that the inclusion of the UltraX supplies as
qualified expenses for the R&D Credit will hinge on whether these supplies were “used” in
qualified research. The Courts have not sufficiently defined the term “used” as it pertains to
supplies and the R&D Credit. The Courts have not addressed whether reused supplies qualify,
nor is it clear whether supplies that were not consumed qualify as “used” during research and
development activities. Given the inconclusive authority, our recommendation is that
Maylor Corp SHOULD NOT include the UltraX supplies in the R&D credit calculation.
You may however conclude that you are comfortable with including them in the calculation.

After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next page.
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[SCREEN 8]
RESPONSE SECTION I: Please respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor
Corp’s Tax Director.

What is the likelihood that you would include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses
for Maylor Corp’s Research & Development Credit?
Not
At All
Likely
0%

Extremely
Likely
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Continuing to envision yourself as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, what do you think Maylor Corp
should do?
Maylor Corp should include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses in the
R&D Credit calculation.
Maylor Corp should not include the UltraX supplies qualified research expenses in the
R&D Credit calculation.

If this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS would permit the
position that the UltraX supplies are qualified research expenses for Maylor Corp’s Research &
Development Credit?
Not
At All
Likely
0%

Extremely
Likely
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The advice from Firm A
is what I was expecting.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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[SCREEN 9]
Please continue to respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor Corp’s Tax
Director.

How certain would you want to be of your tax position before including the UltraX supplies as
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the recommendation of the external tax
professionals?
Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

How confident are you in the advice provided by the external tax professionals at Firm A?
Extremely Confident
Moderately Confident
Somewhat Confident
Slightly Confident
Not At All Confident
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[SCREEN 10]
RESPONSE SECTION II: In this study, Maylor Corp engages external tax professionals at
Firm A, which is not Maylor Corp’s audit firm, to assist with the tax work. Please answer the
following items as you think a corporation’s external tax professionals would respond in
arrangements such as this when the corporation’s external tax professionals are not from the
audit firm.]
[Client Advocacy]
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

In an instance where no judicial
authority exists with respect to an
issue and where the Code and
Regulations are ambiguous, tax
professionals should believe that the
taxpayer is entitled to take the most
favorable tax treatment.
Generally speaking, tax professionals'
loyalties should be first to the tax
system, then to the taxpayer.
Tax professionals should apply
ambiguous tax law to the taxpayer's
benefit.
When examining a tax return, tax
professionals should point out to
taxpayers reasonable positions they
could have taken which would have
contributed to minimizing their tax
liability.
Tax professionals should believe it is
important to encourage the taxpayer
to pay the least amount of taxes
payable.
Tax professionals should always
interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in
favor of the taxpayer.
Tax professionals should use trends
in the law by trying to establish a
pattern of more favorable treatment
for the taxpayer and then extending
the pattern to the taxpayer's position.
Where no judicial authority exists
with respect to an issue, tax
professionals should feel that the
taxpayer is entitled to take the most
favorable tax treatment.
Tax professionals should structure
transactions in ways that yield the
best tax result, even if the law is
unclear in an area.
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Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

[SCREEN 11]
[Manipulation Check Questions]
Regarding your role as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, which best describes the external tax
professionals that provided advice about the UltraX supplies?
Tax professionals at Firm A, which is also Maylor Corp’s audit firm
Tax professionals at Firm A, which is not Maylor Corp’s audit firm

Which of the following is more accurate based upon the tax scenario?
You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD include
the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation.
You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD NOT
include the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation.

The tax professionals at Firm A advised you about whether or not the UltraX supplies should be
included in the R&D Credit calculation. Please evaluate the recommendation of the tax
professionals at Firm A.
Very Aggressive
Aggressive
Somewhat Aggressive
Neither Aggressive nor Conservative
Somewhat Conservative
Conservative
Very Conservative
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[SCREEN 12]
[Demographic Questions]
To help us categorize your responses, can you please answer a few final questions about
yourself. All responses will be completely anonymous.

Please indicate your present job title within the company.
Chief Financial Officer
Vice President, Tax
Tax Director
Tax Controller
Tax Manager
Other (please specify)___________________________________________

Which best describes the company for which you currently work?
Domestic US only; Operations in one state
Domestic US only; Operations in multiple states
Multinational based in the US
Multinational based outside of the US
Other (please specify)___________________________________________

Regarding the company for which you currently work, which best describes the company’s
general attitude towards Federal income taxation?
Very Aggressive
Aggressive
Somewhat Aggressive
Neither Aggressive nor Conservative
Somewhat Conservative
Conservative
Very Conservative
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Regarding your company’s approach to US income tax reporting, how important is minimizing
the company’s risk of controversy with the IRS?
Extremely Important
Moderately Important
Somewhat Important
Slightly Important
Not At All Important

Does your company produce financial statements that are audited by a public accounting firm?
Yes
No

[Show this item if the response to the previous item is “Yes”]
Does the same public accounting firm engaged to audit your company’s financial statements also
provide your company with tax services?
Yes
No

How much of your company’s tax planning and compliance work is handled by third-party tax
professionals (rather than in-house)?
None
0%

All
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%
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60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

[Show this item if the response to the previous item is not “0%”]
How important are each of the following factors in the selection of your company’s current tax
service provider?
Not at all
Important

Slightly
Important

Somewhat
Important

Moderately
Important

Extremely
Important

Expertise in your company’s industry

History of established relationship with your company

Fees for total accounting and tax services

Independence from the audit firm

[Show this item if the response to the previous item is “0%”]
If your company were to hire a third-party tax service provider, how important would each of the
following factors be in the selection of a tax service provider?
Not at all
Important

Slightly
Important

Somewhat
Important

Moderately
Important

Extremely
Important

Expertise in your company’s industry

History of established relationship with your company

Fees for total accounting and tax services

Independence from the audit firm

Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the Research and Development
Credit?
Extremely Familiar
Moderately Familiar
Somewhat Familiar
Slightly Familiar
Not At All Familiar
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Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the tax authority relating to
supplies as qualified research expenses for the Research and Development Credit?
Extremely Familiar
Moderately Familiar
Somewhat Familiar
Slightly Familiar
Not At All Familiar

Are you a Certified Public Accountant?
Yes
No

How much total work experience have you had in the area of taxation?
No tax experience
Less than 3 years
3 to less than 5 years
5 to less than 7 years
7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______

Have you worked in public accounting?
Yes
No

[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”]
What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply.
Big 4
International/National
Regional/Local
Sole Proprietorship
Other (please specify)___________________________________________
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[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”]
How much public accounting work experience have you had in taxation?
No work experience in tax
Less than 3 years
3 to less than 5 years
5 to less than 7 years
7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______

[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”]
How much public accounting work experience have you had in auditing?
No work experience in auditing
Less than 3 years
3 to less than 5 years
5 to less than 7 years
7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return, how certain would
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return and engaged a paid
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax
position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

What is your gender?
Male
Female

What is your age?
Less than 35
35 - 44
45 - 54
55 - 64
65 and over
I would prefer not to answer

What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
High School
Bachelor’s or other undergraduate-level degree
Master’s or other graduate-level degree
Doctoral degree or other advanced graduate work
I would prefer not to answer

Please make any comments that you think would be helpful in understanding your responses.

Thank you so much for your participation!
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Condition 2: Tax-Nonaudit / Aggressive
[SCREEN 1]
Explanation of Research
Title of Project: Corporate Tax Decision Makers
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold
You are being invited to take part in a research project conducted by Bonnie Brown, Doctoral
Candidate, and Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor. You will be asked to answer questions
that will take about 20 minutes of your time. The purpose of this research is to examine
judgments by corporate tax decision makers. You will be asked to read a tax scenario involving a
hypothetical corporation. You will then be provided with some tax authority guidance and be
asked to answer questions about the tax scenario.
Please note that participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses will be
completely anonymous. If you decide to participate, you have the right to withdraw your consent
or discontinue participation at any time. There are no anticipated potential risks associated with
this study. You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints you may contact: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral
Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407)
823-1478 or by email at bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor,
Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, at (407) 823-3192
or by email at vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.
Since this research involves human participants, it has been reviewed and approved by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida. For information about the
rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University
of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite
501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901.

By clicking ">>" you are indicating that you wish to participate in this study.
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[SCREEN 2]
[Screening Questions]
Before we get started, please answer a few questions about yourself. These questions relate
to your experiences while employed in-house by a company. Please note these questions are
not asking about any experience you may have had working for a public accounting firm.

Do you have experience making in-house tax decisions for a company?
Yes
No
Have you been responsible for the in-house supervision of a company’s income tax return
preparation and filing?
Yes
No

Have you researched income tax matters on behalf of a company for which you worked?
Yes
No

Have you conducted tax planning on behalf of a company for which you worked?
Yes
No
Have you prepared or reviewed a company’s tax provision calculations while you were
employed in-house by that company?
Yes
No
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[SCREEN 3]
YOUR TASK
As a participant in this study, you will be asked to read a hypothetical tax scenario and then
respond to questions related to the scenario, share your attitudes and opinions in general, and
provide demographic information. We ask that you place yourself into the role of an in-house
Tax Director employed by a hypothetical corporation, Maylor Corp. Over the next several
screens you will read background information about Maylor Corp, your role as Maylor Corp’s
Tax Director, and a hypothetical tax research project. We anticipate it will take about 10 minutes
to read through this information. We sincerely appreciate receiving input from individuals with
your level of expertise, and your responses are very important to us. Thank you in advance for
your time!
Please note that the first few screens will require reading. The remaining screens will be
mostly questions.
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen.
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[SCREEN 4]
MAYLOR CORP & TAX DIRECTOR ROLE
Maylor Corp is a publicly traded manufacturing company with headquarters in the United States.
The company has operations in six U.S. states and also in a few other countries; consequently,
the company files tax returns with numerous taxing authorities. Over the past several years,
Maylor Corp has averaged annual gross revenue of around $200 million. Maylor Corp
historically has had taxable income, and it does not have any net operating loss carryforwards.
The GAAP effective tax rate generally hovers around 30 percent.
Again, please envision yourself in the role of Maylor Corp’s Tax Director. You have worked as
Maylor Corp’s Tax Director for three years. As Tax Director, you lead tax planning and tax
compliance for Maylor Corp and manage a team of dedicated staff. You work on matters related
to the company’s federal, international, and state income tax returns, as well as franchise, use,
and property taxes. In addition to tax compliance responsibilities, a significant portion of your
time is spent on tax planning, tax authority audits of federal and state income tax filings, and
accounting for income taxes for financial statement purposes. You are satisfied with your work
environment at Maylor Corp and feel that the company provides you with the resources
necessary to meet your job responsibilities. Further, your opinion appears to be valued within the
company and you currently have no plans to leave Maylor Corp.
You report to the CFO and work with both the management team within Maylor Corp as well as
third-party tax professionals external to Maylor Corp. For the last eight years, Maylor Corp’s tax
returns have been prepared and signed by Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm. Sizable research
projects are often conducted in-house by Maylor Corp’s tax department and then reviewed
by the external tax professionals at Firm A. Maylor Corp’s financial statements are audited
by Firm B, a different Big 4 accounting firm.

After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen.
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[SCREEN 5]
CURRENT PROJECT
You are presently working on a project to review the methods that have been used in Maylor
Corp’s Research and Development (R&D) Credit calculations. Maylor Corp currently takes the
R&D Credit, but the calculation is based upon an analysis conducted several years ago. After
consultation with the CFO, it was decided that the R&D Credit calculations should be updated.
In particular, you are considering how Maylor Corp should treat supplies related to a research
and development project conducted during the current tax year for UltraX, a new prototype
product.
ULTRAX SUPPLIES
Maylor Corp has spent $4.2 million on a project to develop a new prototype product, called
UltraX. Included in this amount is $950,000 of supplies. Maylor Corp had originally purchased
the supplies for production of the old model product, but later allocated these supplies to the
UltraX project. Maylor Corp has not capitalized or depreciated the cost of these supplies. The
supplies were used in the development of UltraX; however, none of the supplies were damaged
by the development process and thus were available for reuse during subsequent production of
UltraX. Following successful testing, Maylor Corp manufactured UltraX and is now selling it to
customers. Including the cost of the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation would
be advantageous for tax purposes. You need to determine if the UltraX supplies can be
included as qualified research expenses in the R&D Credit calculation.
You assign the task of gathering relevant tax authority to Maylor Corp’s tax department staff.
Once you review the preliminary opinion of your tax department staff, you will send this
information to the tax professionals at Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm which is not Maylor
Corp’s audit firm, and they will provide their recommendation on the treatment of UltraX
supplies for the R&D credit calculation. You will then evaluate the treatment of UltraX
supplies for the R&D credit calculation and make your decision.

After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen.
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[SCREEN 6]
TAX DEPARTMENT STAFF PRELIMINARY OPINION
The tax department staff has evaluated whether or not the UltraX supplies should be included as
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit. After considering the internal revenue code,
regulations, and other authority, Maylor Corp’s tax department staff concludes that the primary
uncertainty regarding the treatment of the supplies relates to whether the supplies were “used in
the conduct of qualified research.” They estimate that, should Maylor take the position that
the supplies are a qualified research expense, there is a 60% likelihood that the position
would be successfully upheld. The relevant authority related to whether supplies were “used” or
not is briefly summarized below:
Internal Revenue Code Section 41 indicates that qualified research expenses can include inhouse research expenses, including any amount paid or incurred for supplies used in the conduct
of qualified research. Regulation §1.41-2(b) says that supplies are used in the conduct of
qualified research if they are used in the performance of qualified services by an employee of the
taxpayer; however, expenditures for supplies that are indirect research expenditures or general
and administrative expenses do not qualify. The rules do not define indirect research
expenditures. The IRS has adopted the position that “used” means consumed, though nowhere in
the tax rules is used defined as consumed. The courts have thus far largely remained silent on the
definition of “used.” Instead, courts have focused on identifying the specific business component
for which the company is conducting qualified research, and then determining if supplies are
used in that specific business component or a different business component.
After receiving this information from your tax department, you next confer with your external
tax advisor, Firm A. Please click below to continue to the next screen to receive Firm A’s
recommendation.
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[SCREEN 7]
RECOMMENDATION FROM EXTERNAL TAX PROFESSIONALS
Thank you for asking us for advice regarding your R&D Credit. We always appreciate the
opportunity to provide tax services to Maylor Corp. We have read through the information that
your tax department staff compiled regarding the UltraX supplies and the calculation of Maylor
Corp’s R&D Credit. In evaluating the possibility of including the UltraX supplies as qualified
research expenses for the R&D Credit, it may be helpful to consider the potential disclosure
requirements both for tax and financial statement purposes. Generally, disclosure is required in
the tax return if a tax position has a reasonable basis but not substantial authority; however, in
this case disclosure (on Schedule UTP) would be required if a reserve is recorded in the financial
statements for taking the new tax position. Essentially, the disclosure threshold for including the
UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit would be the more-likely-than-not threshold for both tax and
financial statement purposes.
There is a great deal of ambiguity in the tax rules on the topic of supplies as qualified research
expenses for the Research and Development Credit, thus the decision regarding the UltraX
supplies should depend in part upon your interpretation of the risk involved and your comfort
level. Given the facts that you provided, it appears that the inclusion of the UltraX supplies as
qualified expenses for the R&D Credit will hinge on whether these supplies were “used” in
qualified research. The Courts have not sufficiently defined the term “used” as it pertains to
supplies and the R&D Credit. The Courts have not indicated that reused supplies do not qualify,
nor is it clear that supplies must be consumed to qualify as “used” during research and
development activities. Given the inconclusive authority, our recommendation is that
Maylor Corp SHOULD include the UltraX supplies in the R&D credit calculation. You
may however conclude that you are not comfortable with including them in the calculation.

After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next page.
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[SCREEN 8]
RESPONSE SECTION I: Please respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor
Corp’s Tax Director.

What is the likelihood that you would include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses
for Maylor Corp’s Research & Development Credit?
Not
At All
Likely
0%

Extremely
Likely
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Continuing to envision yourself as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, what do you think Maylor Corp
should do?
Maylor Corp should include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses in the
R&D Credit calculation.
Maylor Corp should not include the UltraX supplies qualified research expenses in the
R&D Credit calculation.

If this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS would permit the
position that the UltraX supplies are qualified research expenses for Maylor Corp’s Research &
Development Credit?
Not
At All
Likely
0%

Extremely
Likely
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The advice from Firm A
is what I was expecting.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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[SCREEN 9]
Please continue to respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor Corp’s Tax
Director.

How certain would you want to be of your tax position before including the UltraX supplies as
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the recommendation of the external tax
professionals?
Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

How confident are you in the advice provided by the external tax professionals at Firm A?
Extremely Confident
Moderately Confident
Somewhat Confident
Slightly Confident
Not At All Confident
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[SCREEN 10]
RESPONSE SECTION II: In this study, Maylor Corp engages external tax professionals at
Firm A, which is not Maylor Corp’s audit firm, to assist with the tax work. Please answer the
following items as you think a corporation’s external tax professionals would respond in
arrangements such as this when the corporation’s external tax professionals are not from the
audit firm.]
[Client Advocacy]
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

In an instance where no judicial
authority exists with respect to an
issue and where the Code and
Regulations are ambiguous, tax
professionals should believe that the
taxpayer is entitled to take the most
favorable tax treatment.
Generally speaking, tax professionals'
loyalties should be first to the tax
system, then to the taxpayer.
Tax professionals should apply
ambiguous tax law to the taxpayer's
benefit.
When examining a tax return, tax
professionals should point out to
taxpayers reasonable positions they
could have taken which would have
contributed to minimizing their tax
liability.
Tax professionals should believe it is
important to encourage the taxpayer
to pay the least amount of taxes
payable.
Tax professionals should always
interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in
favor of the taxpayer.
Tax professionals should use trends
in the law by trying to establish a
pattern of more favorable treatment
for the taxpayer and then extending
the pattern to the taxpayer's position.
Where no judicial authority exists
with respect to an issue, tax
professionals should feel that the
taxpayer is entitled to take the most
favorable tax treatment.
Tax professionals should structure
transactions in ways that yield the
best tax result, even if the law is
unclear in an area.
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Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

[SCREEN 11]
[Manipulation Check Questions]
Regarding your role as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, which best describes the external tax
professionals that provided advice about the UltraX supplies?
Tax professionals at Firm A, which is also Maylor Corp’s audit firm
Tax professionals at Firm A, which is not Maylor Corp’s audit firm

Which of the following is more accurate based upon the tax scenario?
You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD include
the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation.
You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD NOT
include the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation.

The tax professionals at Firm A advised you about whether or not the UltraX supplies should be
included in the R&D Credit calculation. Please evaluate the recommendation of the tax
professionals at Firm A.
Very Aggressive
Aggressive
Somewhat Aggressive
Neither Aggressive nor Conservative
Somewhat Conservative
Conservative
Very Conservative
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[SCREEN 12]
[Demographic Questions]
To help us categorize your responses, can you please answer a few final questions about
yourself. All responses will be completely anonymous.

Please indicate your present job title within the company.
Chief Financial Officer
Vice President, Tax
Tax Director
Tax Controller
Tax Manager
Other (please specify)___________________________________________

Which best describes the company for which you currently work?
Domestic US only; Operations in one state
Domestic US only; Operations in multiple states
Multinational based in the US
Multinational based outside of the US
Other (please specify)___________________________________________

Regarding the company for which you currently work, which best describes the company’s
general attitude towards Federal income taxation?
Very Aggressive
Aggressive
Somewhat Aggressive
Neither Aggressive nor Conservative
Somewhat Conservative
Conservative
Very Conservative
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Regarding your company’s approach to US income tax reporting, how important is minimizing
the company’s risk of controversy with the IRS?
Extremely Important
Moderately Important
Somewhat Important
Slightly Important
Not At All Important

Does your company produce financial statements that are audited by a public accounting firm?
Yes
No

[Show this item if the response to the previous item is “Yes”]
Does the same public accounting firm engaged to audit your company’s financial statements also
provide your company with tax services?
Yes
No

How much of your company’s tax planning and compliance work is handled by third-party tax
professionals (rather than in-house)?
None
0%

All
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%
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60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

[Show this item if the response to the previous item is not “0%”]
How important are each of the following factors in the selection of your company’s current tax
service provider?
Not at all
Important

Slightly
Important

Somewhat
Important

Moderately
Important

Extremely
Important

Expertise in your company’s industry

History of established relationship with your company

Fees for total accounting and tax services

Independence from the audit firm

[Show this item if the response to the previous item is “0%”]
If your company were to hire a third-party tax service provider, how important would each of the
following factors be in the selection of a tax service provider?
Not at all
Important

Slightly
Important

Somewhat
Important

Moderately
Important

Extremely
Important

Expertise in your company’s industry

History of established relationship with your company

Fees for total accounting and tax services

Independence from the audit firm

Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the Research and Development
Credit?
Extremely Familiar
Moderately Familiar
Somewhat Familiar
Slightly Familiar
Not At All Familiar
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Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the tax authority relating to
supplies as qualified research expenses for the Research and Development Credit?
Extremely Familiar
Moderately Familiar
Somewhat Familiar
Slightly Familiar
Not At All Familiar

Are you a Certified Public Accountant?
Yes
No

How much total work experience have you had in the area of taxation?
No tax experience
Less than 3 years
3 to less than 5 years
5 to less than 7 years
7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______

Have you worked in public accounting?
Yes
No

[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”]
What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply.
Big 4
International/National
Regional/Local
Sole Proprietorship
Other (please specify)___________________________________________
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[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”]
How much public accounting work experience have you had in taxation?
No work experience in tax
Less than 3 years
3 to less than 5 years
5 to less than 7 years
7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______

[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”]
How much public accounting work experience have you had in auditing?
No work experience in auditing
Less than 3 years
3 to less than 5 years
5 to less than 7 years
7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return, how certain would
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return and engaged a paid
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax
position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

What is your gender?
Male
Female

What is your age?
Less than 35
35 - 44
45 - 54
55 - 64
65 and over
I would prefer not to answer

What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
High School
Bachelor’s or other undergraduate-level degree
Master’s or other graduate-level degree
Doctoral degree or other advanced graduate work
I would prefer not to answer

Please make any comments that you think would be helpful in understanding your responses.

Thank you so much for your participation!
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Condition 3: Tax-Audit / Conservative
[SCREEN 1]
Explanation of Research
Title of Project: Corporate Tax Decision Makers
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold
You are being invited to take part in a research project conducted by Bonnie Brown, Doctoral
Candidate, and Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor. You will be asked to answer questions
that will take about 20 minutes of your time. The purpose of this research is to examine
judgments by corporate tax decision makers. You will be asked to read a tax scenario involving a
hypothetical corporation. You will then be provided with some tax authority guidance and be
asked to answer questions about the tax scenario.
Please note that participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses will be
completely anonymous. If you decide to participate, you have the right to withdraw your consent
or discontinue participation at any time. There are no anticipated potential risks associated with
this study. You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints you may contact: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral
Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407)
823-1478 or by email at bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor,
Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, at (407) 823-3192
or by email at vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.
Since this research involves human participants, it has been reviewed and approved by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida. For information about the
rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University
of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite
501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901.

By clicking ">>" you are indicating that you wish to participate in this study.
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[SCREEN 2]
[Screening Questions]
Before we get started, please answer a few questions about yourself. These questions relate
to your experiences while employed in-house by a company. Please note these questions are
not asking about any experience you may have had working for a public accounting firm.

Do you have experience making in-house tax decisions for a company?
Yes
No
Have you been responsible for the in-house supervision of a company’s income tax return
preparation and filing?
Yes
No

Have you researched income tax matters on behalf of a company for which you worked?
Yes
No

Have you conducted tax planning on behalf of a company for which you worked?
Yes
No
Have you prepared or reviewed a company’s tax provision calculations while you were
employed in-house by that company?
Yes
No
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[SCREEN 3]
YOUR TASK
As a participant in this study, you will be asked to read a hypothetical tax scenario and then
respond to questions related to the scenario, share your attitudes and opinions in general, and
provide demographic information. We ask that you place yourself into the role of an in-house
Tax Director employed by a hypothetical corporation, Maylor Corp. Over the next several
screens you will read background information about Maylor Corp, your role as Maylor Corp’s
Tax Director, and a hypothetical tax research project. We anticipate it will take about 10 minutes
to read through this information. We sincerely appreciate receiving input from individuals with
your level of expertise, and your responses are very important to us. Thank you in advance for
your time!
Please note that the first few screens will require reading. The remaining screens will be
mostly questions.
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen.
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[SCREEN 4]
MAYLOR CORP & TAX DIRECTOR ROLE
Maylor Corp is a publicly traded manufacturing company with headquarters in the United States.
The company has operations in six U.S. states and also in a few other countries; consequently,
the company files tax returns with numerous taxing authorities. Over the past several years,
Maylor Corp has averaged annual gross revenue of around $200 million. Maylor Corp
historically has had taxable income, and it does not have any net operating loss carryforwards.
The GAAP effective tax rate generally hovers around 30 percent.
Again, please envision yourself in the role of Maylor Corp’s Tax Director. You have worked as
Maylor Corp’s Tax Director for three years. As Tax Director, you lead tax planning and tax
compliance for Maylor Corp and manage a team of dedicated staff. You work on matters related
to the company’s federal, international, and state income tax returns, as well as franchise, use,
and property taxes. In addition to tax compliance responsibilities, a significant portion of your
time is spent on tax planning, tax authority audits of federal and state income tax filings, and
accounting for income taxes for financial statement purposes. You are satisfied with your work
environment at Maylor Corp and feel that the company provides you with the resources
necessary to meet your job responsibilities. Further, your opinion appears to be valued within the
company and you currently have no plans to leave Maylor Corp.
You report to the CFO and work with both the management team within Maylor Corp as well as
third-party tax professionals external to Maylor Corp. For the last eight years, Maylor Corp’s tax
returns have been prepared and signed by Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm. Sizable research
projects are often conducted in-house by Maylor Corp’s tax department and then reviewed
by the external tax professionals at Firm A. Maylor Corp’s financial statements are audited
by Firm A, the same Big 4 accounting firm.

After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen.
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[SCREEN 5]
CURRENT PROJECT
You are presently working on a project to review the methods that have been used in Maylor
Corp’s Research and Development (R&D) Credit calculations. Maylor Corp currently takes the
R&D Credit, but the calculation is based upon an analysis conducted several years ago. After
consultation with the CFO, it was decided that the R&D Credit calculations should be updated.
In particular, you are considering how Maylor Corp should treat supplies related to a research
and development project conducted during the current tax year for UltraX, a new prototype
product.
ULTRAX SUPPLIES
Maylor Corp has spent $4.2 million on a project to develop a new prototype product, called
UltraX. Included in this amount is $950,000 of supplies. Maylor Corp had originally purchased
the supplies for production of the old model product, but later allocated these supplies to the
UltraX project. Maylor Corp has not capitalized or depreciated the cost of these supplies. The
supplies were used in the development of UltraX; however, none of the supplies were damaged
by the development process and thus were available for reuse during subsequent production of
UltraX. Following successful testing, Maylor Corp manufactured UltraX and is now selling it to
customers. Including the cost of the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation would
be advantageous for tax purposes. You need to determine if the UltraX supplies can be
included as qualified research expenses in the R&D Credit calculation.
You assign the task of gathering relevant tax authority to Maylor Corp’s tax department staff.
Once you review the preliminary opinion of your tax department staff, you will send this
information to the tax professionals at Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm which is also
Maylor Corp’s audit firm, and they will provide their recommendation on the treatment of
UltraX supplies for the R&D credit calculation. You will then evaluate the treatment of
UltraX supplies for the R&D credit calculation and make your decision.

After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen.
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[SCREEN 6]
TAX DEPARTMENT STAFF PRELIMINARY OPINION
The tax department staff has evaluated whether or not the UltraX supplies should be included as
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit. After considering the internal revenue code,
regulations, and other authority, Maylor Corp’s tax department staff concludes that the primary
uncertainty regarding the treatment of the supplies relates to whether the supplies were “used in
the conduct of qualified research.” They estimate that, should Maylor take the position that
the supplies are a qualified research expense, there is a 60% likelihood that the position
would be successfully upheld. The relevant authority related to whether supplies were “used” or
not is briefly summarized below:
Internal Revenue Code Section 41 indicates that qualified research expenses can include inhouse research expenses, including any amount paid or incurred for supplies used in the conduct
of qualified research. Regulation §1.41-2(b) says that supplies are used in the conduct of
qualified research if they are used in the performance of qualified services by an employee of the
taxpayer; however, expenditures for supplies that are indirect research expenditures or general
and administrative expenses do not qualify. The rules do not define indirect research
expenditures. The IRS has adopted the position that “used” means consumed, though nowhere in
the tax rules is used defined as consumed. The courts have thus far largely remained silent on the
definition of “used.” Instead, courts have focused on identifying the specific business component
for which the company is conducting qualified research, and then determining if supplies are
used in that specific business component or a different business component.
After receiving this information from your tax department, you next confer with your external
tax advisor, Firm A. Please click below to continue to the next screen to receive Firm A’s
recommendation.
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[SCREEN 7]
RECOMMENDATION FROM EXTERNAL TAX PROFESSIONALS
Thank you for asking us for advice regarding your R&D Credit. We always appreciate the
opportunity to provide tax and audit services to Maylor Corp. We have read through the
information that your tax department staff compiled regarding the UltraX supplies and the
calculation of Maylor Corp’s R&D Credit. In evaluating the possibility of including the UltraX
supplies as qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit, it may be helpful to consider the
potential disclosure requirements both for tax and financial statement purposes. Generally,
disclosure is required in the tax return if a tax position has a reasonable basis but not substantial
authority; however, in this case disclosure (on Schedule UTP) would be required if a reserve is
recorded in the financial statements for taking the new tax position. Essentially, the disclosure
threshold for including the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit would be the more-likely-than-not
threshold for both tax and financial statement purposes.
There is a great deal of ambiguity in the tax rules on the topic of supplies as qualified research
expenses for the Research and Development Credit, thus the decision regarding the UltraX
supplies should depend in part upon your interpretation of the risk involved and your comfort
level. Given the facts that you provided, it appears that the inclusion of the UltraX supplies as
qualified expenses for the R&D Credit will hinge on whether these supplies were “used” in
qualified research. The Courts have not sufficiently defined the term “used” as it pertains to
supplies and the R&D Credit. The Courts have not addressed whether reused supplies qualify,
nor is it clear whether supplies that were not consumed qualify as “used” during research and
development activities. Given the inconclusive authority, our recommendation is that
Maylor Corp SHOULD NOT include the UltraX supplies in the R&D credit calculation.
You may however conclude that you are comfortable with including them in the calculation.

After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next page.
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[SCREEN 8]
RESPONSE SECTION I: Please respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor
Corp’s Tax Director.

What is the likelihood that you would include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses
for Maylor Corp’s Research & Development Credit?
Not
At All
Likely
0%

Extremely
Likely
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Continuing to envision yourself as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, what do you think Maylor Corp
should do?
Maylor Corp should include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses in the
R&D Credit calculation.
Maylor Corp should not include the UltraX supplies qualified research expenses in the
R&D Credit calculation.

If this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS would permit the
position that the UltraX supplies are qualified research expenses for Maylor Corp’s Research &
Development Credit?
Not
At All
Likely
0%

Extremely
Likely
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The advice from Firm A
is what I was expecting.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
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[SCREEN 9]
Please continue to respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor Corp’s Tax
Director.

How certain would you want to be of your tax position before including the UltraX supplies as
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the recommendation of the external tax
professionals?
Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

How confident are you in the advice provided by the external tax professionals at Firm A?
Extremely Confident
Moderately Confident
Somewhat Confident
Slightly Confident
Not At All Confident
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[SCREEN 10]
RESPONSE SECTION II: In this study, Maylor Corp engages external tax professionals at
Firm A, which is also Maylor Corp’s audit firm, to assist with the tax work. Please answer the
following items as you think a corporation’s external tax professionals would respond in
arrangements such as this when the corporation’s external tax professionals are from the audit
firm.
[Client Advocacy]
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

In an instance where no judicial
authority exists with respect to an
issue and where the Code and
Regulations are ambiguous, tax
professionals should believe that the
taxpayer is entitled to take the most
favorable tax treatment.
Generally speaking, tax professionals'
loyalties should be first to the tax
system, then to the taxpayer.
Tax professionals should apply
ambiguous tax law to the taxpayer's
benefit.
When examining a tax return, tax
professionals should point out to
taxpayers reasonable positions they
could have taken which would have
contributed to minimizing their tax
liability.
Tax professionals should believe it is
important to encourage the taxpayer
to pay the least amount of taxes
payable.
Tax professionals should always
interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in
favor of the taxpayer.
Tax professionals should use trends
in the law by trying to establish a
pattern of more favorable treatment
for the taxpayer and then extending
the pattern to the taxpayer's position.
Where no judicial authority exists
with respect to an issue, tax
professionals should feel that the
taxpayer is entitled to take the most
favorable tax treatment.
Tax professionals should structure
transactions in ways that yield the
best tax result, even if the law is
unclear in an area.
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Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

[SCREEN 11]
[Manipulation Check Questions]
Regarding your role as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, which best describes the external tax
professionals that provided advice about the UltraX supplies?
Tax professionals at Firm A, which is also Maylor Corp’s audit firm
Tax professionals at Firm A, which is not Maylor Corp’s audit firm

Which of the following is more accurate based upon the tax scenario?
You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD include
the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation.
You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD NOT
include the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation.

The tax professionals at Firm A advised you about whether or not the UltraX supplies should be
included in the R&D Credit calculation. Please evaluate the recommendation of the tax
professionals at Firm A.
Very Aggressive
Aggressive
Somewhat Aggressive
Neither Aggressive nor Conservative
Somewhat Conservative
Conservative
Very Conservative
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[SCREEN 12]
[Demographic Questions]
To help us categorize your responses, can you please answer a few final questions about
yourself. All responses will be completely anonymous.

Please indicate your present job title within the company.
Chief Financial Officer
Vice President, Tax
Tax Director
Tax Controller
Tax Manager
Other (please specify)___________________________________________

Which best describes the company for which you currently work?
Domestic US only; Operations in one state
Domestic US only; Operations in multiple states
Multinational based in the US
Multinational based outside of the US
Other (please specify)___________________________________________

Regarding the company for which you currently work, which best describes the company’s
general attitude towards Federal income taxation?
Very Aggressive
Aggressive
Somewhat Aggressive
Neither Aggressive nor Conservative
Somewhat Conservative
Conservative
Very Conservative
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Regarding your company’s approach to US income tax reporting, how important is minimizing
the company’s risk of controversy with the IRS?
Extremely Important
Moderately Important
Somewhat Important
Slightly Important
Not At All Important

Does your company produce financial statements that are audited by a public accounting firm?
Yes
No

[Show this item if the response to the previous item is “Yes”]
Does the same public accounting firm engaged to audit your company’s financial statements also
provide your company with tax services?
Yes
No

How much of your company’s tax planning and compliance work is handled by third-party tax
professionals (rather than in-house)?
None
0%

All
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%
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60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

[Show this item if the response to the previous item is not “0%”]
How important are each of the following factors in the selection of your company’s current tax
service provider?
Not at all
Important

Slightly
Important

Somewhat
Important

Moderately
Important

Extremely
Important

Expertise in your company’s industry

History of established relationship with your company

Fees for total accounting and tax services

Independence from the audit firm

[Show this item if the response to the previous item is “0%”]
If your company were to hire a third-party tax service provider, how important would each of the
following factors be in the selection of a tax service provider?
Not at all
Important

Slightly
Important

Somewhat
Important

Moderately
Important

Extremely
Important

Expertise in your company’s industry

History of established relationship with your company

Fees for total accounting and tax services

Independence from the audit firm

Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the Research and Development
Credit?
Extremely Familiar
Moderately Familiar
Somewhat Familiar
Slightly Familiar
Not At All Familiar

174

Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the tax authority relating to
supplies as qualified research expenses for the Research and Development Credit?
Extremely Familiar
Moderately Familiar
Somewhat Familiar
Slightly Familiar
Not At All Familiar

Are you a Certified Public Accountant?
Yes
No

How much total work experience have you had in the area of taxation?
No tax experience
Less than 3 years
3 to less than 5 years
5 to less than 7 years
7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______

Have you worked in public accounting?
Yes
No

[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”]
What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply.
Big 4
International/National
Regional/Local
Sole Proprietorship
Other (please specify)___________________________________________
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[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”]
How much public accounting work experience have you had in taxation?
No work experience in tax
Less than 3 years
3 to less than 5 years
5 to less than 7 years
7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______

[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”]
How much public accounting work experience have you had in auditing?
No work experience in auditing
Less than 3 years
3 to less than 5 years
5 to less than 7 years
7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return, how certain would
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return and engaged a paid
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax
position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

What is your gender?
Male
Female

What is your age?
Less than 35
35 - 44
45 - 54
55 - 64
65 and over
I would prefer not to answer

What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
High School
Bachelor’s or other undergraduate-level degree
Master’s or other graduate-level degree
Doctoral degree or other advanced graduate work
I would prefer not to answer

Please make any comments that you think would be helpful in understanding your responses.

Thank you so much for your participation!
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Condition 4: Tax-Audit / Aggressive
[SCREEN 1]
Explanation of Research
Title of Project: Corporate Tax Decision Makers
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold
You are being invited to take part in a research project conducted by Bonnie Brown, Doctoral
Candidate, and Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor. You will be asked to answer questions
that will take about 20 minutes of your time. The purpose of this research is to examine
judgments by corporate tax decision makers. You will be asked to read a tax scenario involving a
hypothetical corporation. You will then be provided with some tax authority guidance and be
asked to answer questions about the tax scenario.
Please note that participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses will be
completely anonymous. If you decide to participate, you have the right to withdraw your consent
or discontinue participation at any time. There are no anticipated potential risks associated with
this study. You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints you may contact: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral
Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407)
823-1478 or by email at bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor,
Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, at (407) 823-3192
or by email at vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.
Since this research involves human participants, it has been reviewed and approved by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida. For information about the
rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University
of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite
501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901.

By clicking ">>" you are indicating that you wish to participate in this study.
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[SCREEN 2]
[Screening Questions]
Before we get started, please answer a few questions about yourself. These questions relate
to your experiences while employed in-house by a company. Please note these questions are
not asking about any experience you may have had working for a public accounting firm.

Do you have experience making in-house tax decisions for a company?
Yes
No
Have you been responsible for the in-house supervision of a company’s income tax return
preparation and filing?
Yes
No

Have you researched income tax matters on behalf of a company for which you worked?
Yes
No

Have you conducted tax planning on behalf of a company for which you worked?
Yes
No
Have you prepared or reviewed a company’s tax provision calculations while you were
employed in-house by that company?
Yes
No

179

[SCREEN 3]
YOUR TASK
As a participant in this study, you will be asked to read a hypothetical tax scenario and then
respond to questions related to the scenario, share your attitudes and opinions in general, and
provide demographic information. We ask that you place yourself into the role of an in-house
Tax Director employed by a hypothetical corporation, Maylor Corp. Over the next several
screens you will read background information about Maylor Corp, your role as Maylor Corp’s
Tax Director, and a hypothetical tax research project. We anticipate it will take about 10 minutes
to read through this information. We sincerely appreciate receiving input from individuals with
your level of expertise, and your responses are very important to us. Thank you in advance for
your time!
Please note that the first few screens will require reading. The remaining screens will be
mostly questions.
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen.
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[SCREEN 4]
MAYLOR CORP & TAX DIRECTOR ROLE
Maylor Corp is a publicly traded manufacturing company with headquarters in the United States.
The company has operations in six U.S. states and also in a few other countries; consequently,
the company files tax returns with numerous taxing authorities. Over the past several years,
Maylor Corp has averaged annual gross revenue of around $200 million. Maylor Corp
historically has had taxable income, and it does not have any net operating loss carryforwards.
The GAAP effective tax rate generally hovers around 30 percent.
Again, please envision yourself in the role of Maylor Corp’s Tax Director. You have worked as
Maylor Corp’s Tax Director for three years. As Tax Director, you lead tax planning and tax
compliance for Maylor Corp and manage a team of dedicated staff. You work on matters related
to the company’s federal, international, and state income tax returns, as well as franchise, use,
and property taxes. In addition to tax compliance responsibilities, a significant portion of your
time is spent on tax planning, tax authority audits of federal and state income tax filings, and
accounting for income taxes for financial statement purposes. You are satisfied with your work
environment at Maylor Corp and feel that the company provides you with the resources
necessary to meet your job responsibilities. Further, your opinion appears to be valued within the
company and you currently have no plans to leave Maylor Corp.
You report to the CFO and work with both the management team within Maylor Corp as well as
third-party tax professionals external to Maylor Corp. For the last eight years, Maylor Corp’s tax
returns have been prepared and signed by Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm. Sizable research
projects are often conducted in-house by Maylor Corp’s tax department and then reviewed
by the external tax professionals at Firm A. Maylor Corp’s financial statements are audited
by Firm A, the same Big 4 accounting firm.

After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen.
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[SCREEN 5]
CURRENT PROJECT
You are presently working on a project to review the methods that have been used in Maylor
Corp’s Research and Development (R&D) Credit calculations. Maylor Corp currently takes the
R&D Credit, but the calculation is based upon an analysis conducted several years ago. After
consultation with the CFO, it was decided that the R&D Credit calculations should be updated.
In particular, you are considering how Maylor Corp should treat supplies related to a research
and development project conducted during the current tax year for UltraX, a new prototype
product.
ULTRAX SUPPLIES
Maylor Corp has spent $4.2 million on a project to develop a new prototype product, called
UltraX. Included in this amount is $950,000 of supplies. Maylor Corp had originally purchased
the supplies for production of the old model product, but later allocated these supplies to the
UltraX project. Maylor Corp has not capitalized or depreciated the cost of these supplies. The
supplies were used in the development of UltraX; however, none of the supplies were damaged
by the development process and thus were available for reuse during subsequent production of
UltraX. Following successful testing, Maylor Corp manufactured UltraX and is now selling it to
customers. Including the cost of the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation would
be advantageous for tax purposes. You need to determine if the UltraX supplies can be
included as qualified research expenses in the R&D Credit calculation.
You assign the task of gathering relevant tax authority to Maylor Corp’s tax department staff.
Once you review the preliminary opinion of your tax department staff, you will send this
information to the tax professionals at Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm which is also
Maylor Corp’s audit firm, and they will provide their recommendation on the treatment of
UltraX supplies for the R&D credit calculation. You will then evaluate the treatment of
UltraX supplies for the R&D credit calculation and make your decision.

After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen.
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[SCREEN 6]
TAX DEPARTMENT STAFF PRELIMINARY OPINION
The tax department staff has evaluated whether or not the UltraX supplies should be included as
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit. After considering the internal revenue code,
regulations, and other authority, Maylor Corp’s tax department staff concludes that the primary
uncertainty regarding the treatment of the supplies relates to whether the supplies were “used in
the conduct of qualified research.” They estimate that, should Maylor take the position that
the supplies are a qualified research expense, there is a 60% likelihood that the position
would be successfully upheld. The relevant authority related to whether supplies were “used” or
not is briefly summarized below:
Internal Revenue Code Section 41 indicates that qualified research expenses can include inhouse research expenses, including any amount paid or incurred for supplies used in the conduct
of qualified research. Regulation §1.41-2(b) says that supplies are used in the conduct of
qualified research if they are used in the performance of qualified services by an employee of the
taxpayer; however, expenditures for supplies that are indirect research expenditures or general
and administrative expenses do not qualify. The rules do not define indirect research
expenditures. The IRS has adopted the position that “used” means consumed, though nowhere in
the tax rules is used defined as consumed. The courts have thus far largely remained silent on the
definition of “used.” Instead, courts have focused on identifying the specific business component
for which the company is conducting qualified research, and then determining if supplies are
used in that specific business component or a different business component.
After receiving this information from your tax department, you next confer with your external
tax advisor, Firm A. Please click below to continue to the next screen to receive Firm A’s
recommendation.
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[SCREEN 7]
RECOMMENDATION FROM EXTERNAL TAX PROFESSIONALS
Thank you for asking us for advice regarding your R&D Credit. We always appreciate the
opportunity to provide tax and audit services to Maylor Corp. We have read through the
information that your tax department staff compiled regarding the UltraX supplies and the
calculation of Maylor Corp’s R&D Credit. In evaluating the possibility of including the UltraX
supplies as qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit, it may be helpful to consider the
potential disclosure requirements both for tax and financial statement purposes. Generally,
disclosure is required in the tax return if a tax position has a reasonable basis but not substantial
authority; however, in this case disclosure (on Schedule UTP) would be required if a reserve is
recorded in the financial statements for taking the new tax position. Essentially, the disclosure
threshold for including the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit would be the more-likely-than-not
threshold for both tax and financial statement purposes.
There is a great deal of ambiguity in the tax rules on the topic of supplies as qualified research
expenses for the Research and Development Credit, thus the decision regarding the UltraX
supplies should depend in part upon your interpretation of the risk involved and your comfort
level. Given the facts that you provided, it appears that the inclusion of the UltraX supplies as
qualified expenses for the R&D Credit will hinge on whether these supplies were “used” in
qualified research. The Courts have not sufficiently defined the term “used” as it pertains to
supplies and the R&D Credit. The Courts have not indicated that reused supplies do not qualify,
nor is it clear that supplies must be consumed to qualify as “used” during research and
development activities. Given the inconclusive authority, our recommendation is that
Maylor Corp SHOULD include the UltraX supplies in the R&D credit calculation. You
may however conclude that you are not comfortable with including them in the calculation.

After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next page.
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[SCREEN 8]
RESPONSE SECTION I: Please respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor
Corp’s Tax Director.

What is the likelihood that you would include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses
for Maylor Corp’s Research & Development Credit?
Not
At All
Likely
0%

Extremely
Likely
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Continuing to envision yourself as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, what do you think Maylor Corp
should do?
Maylor Corp should include the UltraX supplies as qualified research expenses in the
R&D Credit calculation.
Maylor Corp should not include the UltraX supplies qualified research expenses in the
R&D Credit calculation.

If this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS would permit the
position that the UltraX supplies are qualified research expenses for Maylor Corp’s Research &
Development Credit?
Not
At All
Likely
0%

Extremely
Likely
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The advice from Firm A
is what I was expecting.
Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

186

[SCREEN 9]
Please continue to respond to the following questions as if you are Maylor Corp’s Tax
Director.

How certain would you want to be of your tax position before including the UltraX supplies as
qualified research expenses for the R&D Credit?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the recommendation of the external tax
professionals?
Strongly Agree
Agree
Somewhat Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Somewhat Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

How confident are you in the advice provided by the external tax professionals at Firm A?
Extremely Confident
Moderately Confident
Somewhat Confident
Slightly Confident
Not At All Confident
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[SCREEN 10]
RESPONSE SECTION II: In this study, Maylor Corp engages external tax professionals at
Firm A, which is also Maylor Corp’s audit firm, to assist with the tax work. Please answer the
following items as you think a corporation’s external tax professionals would respond in
arrangements such as this when the corporation’s external tax professionals are from the audit
firm.
[Client Advocacy]
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

In an instance where no judicial
authority exists with respect to an
issue and where the Code and
Regulations are ambiguous, tax
professionals should believe that the
taxpayer is entitled to take the most
favorable tax treatment.
Generally speaking, tax professionals'
loyalties should be first to the tax
system, then to the taxpayer.
Tax professionals should apply
ambiguous tax law to the taxpayer's
benefit.
When examining a tax return, tax
professionals should point out to
taxpayers reasonable positions they
could have taken which would have
contributed to minimizing their tax
liability.
Tax professionals should believe it is
important to encourage the taxpayer
to pay the least amount of taxes
payable.
Tax professionals should always
interpret unclear/ambiguous laws in
favor of the taxpayer.
Tax professionals should use trends
in the law by trying to establish a
pattern of more favorable treatment
for the taxpayer and then extending
the pattern to the taxpayer's position.
Where no judicial authority exists
with respect to an issue, tax
professionals should feel that the
taxpayer is entitled to take the most
favorable tax treatment.
Tax professionals should structure
transactions in ways that yield the
best tax result, even if the law is
unclear in an area.
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Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

[SCREEN 11]
[Manipulation Check Questions]
Regarding your role as Maylor Corp’s Tax Director, which best describes the external tax
professionals that provided advice about the UltraX supplies?
Tax professionals at Firm A, which is also Maylor Corp’s audit firm
Tax professionals at Firm A, which is not Maylor Corp’s audit firm

Which of the following is more accurate based upon the tax scenario?
You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD include
the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation.
You were advised by the tax professionals at Firm A that Maylor Corp SHOULD NOT
include the UltraX supplies in the R&D Credit calculation.

The tax professionals at Firm A advised you about whether or not the UltraX supplies should be
included in the R&D Credit calculation. Please evaluate the recommendation of the tax
professionals at Firm A.
Very Aggressive
Aggressive
Somewhat Aggressive
Neither Aggressive nor Conservative
Somewhat Conservative
Conservative
Very Conservative
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[SCREEN 12]
[Demographic Questions]
To help us categorize your responses, can you please answer a few final questions about
yourself. All responses will be completely anonymous.

Please indicate your present job title within the company.
Chief Financial Officer
Vice President, Tax
Tax Director
Tax Controller
Tax Manager
Other (please specify)___________________________________________

Which best describes the company for which you currently work?
Domestic US only; Operations in one state
Domestic US only; Operations in multiple states
Multinational based in the US
Multinational based outside of the US
Other (please specify)___________________________________________

Regarding the company for which you currently work, which best describes the company’s
general attitude towards Federal income taxation?
Very Aggressive
Aggressive
Somewhat Aggressive
Neither Aggressive nor Conservative
Somewhat Conservative
Conservative
Very Conservative
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Regarding your company’s approach to US income tax reporting, how important is minimizing
the company’s risk of controversy with the IRS?
Extremely Important
Moderately Important
Somewhat Important
Slightly Important
Not At All Important

Does your company produce financial statements that are audited by a public accounting firm?
Yes
No

[Show this item if the response to the previous item is “Yes”]
Does the same public accounting firm engaged to audit your company’s financial statements also
provide your company with tax services?
Yes
No

How much of your company’s tax planning and compliance work is handled by third-party tax
professionals (rather than in-house)?
None
0%

All
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%
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60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

[Show this item if the response to the previous item is not “0%”]
How important are each of the following factors in the selection of your company’s current tax
service provider?
Not at all
Important

Slightly
Important

Somewhat
Important

Moderately
Important

Extremely
Important

Expertise in your company’s industry

History of established relationship with your company

Fees for total accounting and tax services

Independence from the audit firm

[Show this item if the response to the previous item is “0%”]
If your company were to hire a third-party tax service provider, how important would each of the
following factors be in the selection of a tax service provider?
Not at all
Important

Slightly
Important

Somewhat
Important

Moderately
Important

Extremely
Important

Expertise in your company’s industry

History of established relationship with your company

Fees for total accounting and tax services

Independence from the audit firm

Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the Research and Development
Credit?
Extremely Familiar
Moderately Familiar
Somewhat Familiar
Slightly Familiar
Not At All Familiar
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Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the tax authority relating to
supplies as qualified research expenses for the Research and Development Credit?
Extremely Familiar
Moderately Familiar
Somewhat Familiar
Slightly Familiar
Not At All Familiar

Are you a Certified Public Accountant?
Yes
No

How much total work experience have you had in the area of taxation?
No tax experience
Less than 3 years
3 to less than 5 years
5 to less than 7 years
7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______

Have you worked in public accounting?
Yes
No

[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”]
What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply.
Big 4
International/National
Regional/Local
Sole Proprietorship
Other (please specify)___________________________________________
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[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”]
How much public accounting work experience have you had in taxation?
No work experience in tax
Less than 3 years
3 to less than 5 years
5 to less than 7 years
7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______

[Show this item if “Yes” response to “Have you worked in public accounting?”]
How much public accounting work experience have you had in auditing?
No work experience in auditing
Less than 3 years
3 to less than 5 years
5 to less than 7 years
7 or more years (Please specify how many years.) ______

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return, how certain would
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return and engaged a paid
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax
position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

What is your gender?
Male
Female

What is your age?
Less than 35
35 - 44
45 - 54
55 - 64
65 and over
I would prefer not to answer

What is the highest level of education that you have completed?
High School
Bachelor’s or other undergraduate-level degree
Master’s or other graduate-level degree
Doctoral degree or other advanced graduate work
I would prefer not to answer

Please make any comments that you think would be helpful in understanding your responses.

Thank you so much for your participation!
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Table 9: Demographics
(n = 58)
n

%

37
14
4
3

63.8
24.1
6.9
5.2

Gender
Male
Female

33
25

56.9
43.1

Work Experience in Public Accounting - All
No public accounting experience
Less than 6 months
6 months – 12 months
Greater than 1 year

24
21
7
6

41.4
36.2
12.1
10.3

Work Experience in Public Accounting - Tax
No public accounting experience in tax
Less than 6 months
6 months – 12 months
Greater than 1 year

38
12
4
4

65.5
20.7
6.9
6.9

Preparation of Most Recent Personal Tax Return
Prepared own return
Hired a paid preparer
Friend or relative prepared
Did not need to file

37
12
7
2

63.8
20.7
12.1
3.4

Number of Tax Classes Taken
1-2
3-4
5+

39
8
11

67.2
13.8
19.0

Age
21-25
26-30
31-35
Over 35
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics by Tax Advisor Role: Means (Standard Deviation)

Number of Observations
Likelihood
Trait Regulatory Focus
Perceived Client Advocacy
IRS Permits
Tax Risk Preference

Advocate
32
57.81% (31.90)
14.28 (11.63)
43.13* (8.79)
29.38% (25.39)
25.63% (18.48)

Overseer
26
50.77% (31.74)
17.00 (9.59)
37.73 (5.69)
31.15% (29.03)
25.38% (22.67)

Total
58
54.66% (31.75)
15.50 (10.76)
40.71 (7.97)
30.17% (26.85)
25.51% (20.28)

* Mean of Perceived Client Advocacy in the advocate condition is significantly greater than overseer condition (p < 0.01, twotailed)
Variable Definitions:
Tax Advisor Role is manipulated by characterizing Sullivan-Reed Corp’s external tax advisor as either an “advocate” or an
“overseer” to induce a regulatory focus state. In the Advocate condition (promotion focus state), participants are informed that
the company’s CFO states “the primary objective of hiring the external tax professionals at Firm A is to help Sullivan-Reed Corp
find the most advantageous tax opportunities in achieving our 30 percent target effective tax rate. In fact, we have continued to
employ Firm A’s tax services primarily due to the Firm’s eagerness and resourcefulness in seeking optimal tax outcomes.” In the
Overseer condition (prevention focus state), participants are informed that the company’s CFO states “the primary objective of
hiring the external tax professionals at Firm A is to make sure Sullivan-Reed Corp follows the tax rules in achieving our 30
percent target effective tax rate. In fact, we have continued to employ Firm A’s tax services primarily due to the Firm’s vigilance
and attention to detail in maintaining tax compliance.”
Likelihood is measured by asking, “What is the likelihood that you would recommend that Sullivan-Reed Corp include the hot
cocoa set product line in the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?” Likelihood uses an eleven-point scale with labeled
points ranging from 0% “Not At All Likely” to 100% “Extremely Likely.” Likelihood is presented as a percentage . Greater
likelihood of including the expenses indicates greater tax aggressiveness.
Trait Regulatory Focus is measured using an eighteen item scale (Lockwood et al 2002). Nine of the items measure promotion
focus and the other nine items measure prevention focus. Each of the items use a seven-point Likert-type scale with labeled
points ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree.” Trait Regulatory Focus is the sum of the promotion focus
items, less the sum of the prevention focus items and could theoretically range from -56 to 56.
Perceived Client Advocacy is measured as the sum of a nine item scale adapted from the Mason and Levy (2001) measure of
client advocacy. Each of the items use a seven-point Likert-type scale with labeled points ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to
7 “Strongly Agree.” Greater Client Advocacy scores reflect a stronger belief that the tax advisor in the experimental scenario is a
client advocate.
IRS Permits is measured by asking participants, “In your opinion, if this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood
that the IRS would uphold the position that Sullivan Reed Corp’s hot cocoa set product line qualifies for the Domestic Production
Activities Deduction?” IRS Permits uses an eleven-point scale with labeled points ranging from 0% “Not At All Likely” to 100%
“Extremely Likely.” Lower perceived likelihood that the IRS would permit the tax position represents greater perceived riskiness
of the tax position.
Tax Risk Preference is measured by asking “As Sullivan-Reed’s tax department staff, how certain would you want to be of your
tax position before including the hot cocoa set product line in the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?” The item uses an
eleven-point scale with labeled points ranging from 0% “Not At All Certain” to 100% “Extremely Certain.” Responses are
reverse coded such that a greater score reflects a greater risk preference (i.e., a preference for more uncertainty).
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Table 11: Correlation Coefficients
(1)
1. Likelihood
2. Trait Regulatory Focus
3. Tax Advisor Role
4. Perceived Client Advocacy
5. IRS Permits
6. Tax Risk Preference

1
0.179
0.111
0.109
0.489
0.139

(2)
0.180
1
-0.127
0.048
-0.128
-0.031

(3)
0.111
-0.120
1
0.340
-0.033
0.006

(4)
0.196
0.072
0.326
1
-0.131
0.137

(5)
0.426
-0.035
-0.007
-0.091
1
0.098

Notes:
Table values are Spearman’s Rho above the diagonal and Pearson Correlation Coefficients below the diagonal.
Bold correlations are significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
See Table 10 for variable definitions.
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(6)
0.123
-0.021
0.039
0.189
0.104
1

Table 12: Regression Results: Dependent Variable – Likelihood

Constant
Trait Regulatory Focus
Tax Advisor Role
Trait Regulatory Focus x Tax Advisor Role
IRS Permits
Adjusted R2
F Statistic
n

Coefficient
Estimate
0.220
0.005
0.037
0.004
0.638
0.278
6.484
58

Notes:
All p-values are two-tailed.
See Table 10 for variable definitions.
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Standard
Error
0.116
0.006
0.134
0.007
0.136

t-statistic
1.901
0.933
0.276
0.583
4.683

p-value
0.063
0.355
0.784
0.563
< 0.000

Table 13: Supplemental Analysis: Mediation Analysis Using PROCESS Procedure
Panel A: Regression of Perceived Client Advocacy on Tax Advisor Role
Coefficient
Estimate
37.731
5.394

Constant
Tax Advisor Role
R2
F Statistic
n

Standard
Error
1.483
1.997

t-statistic
25.440
2.702

p-value
< 0.000
0.009

0.115
7.299
58

Panel B: Regression of Likelihood on Perceived Client Advocacy, Tax Advisor Role,
Trait Regulatory Focus, Perceived Client Advocacy x Trait Regulatory Focus, and
IRS Permits
Constant
Perceived Client Advocacy
Tax Advisor Role
Trait Regulatory Focus
Perceived Client Advocacy x
Trait Regulatory Focus
IRS Permits
R2
F Statistic
n

Coefficient
Estimate
0.548
-0.008
0.063
-0.039

Standard
Error
0.291
0.007
0.073
0.019

t-statistic
1.882
-1.166
0.871
-2.117

p-value
0.066
0.249
0.388
0.039

0.001
0.549

0.001
0.133

2.564
4.137

0.013
< 0.000

0.413
7.302
58

Panel C: Conditional Indirect Effect of Tax Advisor Role on Likelihood at Values of
Trait Regulatory Focus*
Trait Regulatory Focus
4.7407
15.5000
26.2593

Indirect Effect
-0.0135
0.0533
0.1200

Boot SE
0.0323
0.0352
0.0687
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Bootstrapped 95% Confidence
Interval (1000 iterations)
Lower Limit
Upper Limit
-0.0899
0.0283
0.0025
0.1474
0.0189
0.2991

Panel D: Index of Moderated Mediation
Indirect Effect
0.0062

Boot SE
0.0038

Bootstrapped 95% Confidence
Interval (1000 iterations)
Lower Limit
Upper Limit
0.0007
0.0154

Notes:
*Values for the mediator, Trait Regulatory Focus, are the mean and plus/minus one SD from mean.
Mediation Analysis uses PROCESS procedure (Hayes 2013).
All p-values are two-tailed.
See Table 10 for variable definitions.
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Condition 1: Advocate
[SCREEN 1]
Explanation of Research
Title of Project: Corporate Tax and Individual Decision Making
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold
You are being invited to take part in a research project conducted by Bonnie Brown, Doctoral
Candidate, and Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor. You will be asked to answer questions
that will take about 20 minutes of your time. The purpose of this research is to examine
judgments related to corporate taxation. You will be asked to read a tax scenario involving a
hypothetical corporation. You will then be provided with some tax authority guidance and be
asked to answer questions about the tax scenario.
Please note that participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses will be
completely anonymous. If you decide to participate, you have the right to withdraw your consent
or discontinue participation at any time. There are no anticipated potential risks associated with
this study. You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints you may contact: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral
Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407)
823-1478 or by email at bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor,
Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, at (407) 823-3192
or by email at vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.
Since this research involves human participants, it has been reviewed and approved by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida. For information about the
rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University
of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite
501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901.

By clicking ">>" you are indicating that you wish to participate in this study.
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[SCREEN 2]
YOUR TASK
As a participant in this study, you will be asked to read a hypothetical scenario and then respond
to questions related to the scenario, share your attitudes and opinions in general, and provide
demographic information.
We ask that you place yourself into the role of a tax professional employed by a hypothetical
corporation, Sullivan-Reed Corp. Over the next several screens you will read background
information about Sullivan-Reed Corp, your role within Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department,
and a hypothetical tax research project. So that we do not take up too much of your time, we
have not included all of the information you would typically have when making similar
decisions. However, the information provided should be sufficient to make an informed
judgment. We sincerely appreciate receiving your input, and your responses are very important
to us. Thank you in advance for your time!
Please note that the first few screens will require reading that should take about 10 to 15
minutes. The remaining screens will be mostly questions.
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen.
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[SCREEN 3]
SULLIVAN-REED CORP & TAX DEPARTMENT
Sullivan-Reed Corp is a publicly traded manufacturing company with headquarters in the United
States. The company has operations in six U.S. states and also in a few other countries;
consequently, the company files tax returns with numerous taxing authorities. Over the past
several years, Sullivan-Reed Corp has averaged annual gross receipts of around $200 million.
Sullivan-Reed Corp historically has had taxable income, and it does not have any net operating
loss carryforwards. The GAAP effective tax rate generally hovers around 30 percent. SullivanReed Corp’s in-house tax department coordinates the company’s tax function, outsourcing some
of the work to third-party tax professionals. Within the company, the Tax Director leads tax
planning and compliance and is supported by a dedicated team of tax department staff. In
addition to income tax compliance responsibilities, the tax department is also responsible for tax
planning, tax authority audits of federal and state income tax filings, and accounting for income
taxes for financial statement purposes.
You have served as an in-house tax department staff member for a year and a half. You primarily
assist with matters related to the company’s income tax returns - federal, state/local, and
international filings. You report to the Tax Director, who reports to the CFO and works with both
the management team within Sullivan-Reed Corp as well as third-party tax professionals external
to Sullivan-Reed Corp. For the last eight years, Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax returns have been
prepared and signed by Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm. Sullivan-Reed Corp’s financial
statements are audited by a different Big 4 accounting firm. Research projects are often
conducted in-house by Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department and then reviewed by the external
tax professionals at Firm A.
In a recent staff meeting, the CFO of Sullivan-Reed Corp stated that “the primary objective of
hiring the external tax professionals at Firm A is to help Sullivan-Reed Corp find the most
advantageous tax opportunities in achieving our 30 percent target effective tax rate. In fact, we
have continued to employ Firm A’s tax services primarily due to the Firm’s eagerness and
resourcefulness in seeking optimal tax outcomes.”

Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above.
I have read the information
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[SCREEN 4]
CURRENT PROJECT
You are presently working on a project related to a new product line that Sullivan-Reed Corp
introduced during the current tax year. The new product line consists of hot cocoa sets containing
gourmet melting chocolate (dark and milk chocolate) on stir sticks, handcrafted marshmallows,
and mix-ins such as peppermint sugar sprinkles, cinnamon candies, hot fudge, and caramel
sauce. The company conducts market research to predict successful item combinations for the
hot cocoa sets. Sullivan-Reed Corp does not manufacture any of the hot cocoa set components;
rather the company purchases all of the prepackaged items (chocolate, marshmallows, and mixins) as well as oversized deluxe mugs and filler packaging from various vendors. The company
has no input into the design of any hot cocoa set items, filler, or packaging. Further, they
purchase these items in bulk “off the shelf” from vendors. Sullivan-Reed Corp developed design
templates to standardize the assembly of the hot cocoa sets. Company employees arrange the
individually packaged items in the mugs according to the design templates to create the hot
cocoa sets.
You have been assigned the task of determining if the activities associated with assembling
the hot cocoa set product line are eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction.
Sullivan-Reed Corp has previously taken the Domestic Production Activities Deduction for other
products; however, prior to the new hot cocoa set product line, the company had only
manufactured products onsite. The production process for the hot cocoa sets (purchase premade
components and assemble onsite) differs substantially from actually manufacturing products
onsite. Including the hot cocoa set in the Domestic Production Activities Deduction would be
advantageous for tax purposes.
After doing some initial research, you have identified five particularly relevant items. Summaries
and excerpts of these authorities are displayed on the next screens.

Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above.
I have read the information
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[SCREEN 5]
RELEVANT TAX AUTHORITY
Summaries and excerpts from the relevant authorities you have found (listed below) are provided
on the next several screens. Please read these authorities to make your recommendation about
whether Sullivan-Reed Corp should take the Domestic Production Activities Deduction for the
hot cocoa set product line. Please note there is no back button; however, you will have an
opportunity later to review the tax authority and information about the hot cocoa product line
again before making your recommendation.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Internal Revenue Code Section 199 (Effective January 1, 2005)
Regulation §1.199-3(e) (Effective June 1, 2006)
United States v. Dean (May 7, 2013)
Proposed Amendment to Regulation §1.199-3 (August 27, 2015)
Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States (September 24, 2015)
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[SCREEN 6]
A. Internal Revenue Code Section 199
How is the Domestic Production Activities Deduction calculated?
There shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to 9 percent of the lesser of the qualified
production activities income of the taxpayer for the taxable year, or taxable income (determined
without regard to this section) for the taxable year (Sec. 199(a)). The amount of the deduction
allowable under subsection (a) for any taxable year shall not exceed 50 percent of the W-2 wages
of the taxpayer for the taxable year (Sec. 199(b)(1)).
What activities qualify for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?
…any lease, rental, license, sale, exchange, or other disposition of qualifying production
property which was manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted by the taxpayer in whole or
in significant part within the United States… (Sec. 199(c)(4)).
How is “manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted” (MPGE) defined? What activities
qualify as MPGE activities?
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this
section… (Sec. 199(d)(10)).

Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above.
I have read the information
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[SCREEN 7]
B. Regulation §1.199-3(e): Deﬁnition of manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted
(1) In general.—…the term MPGE includes manufacturing, producing, growing, extracting,
installing, developing, improving, and creating QPP [qualified production property]; making
QPP out of scrap, salvage, or junk material as well as from new or raw material by processing,
manipulating, reﬁning, or changing the form of an article, or by combining or assembling two or
more articles…
(2) Packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly.— If a taxpayer packages,
repackages, labels, or performs minor assembly of QPP [qualified production property] and the
taxpayer engages in no other MPGE activity with respect to that QPP, the taxpayer's packaging,
repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly does not qualify as MPGE with respect to that QPP.

Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above.
I have read the information
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[SCREEN 8]
C. United States v. Dean, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (U.S. District Court, C.D. Cal. May 7, 2013)
Summary of United States v. Dean:
Houdini, Inc., a company engaged in the design, assembly, and sale of gift baskets and gift
towers, claimed deductions for domestic production activities. Houdini, Inc. argued that they
manufactured or produced gift baskets and gift towers. The government argued that Houdini,
Inc. was merely packaging and repackaging products, activities which would not qualify as
MPGE (“manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted”). The Court rejected the government’s
argument. The court stated that “the final products, gift baskets and towers, are distinct in form
and purpose from the individual items inside.” The Court reasoned that Houdini, Inc.’s
production process changed the form of the product in accordance with the definition of MPGE
within Treasury Regulation §1.199-3.
Excerpts from United States v. Dean:
In 1989, Dean and O'Brien incorporated their business as Houdini, Inc. (“Houdini”). Houdini
describes its business as the design, assembly, and sale of gift baskets and gift towers through
both wholesale and retail channels. A “gift tower” is a set of decorative boxes into which
different food items are placed. During the holiday season, Houdini can complete up to 80,000
baskets in a day.
…
Designing a Houdini gift basket involves, among other things, selecting the basket and the items
to be placed inside, as well as the “void ﬁll” that holds everything together. Houdini orders its
baskets from suppliers in China. When it orders baskets, Houdini reviews samples and then
provides the manufacturer with exact speciﬁcations for them. Houdini also purchases containers
from suppliers in the United States. The void ﬁll in a Houdini gift basket is a cardboard form or
Styrofoam base that is placed inside the basket; the other items are in turn placed inside. Houdini
generally designs the cardboard forms, indicating where the cuts and folds should be made; it
then hires another company to make the cardboard forms.
…
Houdini purchases the items that are placed inside the baskets from other companies.
…
Houdini's assembly line consists of workers who place the individual food items into baskets in
accordance with detailed work instructions prepared by Houdini. In preparing a ﬁnished gift
basket, employees at several diﬀerent stations on the line put diﬀerent items into the basket.
After the items have been placed inside the basket, a plastic wrapping is heated to shrink around
the basket. Once the plastic wrapping is completed, a bow is placed on the basket, if called for in
the design of the basket. For a gift tower, the food-safe packages are placed directly into
decorative boxes. The boxes in the gift tower are then connected either through cardboard tabs or
through sticky-dot adhesives.
…
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Defendants argue that Houdini's production process “chang[es] the form of an article” within the
meaning of Treasury Regulation §1.199-3(e)(1). The Court agrees. Houdini ﬁrst selects various
items—chocolates, cookies, candy, cheeses, crackers, wine or alcohol, packaging materials, and
a basket or boxes—for its ﬁnal products. Next, the individual items are assembled in a gift basket
or gift tower based on one of many detailed plans. This complex production process relies on
both assembly line workers and machines. The ﬁnal products, gift baskets and gift towers, are
distinct in form and purpose from the individual items inside. The individual items would
typically be purchased by consumers as ordinary groceries. But after Houdini's production
process, they are transformed into a gift that is usually given during the holiday season.

Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above.
I have read the information
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[SCREEN 9]
D. Proposed Amendment to Regulation §1.199-3, August 27, 2015
(Proposed Regulations do not have the force of the law and carry little weight in the litigation
process until they are finalized, however they do reflect the IRS’s position on an issue.)
Section 1.199-3(e)(2) provides that if a taxpayer packages, repackages, labels, or performs minor
assembly of QPP [qualified production property] and the taxpayer engages in no other MPGE
activities with respect to that QPP, the taxpayer's packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor
assembly does not qualify as MPGE with respect to that QPP. This rule has been the subject of
recent litigation. See United States v. Dean, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (concluding
that the taxpayer's activity of preparing gift baskets was a manufacturing activity and not solely
packaging or repackaging for purposes of section 199). The Treasury Department and the IRS
disagree with the interpretation of §1.199-3(e)(2) adopted by the court in United States v. Dean,
and the proposed regulations add an example (Example 9) that illustrates the appropriate
application of this rule in a situation in which the taxpayer is engaged in no other MPGE
activities with respect to the QPP other than those described in §1.199-3(e)(2).
…
Example 9. X is in the business of selling gift baskets containing various products that are
packaged together. X purchases the baskets and the products included within the baskets from
unrelated third parties. X plans where and how the products should be arranged into the baskets.
On an assembly line in a gift basket production facility, X arranges the products into the baskets
according to that plan, sometimes relabeling the products before placing them into the baskets. X
engages in no other activity besides packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly with
respect to the gift baskets. Therefore, X is not considered to have engaged in the MPGE of
QPP under paragraph (e)(2) of this section.

Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above.
I have read the information
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[SCREEN 10]
E. Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States, No. 3:12-cv-50180 (U.S. District Court, N.D. Ill.
September 24, 2015)
Summary of Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States:
Precision Dose, Inc. purchased certain drugs in bulk and then sold them as unit doses (drugs in
single-dose containers). The company had a complex production process involving extensive
research about demand for medications, appropriate materials for containers, and drug storage.
The company worked with vendors to produce containers according to precise specifications and
dedicated significant resources to dose standardization and process documentation. As in United
States v. Dean, the government argued that the company was merely packaging and repackaging
products, activities which would not qualify as MPGE (“manufactured, produced, grown, or
extracted”). The Court determined that Precision Dose, Inc. engaged in a “complex production
process” that resulted in a “distinct ﬁnal product” and permitted the domestic production activity
deduction.
Excerpts from Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States:
The facts show plaintiﬀ looks for drugs it believes it can successfully process into and sell as unit
doses. Drug manufacturers do not seek bids from companies to repackage their drugs into small
packages. Plaintiﬀ engages in market research to determine which drugs to buy to turn into unit
doses. Plaintiﬀ works with potential customers to identify needs for new unit dose products.
Plaintiﬀ acquires sample drugs and tests them for suitability to be processed into unit doses.
Plaintiﬀ prepares speciﬁcations and works with vendors to develop cups and syringes that are
suitable to use for unit doses for each drug that it buys. Sometimes existing cups or syringes are
used and sometimes new ones are created through the joint eﬀorts of plaintiﬀ's personnel and
vendor personnel. Plaintiﬀ conducts mixing studies to determine the best mixing procedures to
use to obtain the proper suspension of the active ingredient in each unit dose and whether the
drug can be mixed in such a way that the proper suspension can be obtained at all. It tests plastics
to determine compatibility with speciﬁc drugs for use in the cups or syringes. The cups, lidding,
trays and product inserts are produced by vendors using plaintiﬀ's proprietary design. For cups
for which plaintiﬀ owns the designs vendors use molds owned by plaintiﬀ to produce the cups,
for trays, which are designed by plaintiﬀ, vendors use molds owned by plaintiﬀ. For lidding
which is designed by plaintiﬀ, the vendors use cutting dies owned by plaintiﬀ.
…
This brief recitation of portions of plaintiﬀ's activities in producing the unit doses show, that like
in Dean, plaintiﬀ engages in a “complex production process that results in a distinct ﬁnal
product.” The government argues Dean is wrongly decided. It contends the Dean court failed to
understand that all Houdini's activities were just part of the repackaging process and thus did not
take those activities outside the (e)(2) exception. However, the court disagrees. Dean correctly
determined that Houdini was creating an entirely new product – a gift basket or gift tower –
which was not simply a method of repackaging the components included in the baskets or
214

towers. A gift basket is not simply a container of stuff – like a grocery cart in which the items
had been dropped when pulled from the shelf. It is a unique product itself. Likewise, a unit dose
is a unique product. Plaintiﬀ is entitled to the Section 199 deduction.

Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above.
I have read the information
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[SCREEN 11]
Now that you have reviewed these authorities, you will be asked to evaluate whether the hot
cocoa set product line is eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction and make
your recommendation to the Tax Director. After receiving your recommendation, the Tax
Director will likely consult the company’s external tax professionals at Firm A who were hired
to help the company find the most advantageous tax opportunities.
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[SCREEN 12]
RESPONSE SECTION I: Please respond to the following questions as if you are a member
of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department staff.

For your reference, the relevant tax authority is provided again below. Clicking "Review Tax
Authority" will allow you to open a PDF document in a separate window.
Review Tax Authority

Information about your current project, the hot cocoa set product line, is provided again below.
Clicking "Review Current Project Facts" will allow you to open a PDF document in a separate
window.
Review Current Project Facts

What is the likelihood that you would recommend that Sullivan-Reed Corp include the hot cocoa
set product line in the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?
Not
At All
Likely
0%

Extremely
Likely
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The hot cocoa set product
line is eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction.
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neither Agree Somewhat
nor Disagree
Agree
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Agree

Strongly
Agree

In your opinion, if this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS
would uphold the position that Sullivan Reed Corp’s hot cocoa set product line qualifies for the
Domestic Production Activities Deduction?
Not
At All
Likely
0%

Extremely
Likely
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

In your opinion, if this position was examined in court, what is the likelihood that the Court
would uphold the position that Sullivan Reed Corp’s hot cocoa set product line qualifies for the
Domestic Production Activities Deduction?
Not
At All
Likely
0%

Extremely
Likely
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

As Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department staff, how certain would you want to be of your tax
position before including the hot cocoa set product line in the Domestic Production Activities
Deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

[SCREEN 13]
How important were each of the following authorities in your evaluation of whether the hot
cocoa set product line is eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?
Not at all
Important

Internal Revenue Code Section 199
Regulation §1.199-3(e)
United States v. Dean (Gift baskets)
Proposed Amendment to Regulation §1.199-3
Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States (Unit doses)
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Slightly
Important

Somewhat
Important

Moderately
Important

Extremely
Important

[SCREEN 14]
These statements relate to your job at Sullivan-Reed Corp. Continuing to envision yourself as a
member of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department staff, please rate how often you could imagine
yourself focusing on these thoughts and activities while you are working.
[Regulatory Focus State: Regulatory Focus at Work Scale (RWS)]
Never
I focus on…
Following rules and regulations at work
Completing work tasks correctly
Doing my duty at work
My work responsibilities
Fulfilling my work obligations
The details of my work
Accomplishing a lot at work
Getting my work done no matter what
Getting a lot of work finished in a short amount of
time
Work activities that allow me to get ahead at work
My work accomplishments
How many job tasks I can complete
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Rarely

Sometimes

Often

Constantly

[SCREEN 15]
In this study, Sullivan-Reed Corp engages external tax professionals at Firm A to assist with the
tax work. Please answer the following items as you think Sullivan-Reed Corp’s external tax
professionals at Firm A would respond.
[Client Advocacy]
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

In an instance where no judicial
authority exists with respect to
an issue and where the Code and
Regulations are ambiguous, tax
professionals should believe that
the taxpayer is entitled to take
the most favorable tax treatment.
Generally speaking, tax
professionals' loyalties should be
first to the tax system, then to
the taxpayer.
Tax professionals should apply
ambiguous tax law to the
taxpayer's benefit.
When examining a tax return,
tax professionals should point
out to taxpayers reasonable
positions they could have taken
which would have contributed to
minimizing their tax liability.
Tax professionals should believe
it is important to encourage the
taxpayer to pay the least amount
of taxes payable.
Tax professionals should always
interpret unclear/ambiguous
laws in favor of the taxpayer.
Tax professionals should use
trends in the law by trying to
establish a pattern of more
favorable treatment for the
taxpayer and then extending the
pattern to the taxpayer's position.
Where no judicial authority
exists with respect to an issue,
tax professionals should feel that
the taxpayer is entitled to take
the most favorable tax treatment.
Tax professionals should
structure transactions in ways
that yield the best tax result,
even if the law is unclear in an
area.
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Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

[SCREEN 16]
[Manipulation Check Question]
Based upon the tax scenario, which of the following more accurately describes the primary
function of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s external tax professionals at Firm A?
The primary function of the tax professionals at Firm A is to…
find the most advantageous tax opportunities for Sullivan-Reed Corp
make sure Sullivan-Reed Corp follows the tax rules
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[SCREEN 17]
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS: Now moving away from the scenario, please provide the
following information. All responses to this survey are anonymous and confidential.
How many tax classes have you taken? Include the current semester.
0
1-2
3-4
5 or more

Please select your graduate degree program.
MACC, Tax Track
MACC, BMA Track
MSA
Other (Please specify)_________

Do you plan to work in taxation?
Yes
No

How much total work experience have you had in public accounting?
No experience in public accounting
Less than 6 months
6 – 12 months
More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________

How much work experience have you had in public accounting, specifically in tax?
No tax experience in public accounting
Less than 6 months
6 – 12 months
More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________
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What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply.
No experience in public accounting
Big 4
International/National
Regional/Local
Sole Proprietorship
Other (Please specify)_________

Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the Domestic Production
Activities Deduction?
Very Familiar
Familiar
Neither Familiar nor Unfamiliar
Unfamiliar
Very Unfamiliar

Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the tax authority relating to
activities that qualify for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?
Very Familiar
Familiar
Neither Familiar nor Unfamiliar
Unfamiliar
Very Unfamiliar

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return, how certain would
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return and engaged a paid
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax
position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Who prepared your most recent individual income tax return?
I prepared my own tax return
I hired a paid preparer
A friend or relative prepared my tax return
I do not file a tax return
Other (Please specify)_________

What is your age?
18 - 20
21 - 25
26 - 30
31 - 35
36 and over

What is your gender?
Male
Female
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70%

80%

90%

100%

[SCREEN 18]
FINAL RESPONSE SECTION: Please use the scale to indicate your response to each of the
items below. There are no right or wrong answers. Therefore, please respond as honestly and
accurately as possible.
[Trait Regulatory Focus: General Regulatory Focus Measure (GRFM)]
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

In general, I am focused on
preventing negative events in my
life.
I am anxious that I will fall short
of my responsibilities and
obligations.
I frequently imagine how I will
achieve my hopes and
aspirations.
I often think about the person I
am afraid I might become in the
future.
I often think about the person I
would ideally like to be in the
future.
I typically focus on the success I
hope to achieve in the future.
I often worry that I will fail to
accomplish my academic goals.
I often think about how I will
achieve academic success.
I often imagine myself
experiencing bad things that I
fear might happen to me.
I frequently think about how I
can prevent failures in my life.
I am more oriented toward
preventing losses than I am
toward achieving gains.
My major goal in school right
now is to achieve my academic
ambitions.
My major goal in school right
now is to avoid becoming an
academic failure.
I see myself as someone who is
primarily striving to reach my
“ideal self”—to fulfill my hopes,
wishes, and aspirations.
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Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

I see myself as someone who is
primarily striving to become the
self I “ought” to be—to fulfill
my duties, responsibilities, and
obligations.
In general, I am focused on
achieving positive outcomes in
my life.
I often imagine myself
experiencing good things that I
hope will happen to me.
Overall, I am more oriented
toward achieving success than
preventing failure.

Please make any comments you think would be helpful in understanding your responses.
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Strongly
Agree

Condition 2: Overseer
[SCREEN 1]
Explanation of Research
Title of Project: Corporate Tax and Individual Decision Making
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold
You are being invited to take part in a research project conducted by Bonnie Brown, Doctoral
Candidate, and Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor. You will be asked to answer questions
that will take about 20 minutes of your time. The purpose of this research is to examine
judgments related to corporate taxation. You will be asked to read a tax scenario involving a
hypothetical corporation. You will then be provided with some tax authority guidance and be
asked to answer questions about the tax scenario.
Please note that participation in this study is completely voluntary and your responses will be
completely anonymous. If you decide to participate, you have the right to withdraw your consent
or discontinue participation at any time. There are no anticipated potential risks associated with
this study. You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints you may contact: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral
Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407)
823-1478 or by email at bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor,
Kenneth G. Dixon School of Accounting, College of Business Administration, at (407) 823-3192
or by email at vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.
Since this research involves human participants, it has been reviewed and approved by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Central Florida. For information about the
rights of people who take part in research, please contact: Institutional Review Board, University
of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite
501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901.

By clicking ">>" you are indicating that you wish to participate in this study.
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[SCREEN 2]
YOUR TASK
As a participant in this study, you will be asked to read a hypothetical scenario and then respond
to questions related to the scenario, share your attitudes and opinions in general, and provide
demographic information.
We ask that you place yourself into the role of a tax professional employed by a hypothetical
corporation, Sullivan-Reed Corp. Over the next several screens you will read background
information about Sullivan-Reed Corp, your role within Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department,
and a hypothetical tax research project. So that we do not take up too much of your time, we
have not included all of the information you would typically have when making similar
decisions. However, the information provided should be sufficient to make an informed
judgment. We sincerely appreciate receiving your input, and your responses are very important
to us. Thank you in advance for your time!
Please note that the first few screens will require reading that should take about 10 to 15
minutes. The remaining screens will be mostly questions.
After you have finished reading, please click below to continue to the next screen.
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[SCREEN 3]
SULLIVAN-REED CORP & TAX DEPARTMENT
Sullivan-Reed Corp is a publicly traded manufacturing company with headquarters in the United
States. The company has operations in six U.S. states and also in a few other countries;
consequently, the company files tax returns with numerous taxing authorities. Over the past
several years, Sullivan-Reed Corp has averaged annual gross receipts of around $200 million.
Sullivan-Reed Corp historically has had taxable income, and it does not have any net operating
loss carryforwards. The GAAP effective tax rate generally hovers around 30 percent. SullivanReed Corp’s in-house tax department coordinates the company’s tax function, outsourcing some
of the work to third-party tax professionals. Within the company, the Tax Director leads tax
planning and compliance and is supported by a dedicated team of tax department staff. In
addition to income tax compliance responsibilities, the tax department is also responsible for tax
planning, tax authority audits of federal and state income tax filings, and accounting for income
taxes for financial statement purposes.
You have served as an in-house tax department staff member for a year and a half. You primarily
assist with matters related to the company’s income tax returns - federal, state/local, and
international filings. You report to the Tax Director, who reports to the CFO and works with both
the management team within Sullivan-Reed Corp as well as third-party tax professionals external
to Sullivan-Reed Corp. For the last eight years, Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax returns have been
prepared and signed by Firm A, a Big 4 accounting firm. Sullivan-Reed Corp’s financial
statements are audited by a different Big 4 accounting firm. Research projects are often
conducted in-house by Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department and then reviewed by the external
tax professionals at Firm A.
In a recent staff meeting, the CFO of Sullivan-Reed Corp stated that “the primary objective of
hiring the external tax professionals at Firm A is to make sure Sullivan-Reed Corp follows the
tax rules in achieving our 30 percent target effective tax rate. In fact, we have continued to
employ Firm A’s tax services primarily due to the Firm’s vigilance and attention to detail in
maintaining tax compliance.”

Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above.
I have read the information
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[SCREEN 4]
CURRENT PROJECT
You are presently working on a project related to a new product line that Sullivan-Reed Corp
introduced during the current tax year. The new product line consists of hot cocoa sets containing
gourmet melting chocolate (dark and milk chocolate) on stir sticks, handcrafted marshmallows,
and mix-ins such as peppermint sugar sprinkles, cinnamon candies, hot fudge, and caramel
sauce. The company conducts market research to predict successful item combinations for the
hot cocoa sets. Sullivan-Reed Corp does not manufacture any of the hot cocoa set components;
rather the company purchases all of the prepackaged items (chocolate, marshmallows, and mixins) as well as oversized deluxe mugs and filler packaging from various vendors. The company
has no input into the design of any hot cocoa set items, filler, or packaging. Further, they
purchase these items in bulk “off the shelf” from vendors. Sullivan-Reed Corp developed design
templates to standardize the assembly of the hot cocoa sets. Company employees arrange the
individually packaged items in the mugs according to the design templates to create the hot
cocoa sets.
You have been assigned the task of determining if the activities associated with assembling
the hot cocoa set product line are eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction.
Sullivan-Reed Corp has previously taken the Domestic Production Activities Deduction for other
products; however, prior to the new hot cocoa set product line, the company had only
manufactured products onsite. The production process for the hot cocoa sets (purchase premade
components and assemble onsite) differs substantially from actually manufacturing products
onsite. Including the hot cocoa set in the Domestic Production Activities Deduction would be
advantageous for tax purposes.
After doing some initial research, you have identified five particularly relevant items. Summaries
and excerpts of these authorities are displayed on the next screens.

Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above.
I have read the information
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[SCREEN 5]
RELEVANT TAX AUTHORITY
Summaries and excerpts from the relevant authorities you have found (listed below) are provided
on the next several screens. Please read these authorities to make your recommendation about
whether Sullivan-Reed Corp should take the Domestic Production Activities Deduction for the
hot cocoa set product line. Please note there is no back button; however, you will have an
opportunity later to review the tax authority and information about the hot cocoa product line
again before making your recommendation.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.

Internal Revenue Code Section 199 (Effective January 1, 2005)
Regulation §1.199-3(e) (Effective June 1, 2006)
United States v. Dean (May 7, 2013)
Proposed Amendment to Regulation §1.199-3 (August 27, 2015)
Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States (September 24, 2015)
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[SCREEN 6]
A. Internal Revenue Code Section 199
How is the Domestic Production Activities Deduction calculated?
There shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to 9 percent of the lesser of the qualified
production activities income of the taxpayer for the taxable year, or taxable income (determined
without regard to this section) for the taxable year (Sec. 199(a)). The amount of the deduction
allowable under subsection (a) for any taxable year shall not exceed 50 percent of the W-2 wages
of the taxpayer for the taxable year (Sec. 199(b)(1)).
What activities qualify for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?
…any lease, rental, license, sale, exchange, or other disposition of qualifying production
property which was manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted by the taxpayer in whole or
in significant part within the United States… (Sec. 199(c)(4)).
How is “manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted” (MPGE) defined? What activities
qualify as MPGE activities?
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out the purposes of this
section… (Sec. 199(d)(10)).

Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above.
I have read the information

233

[SCREEN 7]
B. Regulation §1.199-3(e): Deﬁnition of manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted
(1) In general.—…the term MPGE includes manufacturing, producing, growing, extracting,
installing, developing, improving, and creating QPP [qualified production property]; making
QPP out of scrap, salvage, or junk material as well as from new or raw material by processing,
manipulating, reﬁning, or changing the form of an article, or by combining or assembling two or
more articles…
(2) Packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly.— If a taxpayer packages,
repackages, labels, or performs minor assembly of QPP [qualified production property] and the
taxpayer engages in no other MPGE activity with respect to that QPP, the taxpayer's packaging,
repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly does not qualify as MPGE with respect to that QPP.

Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above.
I have read the information
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[SCREEN 8]
C. United States v. Dean, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (U.S. District Court, C.D. Cal. May 7, 2013)
Summary of United States v. Dean:
Houdini, Inc., a company engaged in the design, assembly, and sale of gift baskets and gift
towers, claimed deductions for domestic production activities. Houdini, Inc. argued that they
manufactured or produced gift baskets and gift towers. The government argued that Houdini,
Inc. was merely packaging and repackaging products, activities which would not qualify as
MPGE (“manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted”). The Court rejected the government’s
argument. The court stated that “the final products, gift baskets and towers, are distinct in form
and purpose from the individual items inside.” The Court reasoned that Houdini, Inc.’s
production process changed the form of the product in accordance with the definition of MPGE
within Treasury Regulation §1.199-3.
Excerpts from United States v. Dean:
In 1989, Dean and O'Brien incorporated their business as Houdini, Inc. (“Houdini”). Houdini
describes its business as the design, assembly, and sale of gift baskets and gift towers through
both wholesale and retail channels. A “gift tower” is a set of decorative boxes into which
different food items are placed. During the holiday season, Houdini can complete up to 80,000
baskets in a day.
…
Designing a Houdini gift basket involves, among other things, selecting the basket and the items
to be placed inside, as well as the “void ﬁll” that holds everything together. Houdini orders its
baskets from suppliers in China. When it orders baskets, Houdini reviews samples and then
provides the manufacturer with exact speciﬁcations for them. Houdini also purchases containers
from suppliers in the United States. The void ﬁll in a Houdini gift basket is a cardboard form or
Styrofoam base that is placed inside the basket; the other items are in turn placed inside. Houdini
generally designs the cardboard forms, indicating where the cuts and folds should be made; it
then hires another company to make the cardboard forms.
…
Houdini purchases the items that are placed inside the baskets from other companies.
…
Houdini's assembly line consists of workers who place the individual food items into baskets in
accordance with detailed work instructions prepared by Houdini. In preparing a ﬁnished gift
basket, employees at several diﬀerent stations on the line put diﬀerent items into the basket.
After the items have been placed inside the basket, a plastic wrapping is heated to shrink around
the basket. Once the plastic wrapping is completed, a bow is placed on the basket, if called for in
the design of the basket. For a gift tower, the food-safe packages are placed directly into
decorative boxes. The boxes in the gift tower are then connected either through cardboard tabs or
through sticky-dot adhesives.
…
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Defendants argue that Houdini's production process “chang[es] the form of an article” within the
meaning of Treasury Regulation §1.199-3(e)(1). The Court agrees. Houdini ﬁrst selects various
items—chocolates, cookies, candy, cheeses, crackers, wine or alcohol, packaging materials, and
a basket or boxes—for its ﬁnal products. Next, the individual items are assembled in a gift basket
or gift tower based on one of many detailed plans. This complex production process relies on
both assembly line workers and machines. The ﬁnal products, gift baskets and gift towers, are
distinct in form and purpose from the individual items inside. The individual items would
typically be purchased by consumers as ordinary groceries. But after Houdini's production
process, they are transformed into a gift that is usually given during the holiday season.

Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above.
I have read the information
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[SCREEN 9]
D. Proposed Amendment to Regulation §1.199-3, August 27, 2015
(Proposed Regulations do not have the force of the law and carry little weight in the litigation
process until they are finalized, however they do reflect the IRS’s position on an issue.)
Section 1.199-3(e)(2) provides that if a taxpayer packages, repackages, labels, or performs minor
assembly of QPP [qualified production property] and the taxpayer engages in no other MPGE
activities with respect to that QPP, the taxpayer's packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor
assembly does not qualify as MPGE with respect to that QPP. This rule has been the subject of
recent litigation. See United States v. Dean, 945 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (concluding
that the taxpayer's activity of preparing gift baskets was a manufacturing activity and not solely
packaging or repackaging for purposes of section 199). The Treasury Department and the IRS
disagree with the interpretation of §1.199-3(e)(2) adopted by the court in United States v. Dean,
and the proposed regulations add an example (Example 9) that illustrates the appropriate
application of this rule in a situation in which the taxpayer is engaged in no other MPGE
activities with respect to the QPP other than those described in §1.199-3(e)(2).
…
Example 9. X is in the business of selling gift baskets containing various products that are
packaged together. X purchases the baskets and the products included within the baskets from
unrelated third parties. X plans where and how the products should be arranged into the baskets.
On an assembly line in a gift basket production facility, X arranges the products into the baskets
according to that plan, sometimes relabeling the products before placing them into the baskets. X
engages in no other activity besides packaging, repackaging, labeling, or minor assembly with
respect to the gift baskets. Therefore, X is not considered to have engaged in the MPGE of
QPP under paragraph (e)(2) of this section.

Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above.
I have read the information
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[SCREEN 10]
E. Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States, No. 3:12-cv-50180 (U.S. District Court, N.D. Ill.
September 24, 2015)
Summary of Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States:
Precision Dose, Inc. purchased certain drugs in bulk and then sold them as unit doses (drugs in
single-dose containers). The company had a complex production process involving extensive
research about demand for medications, appropriate materials for containers, and drug storage.
The company worked with vendors to produce containers according to precise specifications and
dedicated significant resources to dose standardization and process documentation. As in United
States v. Dean, the government argued that the company was merely packaging and repackaging
products, activities which would not qualify as MPGE (“manufactured, produced, grown, or
extracted”). The Court determined that Precision Dose, Inc. engaged in a “complex production
process” that resulted in a “distinct ﬁnal product” and permitted the domestic production activity
deduction.
Excerpts from Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States:
The facts show plaintiﬀ looks for drugs it believes it can successfully process into and sell as unit
doses. Drug manufacturers do not seek bids from companies to repackage their drugs into small
packages. Plaintiﬀ engages in market research to determine which drugs to buy to turn into unit
doses. Plaintiﬀ works with potential customers to identify needs for new unit dose products.
Plaintiﬀ acquires sample drugs and tests them for suitability to be processed into unit doses.
Plaintiﬀ prepares speciﬁcations and works with vendors to develop cups and syringes that are
suitable to use for unit doses for each drug that it buys. Sometimes existing cups or syringes are
used and sometimes new ones are created through the joint eﬀorts of plaintiﬀ's personnel and
vendor personnel. Plaintiﬀ conducts mixing studies to determine the best mixing procedures to
use to obtain the proper suspension of the active ingredient in each unit dose and whether the
drug can be mixed in such a way that the proper suspension can be obtained at all. It tests plastics
to determine compatibility with speciﬁc drugs for use in the cups or syringes. The cups, lidding,
trays and product inserts are produced by vendors using plaintiﬀ's proprietary design. For cups
for which plaintiﬀ owns the designs vendors use molds owned by plaintiﬀ to produce the cups,
for trays, which are designed by plaintiﬀ, vendors use molds owned by plaintiﬀ. For lidding
which is designed by plaintiﬀ, the vendors use cutting dies owned by plaintiﬀ.
…
This brief recitation of portions of plaintiﬀ's activities in producing the unit doses show, that like
in Dean, plaintiﬀ engages in a “complex production process that results in a distinct ﬁnal
product.” The government argues Dean is wrongly decided. It contends the Dean court failed to
understand that all Houdini's activities were just part of the repackaging process and thus did not
take those activities outside the (e)(2) exception. However, the court disagrees. Dean correctly
determined that Houdini was creating an entirely new product – a gift basket or gift tower –
which was not simply a method of repackaging the components included in the baskets or
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towers. A gift basket is not simply a container of stuff – like a grocery cart in which the items
had been dropped when pulled from the shelf. It is a unique product itself. Likewise, a unit dose
is a unique product. Plaintiﬀ is entitled to the Section 199 deduction.

Please click to indicate that you have read the information shown above.
I have read the information
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[SCREEN 11]
Now that you have reviewed these authorities, you will be asked to evaluate whether the hot
cocoa set product line is eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction and make
your recommendation to the Tax Director. After receiving your recommendation, the Tax
Director will likely consult the company’s external tax professionals at Firm A who were hired
to make sure the company follows the tax rules.
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[SCREEN 12]
RESPONSE SECTION I: Please respond to the following questions as if you are a member
of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department staff.

For your reference, the relevant tax authority is provided again below. Clicking "Review Tax
Authority" will allow you to open a PDF document in a separate window.
Review Tax Authority

Information about your current project, the hot cocoa set product line, is provided again below.
Clicking "Review Current Project Facts" will allow you to open a PDF document in a separate
window.
Review Current Project Facts

What is the likelihood that you would recommend that Sullivan-Reed Corp include the hot cocoa
set product line in the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?
Not
At All
Likely
0%

Extremely
Likely
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The hot cocoa set product
line is eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction.
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neither Agree Somewhat
nor Disagree
Agree
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Agree

Strongly
Agree

In your opinion, if this position was examined by the IRS, what is the likelihood that the IRS
would uphold the position that Sullivan Reed Corp’s hot cocoa set product line qualifies for the
Domestic Production Activities Deduction?
Not
At All
Likely
0%

Extremely
Likely
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

In your opinion, if this position was examined in court, what is the likelihood that the Court
would uphold the position that Sullivan Reed Corp’s hot cocoa set product line qualifies for the
Domestic Production Activities Deduction?
Not
At All
Likely
0%

Extremely
Likely
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

As Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department staff, how certain would you want to be of your tax
position before including the hot cocoa set product line in the Domestic Production Activities
Deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

[SCREEN 13]
How important were each of the following authorities in your evaluation of whether the hot
cocoa set product line is eligible for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?
Not at all
Important

Internal Revenue Code Section 199
Regulation §1.199-3(e)
United States v. Dean (Gift baskets)
Proposed Amendment to Regulation §1.199-3
Precision Dose, Inc. v. United States (Unit doses)
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Slightly
Important

Somewhat
Important

Moderately
Important

Extremely
Important

[SCREEN 14]
These statements relate to your job at Sullivan-Reed Corp. Continuing to envision yourself as a
member of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s tax department staff, please rate how often you could imagine
yourself focusing on these thoughts and activities while you are working.
[Regulatory Focus State: Regulatory Focus at Work Scale (RWS)]
Never
I focus on…
Following rules and regulations at work
Completing work tasks correctly
Doing my duty at work
My work responsibilities
Fulfilling my work obligations
The details of my work
Accomplishing a lot at work
Getting my work done no matter what
Getting a lot of work finished in a short amount of
time
Work activities that allow me to get ahead at work
My work accomplishments
How many job tasks I can complete
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Rarely

Sometimes

Often

Constantly

[SCREEN 15]
In this study, Sullivan-Reed Corp engages external tax professionals at Firm A to assist with the
tax work. Please answer the following items as you think Sullivan-Reed Corp’s external tax
professionals at Firm A would respond.
[Client Advocacy]
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

In an instance where no judicial
authority exists with respect to
an issue and where the Code and
Regulations are ambiguous, tax
professionals should believe that
the taxpayer is entitled to take
the most favorable tax treatment.
Generally speaking, tax
professionals' loyalties should be
first to the tax system, then to
the taxpayer.
Tax professionals should apply
ambiguous tax law to the
taxpayer's benefit.
When examining a tax return,
tax professionals should point
out to taxpayers reasonable
positions they could have taken
which would have contributed to
minimizing their tax liability.
Tax professionals should believe
it is important to encourage the
taxpayer to pay the least amount
of taxes payable.
Tax professionals should always
interpret unclear/ambiguous
laws in favor of the taxpayer.
Tax professionals should use
trends in the law by trying to
establish a pattern of more
favorable treatment for the
taxpayer and then extending the
pattern to the taxpayer's position.
Where no judicial authority
exists with respect to an issue,
tax professionals should feel that
the taxpayer is entitled to take
the most favorable tax treatment.
Tax professionals should
structure transactions in ways
that yield the best tax result,
even if the law is unclear in an
area.
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Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

[SCREEN 16]
[Manipulation Check Question]
Based upon the tax scenario, which of the following more accurately describes the primary
function of Sullivan-Reed Corp’s external tax professionals at Firm A?
The primary function of the tax professionals at Firm A is to…
find the most advantageous tax opportunities for Sullivan-Reed Corp
make sure Sullivan-Reed Corp follows the tax rules
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[SCREEN 17]
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS: Now moving away from the scenario, please provide the
following information. All responses to this survey are anonymous and confidential.
How many tax classes have you taken? Include the current semester.
0
1-2
3-4
5 or more

Please select your graduate degree program.
MACC, Tax Track
MACC, BMA Track
MSA
Other (Please specify)_________

Do you plan to work in taxation?
Yes
No

How much total work experience have you had in public accounting?
No experience in public accounting
Less than 6 months
6 – 12 months
More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________

How much work experience have you had in public accounting, specifically in tax?
No tax experience in public accounting
Less than 6 months
6 – 12 months
More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________
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What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply.
No experience in public accounting
Big 4
International/National
Regional/Local
Sole Proprietorship
Other (Please specify)_________

Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the Domestic Production
Activities Deduction?
Very Familiar
Familiar
Neither Familiar nor Unfamiliar
Unfamiliar
Very Unfamiliar

Before participating in this study, how familiar were you with the tax authority relating to
activities that qualify for the Domestic Production Activities Deduction?
Very Familiar
Familiar
Neither Familiar nor Unfamiliar
Unfamiliar
Very Unfamiliar

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return, how certain would
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your individual tax return and engaged a paid
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax
position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Who prepared your most recent individual income tax return?
I prepared my own tax return
I hired a paid preparer
A friend or relative prepared my tax return
I do not file a tax return
Other (Please specify)_________

What is your age?
18 - 20
21 - 25
26 - 30
31 - 35
36 and over

What is your gender?
Male
Female
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70%

80%

90%

100%

[SCREEN 18]
FINAL RESPONSE SECTION: Please use the scale to indicate your response to each of the
items below. There are no right or wrong answers. Therefore, please respond as honestly and
accurately as possible.
[Trait Regulatory Focus: General Regulatory Focus Measure (GRFM)]
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

In general, I am focused on
preventing negative events in my
life.
I am anxious that I will fall short
of my responsibilities and
obligations.
I frequently imagine how I will
achieve my hopes and
aspirations.
I often think about the person I
am afraid I might become in the
future.
I often think about the person I
would ideally like to be in the
future.
I typically focus on the success I
hope to achieve in the future.
I often worry that I will fail to
accomplish my academic goals.
I often think about how I will
achieve academic success.
I often imagine myself
experiencing bad things that I
fear might happen to me.
I frequently think about how I
can prevent failures in my life.
I am more oriented toward
preventing losses than I am
toward achieving gains.
My major goal in school right
now is to achieve my academic
ambitions.
My major goal in school right
now is to avoid becoming an
academic failure.
I see myself as someone who is
primarily striving to reach my
“ideal self”—to fulfill my hopes,
wishes, and aspirations.
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Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

Neither
Agree
nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

I see myself as someone who is
primarily striving to become the
self I “ought” to be—to fulfill
my duties, responsibilities, and
obligations.
In general, I am focused on
achieving positive outcomes in
my life.
I often imagine myself
experiencing good things that I
hope will happen to me.
Overall, I am more oriented
toward achieving success than
preventing failure.

Please make any comments you think would be helpful in understanding your responses.
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Strongly
Agree

APPENDIX E: STUDY 3 TABLES
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Table 14: Demographics
(n = 51)*
n

%

7
33
5
2
3
1

13.7
64.7
9.8
3.9
5.9
2.0

Gender
Male
Female

22
29

43.1
56.9

Work Experience in Public Accounting - All
No public accounting experience
Less than 6 months
6 months – 12 months

44
4
3

86.3
7.8
5.9

Work Experience in Public Accounting - Tax
No public accounting experience in tax
Less than 6 months
6 months – 12 months

44
6
1

86.3
11.7
2.0

Preparation of Most Recent Personal Tax
Return
Prepared own return
Hired a paid preparer
Friend or relative prepared
Did not need to file

26
12
6
7

51.0
23.6
11.7
13.7

Number of Tax Classes Taken
1-2
None

50
1

98.0
2.0

Age
18-20
21-25
26-30
31-35
Over 35
Prefer not to answer
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CPA Intentions
Plan to take the CPA exam in the future
Do not plan to be a CPA

n

%

45
6

88.2
11.8

Notes: * n = 51 includes 17 participants in the individual decision maker condition and 34
participants in the group decision maker condition (forming 17 two-member groups).
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics by Decision Maker: Means (Standard Deviation)
Number of Observations
Unreported Income
Felt Responsibility
Relative Perceived Risk
Fear of Negative Outcome
Risk Attitude

Individual
17
3.12 (3.52)
15.94* (3.29)
3.24 (2.36)
3.71 (1.21)
1.74 (1.39)

Group
17
3.71 (2.97)
13.44 (2.94)
3.79 (1.51)
3.62 (0.70)
1.83 (1.00)

Total
34
3.41 (3.22)
14.69 (3.32)
3.52 (1.97)
3.66 (0.97)
1.78 (1.19)

Notes:
* Mean of Felt Responsibility is significantly greater for the Individual condition than the Group condition (p = 0.026, two-tailed)
Variable Definitions:
Decision Maker is manipulated by structuring the decision to be made by either one decision maker (Individual) or by a group of
decision makers (Group). Each participant in the Individual condition makes the reporting decision alone as the sole decision
maker. Participants in the Group condition make the decision together as a group after reaching a group consensus.
Unreported Income is measured as follows: Participants in the experimental task are provided with experimental currency and
then asked, “How much of the 10,000 Francs [20,000 Francs for the Group condition] would you like to report?” Reported
income is measured on an 11-point scale; an individual decision maker may decide to report amounts from zero to 10,000 Francs
in increments of 1,000 and a group may decide to report amounts from zero to 20,000 Francs in increments of 2,000. Reporting
less income reflects greater risk taking. Reported income is reverse coded so that greater Unreported Income reflects greater risk
taking.
Felt Responsibility is the sum of a three item scale adapted from Hackman and Oldham (1974) to measure how personally
responsible a decision maker feels for possible outcomes of the decision. Each of the items uses a seven-point Likert-type scale
with labeled points ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7 “Strongly Agree.” Greater Felt Responsibility scores reflect stronger
feelings of personal responsibility. Felt Responsibility is expected to mediate the effect of Decision Maker on Unreported
Income.
Relative Perceived Risk is a measure of a decision maker’s self-perceived riskiness compared to other individuals and is designed
to capture a decision maker’s perception of widely-held social values. Participants are asked “Compared to the average person,
how risky was the decision you just made?” Relative Perceived Risk is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “Much
less risky than average” to 7 “Much more risky than average.” Self-rating as less risky than others signifies a perception that the
socially-valued position is to be less risky. Self-rating as more risky than others signifies a perception that the socially-valued
position is to be more risky.
Fear of Negative Outcome is measured by asking, “When deciding how many Francs to report on the form, how concerned were
you about the possibility that the report would be inspected?” Fear of negative outcome is measured on a five-point Likert-type
scale with labeled points ranging from 1 “Not At All Concerned” to 5 “Extremely Concerned.”
Risk Attitude is a four item measure adopted from the Weber et al. (2002) measure of risk attitude in the gambling domain, a
subscale in the domain-specific risk attitude scale. Participants are asked to indicate their likelihood of engaging in different
activities or behaviors; each item is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 “Very Unlikely” to 7 “Very Likely.” Risk
Attitude is measured as a potential control variable.
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Table 16: Correlation Coefficients
(1)
1. Unreported Income
2. Decision Maker
3. Felt Responsibility
4. Relative Perceived Risk
5. Fear of Negative Outcome
6. Risk Attitude

1
0.093
-0.451
0.658
-0.268
0.360

(2)
0.173
1
-0.382
0.144
-0.046
0.041

(3)
-0.427
-0.400
1
-0.330
0.130
-0.269

(4)
0.628
0.185
-0.351
1
-0.084
0.576

(5)
-0.441
-0.175
0.314
-0.247
1
-0.080

Notes:
Table values are Spearman’s Rho above the diagonal and Pearson Correlation Coefficients below the diagonal.
Bold correlations are significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
See Table 15 for variable definitions.
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(6)
0.433
0.194
-0.396
0.533
-0.216
1

Table 17: Results of ANOVA: Effect of Decision Maker on Unreported Income
Source of Variation
Decision Maker
Relative Perceived Risk
Error

Sum of Squares
0.001
145.117
16.985

df
1
1
115

Notes:
All p-values are two-tailed.
See Table 15 for variable definitions.
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Mean Square
0.001
145.117
0.148

F
0.000
23.168

p
0.989
< 0.000

Table 18: Supplemental Analysis: Mediation Analysis Using PROCESS Procedure
Panel A: Regression of Felt Responsibility on Decision Maker

Constant
Decision Maker
R2
F Statistic
n

Coefficient
Estimate
15.941
-2.500

Standard
Error
0.757
1.070

t-statistic
21.070
-2.337

p-value
< 0.000
0.026

0.146
5.460
34

Panel B: Regression of Unreported Income on Felt Responsibility and Decision Maker with
Relative Perceived Risk

Constant
Felt Responsibility
Decision Maker
Relative Perceived Risk
R2
F Statistic
n

Coefficient
Estimate
4.745
-0.292
-0.666
0.937

Standard
Error
2.630
0.141
0.884
0.223

t-statistic
1.805
-2.066
-0.753
4.205

p-value
0.081
0.048
0.457
< 0.000

0.503
10.132
34

Panel C: Indirect Effect of Decision Maker on Unreported Income

Indirect Effect
0.7304

Bootstrapped 95% Confidence
Interval (1000 iterations)
Lower Limit
Upper Limit
0.0892
2.1021

Boot SE
0.4682

Notes:
Mediation Analysis uses PROCESS procedure (Hayes 2013).
All p-values are two-tailed.
See Table 15 for variable definitions.
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Condition 1: Individual / Self
[Paper format]
Explanation of Research
Title of Project: Decision Making and Reporting
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you. Your
professor has agreed to award you extra credit for your participation. If you wish to earn extra
credit in your class, but do not wish to participate in the research study or are under 18 years of
age, your professor will provide you with an alternate assignment of comparable time and effort.
If you have decided to participate in this project, please understand that your participation is
voluntary and that you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at
any time without penalty. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to
which you are otherwise entitled. The purpose of this research is to examine individual decision
making and reporting. You will be asked to read instructions for a decision involving reporting.
You will then be asked to make your decision and answer some questions about your opinions
and demographic questions. This research study will be conducted in a behavioral lab. The
estimated time to complete this study is approximately 30 minutes.
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions,
concerns, or complaints: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-1478 or by email at
bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, Kenneth G. Dixon School of
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-3192 or by email at
vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint: Research at the University
of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of the
Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and approved by the
IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact:
Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research &
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by
telephone at (407) 823-2901.
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TASK INSTRUCTIONS [Paper format]
You will be participating in a task in which you are provided with Francs and then are asked to
make a reporting decision. Note that Francs are the experimental currency, and there are no right
or wrong answers.
The Francs will belong to you, and you will make the reporting decision for yourself. At the
conclusion of the task, Francs will be converted into dollars using a positive conversion rate and
you will be paid based upon the net Francs from your decision. In other words, your decision
affects the payout that you will receive.
After being provided with Francs, you will decide how much of the Francs to report on a form,
ranging from zero Francs to all of the Francs. Francs reported on the form are subject to a 50%
fee. Francs that you decide not to report on the form are not subject to a fee unless the form is
selected for inspection. If the form is selected for inspection, the amount of Francs reported is
compared to the initial amount of Francs provided, and any Francs not reported on the form are
subject to a 100% fee. The form has a 50% chance of being selected for inspection. Inspections
are determined completely at random and do not depend on your decisions or the decisions of
others.
After you have decided the amount of Francs to report and have submitted your form, you will
be notified whether or not the form was selected for inspection. After the inspection period, net
Francs will be calculated as the initial Francs provided, less total fees (Net Francs = Initial
Francs - Total Fees). Thus, any fees assessed reduce your payout at the end of the task. Total
Fees depend upon both the amount you decide to report on the form and whether the form is
selected for inspection:
If selected for inspection, Total Fees equals 50% of the Francs reported on the form, plus
100% of the Francs not reported on the form.
If not selected for inspection, Total Fees equals 50% of the amount reported on the form.
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PRACTICE REPORTING DECISION
Just for practice, imagine you are provided with 2,000 Francs and are asked to decide what
amount to report on a form, ranging from 0 Francs to 2,000 Francs (in 200 Franc increments).
The 2,000 Francs will belong to you, and you will make the reporting decision for yourself.
The following chart has been provided to help you decide how much of the 2,000 Francs you
want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs that
may be possible outcomes, given the Francs you decide to report.
Francs You Could
Choose to Report
Maximum Possible
Net Francs
Minimum Possible
Net Francs

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

2,000

1,900

1,800

1,700

1,600

1,500

1,400

1,300

1,200

1,100

1,000

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1,000

Several amounts are shown on the top row of the chart as “Francs you could choose to report.”
For each reporting option, the chart presents both the maximum (no inspection) and minimum
(inspection) possible net Francs if you choose to report that particular amount.
EXAMPLE 1: Note (towards the top right of the chart) if you decide to report all 2,000 Francs,
net Francs would be 1,000 Francs regardless of whether the form is selected for inspection.
EXAMPLE 2: On the other end of the chart, note that if you decide to report 0 Francs, net Francs
depend upon whether the form is selected for inspection.
If the form is selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs would
be 0 Francs, calculated as follows:
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, plus 100% of the 2,000 Francs not
reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 2,000. Net Francs are calculated as the 2,000 Initial
Francs, less 2,000 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 0.
If the form is not selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs
would be 2,000 Francs, calculated as follows:
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 0. Net Francs
are calculated as the 2,000 Initial Francs, less 0 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 2,000.
As shown in the chart, the other reporting options fall between these two examples. Please take a
few minutes to review this chart.
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[QUALTRICS PORTION; SCREEN 1]
Your participant number is displayed on the outside of the envelopes you were given. Do
not open the envelopes.
Please locate your PARTICIPANT NUMBER and enter it in the space provided below.

________________
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[SCREEN 2]
YOU HAVE NOW BEEN PROVIDED WITH 10,000 FRANCS
Your task is to decide how much of the 10,000 Francs you would like to report.
The 10,000 Francs will belong to you, and you will make the reporting decision for yourself.
Please feel free to refer back to your paper hardcopy of the Task Instructions.
The following chart has been provided to help you decide how much of the 10,000 Francs you
want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs that
may be possible, given the Francs you decide to report.
Possible Net Francs
Francs You
Could Choose
to Report
Maximum
Possible Net
Francs
Minimum
Possible Net
Francs

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

10,000

9,500

9,000

8,500

8,000

7,500

7,000

6,500

6,000

5,500

5,000

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

Please type in the textbox provided below to share your thought process as you decide how much
of the 10,000 Francs to report.

How much of the 10,000 Francs would you like to report?
0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000
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6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

[SCREEN 3]
Please open Envelope 1 and complete the contents individually on your own. Only open
“Envelope 1” at this time. Once complete, place materials back inside the envelope and
wait for further instruction.

WAIT Do not click on the computer until the person administering the study tells you to proceed
in the computer survey.

Please remain quiet. After everyone is ready, you will be instructed to continue.
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[SCREEN 4]
INSPECTION PERIOD
Reports will now be randomly selected for inspection. On the next screen, you will be
notified whether or not your report was selected for inspection.
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[SCREEN 5]
Your report was selected for inspection.
[Your report was not selected for inspection.]
Net Francs = [Insert Net Francs]
Please click “>>” below to proceed.
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[SCREEN 6 – Custom Final Qualtrics Screen]

Please WAIT here for further instruction.
As a reminder, please remain quiet while you are waiting.
After everyone is ready, you will be instructed how to proceed.
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[End of Qualtrics Study – Blank page intentional spacer]
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ENVELOPE 1
[Contains Covariate Questionnaire]
[Envelope 1 Outside Label]
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so.

YOUR PARTICIPANT NUMBER IS: 000000
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[Covariate Questionnaire]
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below.
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________

ADDITIONAL RESPONSE QUESTIONS: Please respond to the following questions.
There are no right or wrong answers. Therefore, please respond as honestly and accurately
as possible.
Regarding the reporting decision that you just made, please indicate your agreement or
disagreement with the following statements:
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

It was hard for me to care very much
about whether or not a good reporting
decision was made.
I felt a very high degree of personal
responsibility for the decision about
how much to report.
I feel I should personally take the credit
or blame for the results of the reporting
decision.
Whether or not a good reporting
decision was made is clearly my
responsibility.
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

When deciding how many Francs to report on the form, how concerned were you about the
possibility that the report would be inspected?
Extremely Concerned
Moderately Concerned
Somewhat Concerned
Slightly Concerned
Not at all Concerned

Compared to the average person, how risky was the decision you just made?
Much more risky than average
More risky than average
Somewhat more risky than average
Neither more or less risky than average
Somewhat less risky than average
Less risky than average
Much less risky than average

Which best describes how your payment is determined for this study?
Based on a reporting decision I made
Based on a reporting decision that someone else made
Based on a reporting decision that my group made
Based on a reporting decision that another group made
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ENVELOPE 2
[Contains Demographics Questionnaire]
[Envelope 2 Outside Label]
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so.

YOUR PARTICIPANT IS: 000000

275

[Demographics Questionnaire]
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below.
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS: Please tell us a little about yourself to help categorize
your responses. All responses to this survey are anonymous and confidential.

What is your age?
18 - 20
21 - 25
26 - 30
31 - 35
36 and over
I would prefer not to answer

What is your gender?
Male
Female

How many tax classes have you taken? Include the current semester.
0
1-2
3-4
5 or more

How much total work experience have you had in public accounting?
No experience in public accounting
Less than 6 months
6 – 12 months
More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________

How much work experience have you had in public accounting, specifically in tax?
No tax experience in public accounting
Less than 6 months
6 – 12 months
More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________
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What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply.
Big 4
International/National (does not include Big 4)
Regional/Local
Sole Proprietorship
Other (Please specify)_________
No experience in public accounting

What is your status regarding becoming a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)?
Currently a licensed CPA
Passed the CPA exam but not yet licensed
Plan to take CPA exam in the future
Do not plan to be a CPA

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return, how certain would
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return and engaged a paid
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax
position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

Who prepared your most recent individual income tax return?
I prepared my own tax return
I hired a paid preparer
A friend or relative prepared my tax return
I do not file a tax return
Other (Please specify)_________

For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity
or behavior.
Very
Unlikely

Unlikely

Somewhat
Unlikely

Admitting that your tastes are
different from those of your friends.
Betting a day’s income at the horse
races.
Investing 10% of your annual income
in a moderate growth mutual fund.
Disagreeing with your father on a
major issue.
Betting a day’s income at a high stake
poker game.
Arguing with a friend about an issue
on which he or she has a very
different opinion.
Investing 5% of your annual income
in a very speculative stock.
Approaching your boss to ask for a
raise.
Betting a day’s income on the
outcome of a sporting event (e.g.
baseball, soccer, or football).
Telling a friend if his or her significant
other has made a pass at you.
Investing 5% of your annual income
in a conservative stock.
Wearing shocking or unconventional
clothes on occasion.
Investing 10% of your annual income
in government bonds (treasury bills).
Gambling a week’s income at a
casino.
Taking a job that you enjoy over one
that is prestigious but less enjoyable.
Defending an unpopular issue that
you believe in at a social occasion.
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Neither
Likely
nor
Unlikely

Somewhat
Likely

Likely

Very
Likely

Thank you for participating in this study! Please place this questionnaire back into Envelope 2
and remain seated until the person administering the study instructs you to line up for payout.
To ensure that you receive your payout, please have the following materials ready to bring with
you:
 Envelope 1 containing completed questions
 Envelope 2 containing completed questions
 Acknowledgement of Payment form – print your name, sign your name, and leave the
“amount received” blank
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[End of Envelope 2 Demographics Questionnaire – Blank page intentional spacer]
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PAYMENT
Thank you for participating in this study on reporting decisions conducted by Bonnie Brown.
Please sign below to acknowledge receipt of payment for your participation in this study.
In addition, by signing below you acknowledge that you will NOT discuss the study with
other students. To get valid and useful results, we need each participant’s honest and unfiltered
reactions to his/her experiences in the study. Thank you very much for your cooperation.
Session Date and Time: [Insert Date] ([Insert Day of the Week]) [Insert Time]

______________________________________________
Amount Received (in U.S. dollars)

______________________________________________
Printed Name

______________________________________________
Signed Name

Thank you very much for your participation!

282

Condition 2: Individual / Other
[Paper format]
Explanation of Research
Title of Project: Decision Making and Reporting
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you. Your
professor has agreed to award you extra credit for your participation. If you wish to earn extra
credit in your class, but do not wish to participate in the research study or are under 18 years of
age, your professor will provide you with an alternate assignment of comparable time and effort.
If you have decided to participate in this project, please understand that your participation is
voluntary and that you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at
any time without penalty. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to
which you are otherwise entitled. The purpose of this research is to examine individual decision
making and reporting. You will be asked to read instructions for a decision involving reporting.
You will then be asked to make your decision and answer some questions about your opinions
and demographic questions. This research study will be conducted in a behavioral lab. The
estimated time to complete this study is approximately 30 minutes.
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions,
concerns, or complaints: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-1478 or by email at
bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, Kenneth G. Dixon School of
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-3192 or by email at
vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint: Research at the University
of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of the
Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and approved by the
IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact:
Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research &
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by
telephone at (407) 823-2901.
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TASK INSTRUCTIONS [Paper format]
You will be participating in a task in which you are provided with Francs and then are asked to
make a reporting decision. Note that Francs are the experimental currency, and there are no right
or wrong answers.
The Francs will belong to another person, and you will make the reporting decision for that other
person. At the conclusion of the task, Francs will be converted into dollars using a positive
conversion rate and the other person will be paid based upon the net Francs from your decision.
In other words, your decision affects the payout that someone else will receive. Your own
payout will be based upon the net Francs of another person deciding on your behalf. Assignment
is completely random – you should assume the person deciding on your behalf is not the same
person for whom you are deciding.
After being provided with Francs, you will decide how much of the Francs to report on a form,
ranging from zero Francs to all of the Francs. Francs reported on the form are subject to a 50%
fee. Francs that you decide not to report on the form are not subject to a fee unless the form is
selected for inspection. If the form is selected for inspection, the amount of Francs reported is
compared to the initial amount of Francs provided, and any Francs not reported on the form are
subject to a 100% fee. The form has a 50% chance of being selected for inspection. Inspections
are determined completely at random and do not depend on your decisions or the decisions of
others.
After you have decided the amount of Francs to report and have submitted the form on behalf of
another person, you will be notified whether or not the form was selected for inspection. After
the inspection period, net Francs will be calculated as the initial Francs provided, less total fees
(Net Francs = Initial Francs - Total Fees). Thus, any fees assessed reduce the other person’s
payout at the end of the task. Total Fees depend upon both the amount you decide to report on
the form and whether the form is selected for inspection:
If selected for inspection, Total Fees equals 50% of the Francs reported on the form, plus
100% of the Francs not reported on the form.
If not selected for inspection, Total Fees equals 50% of the amount reported on the form.
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PRACTICE REPORTING DECISION
Just for practice, imagine you are provided with 2,000 Francs and are asked to decide what
amount to report on a form, ranging from 0 Francs to 2,000 Francs (in 200 Franc increments).
The 2,000 Francs will belong to another person, and you will make the reporting decision for that
other person.
The following chart has been provided to help you decide how much of the 2,000 Francs you
want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs that
may be possible outcomes, given the Francs you decide to report.
Francs You Could
Choose to Report
Maximum Possible
Net Francs
Minimum Possible
Net Francs

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

2,000

1,900

1,800

1,700

1,600

1,500

1,400

1,300

1,200

1,100

1,000

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1,000

Several amounts are shown on the top row of the chart as “Francs you could choose to report.”
For each reporting option, the chart presents both the maximum (no inspection) and minimum
(inspection) possible net Francs if you choose to report that particular amount.
EXAMPLE 1: Note (towards the top right of the chart) if you decide to report all 2,000 Francs,
net Francs would be 1,000 Francs regardless of whether the form is selected for inspection.
EXAMPLE 2: On the other end of the chart, note that if you decide to report 0 Francs, net Francs
depend upon whether the form is selected for inspection.
If the form is selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs would
be 0 Francs, calculated as follows:
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, plus 100% of the 2,000 Francs not
reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 2,000. Net Francs are calculated as the 2,000 Initial
Francs, less 2,000 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 0.
If the form is not selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs
would be 2,000 Francs, calculated as follows:
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 0. Net Francs
are calculated as the 2,000 Initial Francs, less 0 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 2,000.
As shown in the chart, the other reporting options fall between these two examples. Please take a
few minutes to review this chart.
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[QUALTRICS PORTION; SCREEN 1]
Your participant number is displayed on the outside of the envelopes you were given. Do
not open the envelopes.
Please locate your PARTICIPANT NUMBER and enter it in the space provided below.

________________
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[SCREEN 2]
YOU HAVE NOW BEEN PROVIDED WITH 10,000 FRANCS
Your task is to decide how much of the 10,000 Francs you would like to report.
The 10,000 Francs will belong to another person, and you will make the reporting decision for
that other person.
Please feel free to refer back to your paper hardcopy of the Task Instructions.
The following chart has been provided to help you decide how much of the 10,000 Francs you
want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs that
may be possible, given the Francs you decide to report.
Possible Net Francs
Francs You
Could Choose
to Report
Maximum
Possible Net
Francs
Minimum
Possible Net
Francs

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

10,000

9,500

9,000

8,500

8,000

7,500

7,000

6,500

6,000

5,500

5,000

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

Please type in the textbox provided below to share your thought process as you decide how much
of the 10,000 Francs to report.

How much of the 10,000 Francs would you like to report?
0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000
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6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

[SCREEN 3]
Please open Envelope 1 and complete the contents individually on your own. Only open
“Envelope 1” at this time. Once complete, place materials back inside the envelope and
wait for further instruction.

WAIT Do not click on the computer until the person administering the study tells you to proceed
in the computer survey.

Please remain quiet. After everyone is ready, you will be instructed to continue.
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[SCREEN 4]
INSPECTION PERIOD
Reports will now be randomly selected for inspection. On the next screen, you will be
notified whether or not your report was selected for inspection.
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[SCREEN 5]
Your report was selected for inspection.
[Your report was not selected for inspection.]
Net Francs = [Insert Net Francs]
Please click “>>” below to proceed.
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[SCREEN 6 – Custom Final Qualtrics Screen]

Please WAIT here for further instruction.
As a reminder, please remain quiet while you are waiting.
After everyone is ready, you will be instructed how to proceed.
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ENVELOPE 1
[Contains Covariate Questionnaire]
[Envelope 1 Outside Label]
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so.

YOUR PARTICIPANT NUMBER IS: 000000
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[Covariate Questionnaire]
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below.
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________

ADDITIONAL RESPONSE QUESTIONS: Please respond to the following questions.
There are no right or wrong answers. Therefore, please respond as honestly and accurately
as possible.
Regarding the reporting decision that you just made, please indicate your agreement or
disagreement with the following statements:
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

It was hard for me to care very much
about whether or not a good reporting
decision was made.
I felt a very high degree of personal
responsibility for the decision about
how much to report.
I feel I should personally take the credit
or blame for the results of the reporting
decision.
Whether or not a good reporting
decision was made is clearly my
responsibility.
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Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

When deciding how many Francs to report on the form, how concerned were you about the
possibility that the report would be inspected?
Extremely Concerned
Moderately Concerned
Somewhat Concerned
Slightly Concerned
Not at all Concerned

Compared to the average person, how risky was the decision you just made?
Much more risky than average
More risky than average
Somewhat more risky than average
Neither more or less risky than average
Somewhat less risky than average
Less risky than average
Much less risky than average

Which best describes how your payment is determined for this study?
Based on a reporting decision I made
Based on a reporting decision that someone else made
Based on a reporting decision that my group made
Based on a reporting decision that another group made
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ENVELOPE 2
[Contains Demographics Questionnaire]
[Envelope 2 Outside Label]
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so.

YOUR PARTICIPANT IS: 000000
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[Demographics Questionnaire]
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below.
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS: Please tell us a little about yourself to help categorize
your responses. All responses to this survey are anonymous and confidential.

What is your age?
18 - 20
21 - 25
26 - 30
31 - 35
36 and over
I would prefer not to answer

What is your gender?
Male
Female

How many tax classes have you taken? Include the current semester.
0
1-2
3-4
5 or more

How much total work experience have you had in public accounting?
No experience in public accounting
Less than 6 months
6 – 12 months
More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________

How much work experience have you had in public accounting, specifically in tax?
No tax experience in public accounting
Less than 6 months
6 – 12 months
More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________
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What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply.
Big 4
International/National (does not include Big 4)
Regional/Local
Sole Proprietorship
Other (Please specify)_________
No experience in public accounting

What is your status regarding becoming a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)?
Currently a licensed CPA
Passed the CPA exam but not yet licensed
Plan to take CPA exam in the future
Do not plan to be a CPA

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return, how certain would
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return and engaged a paid
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax
position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

Who prepared your most recent individual income tax return?
I prepared my own tax return
I hired a paid preparer
A friend or relative prepared my tax return
I do not file a tax return
Other (Please specify)_________

For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity
or behavior.
Very
Unlikely

Unlikely

Somewhat
Unlikely

Admitting that your tastes are
different from those of your friends.
Betting a day’s income at the horse
races.
Investing 10% of your annual income
in a moderate growth mutual fund.
Disagreeing with your father on a
major issue.
Betting a day’s income at a high stake
poker game.
Arguing with a friend about an issue
on which he or she has a very
different opinion.
Investing 5% of your annual income
in a very speculative stock.
Approaching your boss to ask for a
raise.
Betting a day’s income on the
outcome of a sporting event (e.g.
baseball, soccer, or football).
Telling a friend if his or her significant
other has made a pass at you.
Investing 5% of your annual income
in a conservative stock.
Wearing shocking or unconventional
clothes on occasion.
Investing 10% of your annual income
in government bonds (treasury bills).
Gambling a week’s income at a
casino.
Taking a job that you enjoy over one
that is prestigious but less enjoyable.
Defending an unpopular issue that
you believe in at a social occasion.
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Neither
Likely
nor
Unlikely

Somewhat
Likely

Likely

Very
Likely

Thank you for participating in this study! Please place this questionnaire back into Envelope 2
and remain seated until the person administering the study instructs you to line up for payout.
To ensure that you receive your payout, please have the following materials ready to bring with
you:
 Envelope 1 containing completed questions
 Envelope 2 containing completed questions
 Acknowledgement of Payment form – print your name, sign your name, and leave the
“amount received” blank
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PAYMENT
Thank you for participating in this study on reporting decisions conducted by Bonnie Brown.
Please sign below to acknowledge receipt of payment for your participation in this study.
In addition, by signing below you acknowledge that you will NOT discuss the study with
other students. To get valid and useful results, we need each participant’s honest and unfiltered
reactions to his/her experiences in the study. Thank you very much for your cooperation.
Session Date and Time: [Insert Date] ([Insert Day of the Week]) [Insert Time]

______________________________________________
Amount Received (in U.S. dollars)

______________________________________________
Printed Name

______________________________________________
Signed Name

Thank you very much for your participation!
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Condition 3: Group / Self
[Paper format]
Explanation of Research
Title of Project: Decision Making and Reporting
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you. Your
professor has agreed to award you extra credit for your participation. If you wish to earn extra
credit in your class, but do not wish to participate in the research study or are under 18 years of
age, your professor will provide you with an alternate assignment of comparable time and effort.
If you have decided to participate in this project, please understand that your participation is
voluntary and that you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at
any time without penalty. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to
which you are otherwise entitled. The purpose of this research is to examine individual decision
making and reporting. You will be asked to read instructions for a decision involving reporting.
You will then be asked to make your decision and answer some questions about your opinions
and demographic questions. This research study will be conducted in a behavioral lab. The
estimated time to complete this study is approximately 30 minutes.
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions,
concerns, or complaints: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-1478 or by email at
bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, Kenneth G. Dixon School of
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-3192 or by email at
vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint: Research at the University
of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of the
Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and approved by the
IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact:
Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research &
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by
telephone at (407) 823-2901.
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TASK INSTRUCTIONS [Paper format]
You will be participating in a task in which your group is provided with Francs and then is asked
to make a reporting decision. Note that Francs are the experimental currency, and there are no
right or wrong answers.
The Francs will belong to your group, and your two member group will make the reporting
decision together for your entire group. At the conclusion of the task, Francs will be converted
into dollars using a positive conversion rate and your group will be paid based upon the net
Francs from your group’s decision. In other words, your group’s decision affects the payout
that your group will receive. Payouts will be divided equally between group members.
After being provided with Francs, your group will decide how much of the Francs to report on a
form, ranging from zero Francs to all of the Francs. Francs reported on the form are subject to a
50% fee. Francs that you decide not to report on the form are not subject to a fee unless the form
is selected for inspection. If the form is selected for inspection, the amount of Francs reported is
compared to the initial amount of Francs provided, and any Francs not reported on the form are
subject to a 100% fee. The form has a 50% chance of being selected for inspection. Inspections
are determined completely at random and do not depend on your group’s decisions or the
decisions of other groups.
After your group has decided the amount of Francs to report and has submitted your form, you
will be notified whether or not the form was selected for inspection. After the inspection period,
net Francs will be calculated as the initial Francs provided, less total fees (Net Francs = Initial
Francs - Total Fees). Thus, any fees assessed reduce your group’s payout at the end of the task.
Total Fees depend upon both the amount your group decides to report on the form and whether
the form is selected for inspection:
If selected for inspection, Total Fees equal 50% of the Francs reported on the form, plus
100% of the Francs not reported on the form.
If not selected for inspection, Total Fees equal 50% of the amount reported on the form.
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PRACTICE REPORTING DECISION
Just for practice, imagine your group is provided with 4,000 Francs and is asked to decide what
amount to report on a form, ranging from 0 Francs to 4,000 Francs (in 400 Franc increments).
The 4,000 Francs will belong to your group, and your two member group will make the reporting
decision together for your entire group. Payouts will be divided equally between group members.
The following chart has been provided to help your group decide how much of the 4,000 Francs
you want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs
that may be possible outcomes, given the Francs your group decides to report.
Francs You Could
Choose to Report
Maximum Possible
Net Francs
Minimum Possible
Net Francs

0

400

800

1,200

1,600

2,000

2,400

2,800

3,200

3,600

4,000

4,000

3,800

3,600

3,400

3,200

3,000

2,800

2,600

2,400

2,200

2,000

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

Several amounts are shown on the top row of the chart as “Francs you could choose to report.”
For each reporting option, the chart presents both the maximum (no inspection) and minimum
(inspection) possible net Francs if your group chooses to report that particular amount.
EXAMPLE 1: Note (towards the top right of the chart) if your group decides to report all 4,000
Francs, net Francs would be 2,000 Francs regardless of whether the form is selected for
inspection.
EXAMPLE 2: On the other end of the chart, note that if your group decides to report 0 Francs,
net Francs depend upon whether the form is selected for inspection.
If the form is selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs would
be 0 Francs, calculated as follows:
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, plus 100% of the 4,000 Francs not
reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 4,000. Net Francs are calculated as the 4,000 Initial
Francs, less 4,000 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 0.
If the form is not selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs
would be 4,000 Francs, calculated as follows:
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 0. Net Francs
are calculated as the 4,000 Initial Francs, less 0 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 4,000.
As shown in the chart, the other reporting options fall between these two examples. Please take a
few minutes to review this chart.
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[End of Task Instructions – Blank page intentional spacer]
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[QUALTRICS PORTION; SCREEN 1]
Your group name and participant number are displayed on the outside of the envelopes
you were given. Do not open the envelopes.
Please locate your GROUP NAME and enter it in the space provided below.

________________

Please locate both of your PARTICIPANT NUMBERS and enter them in the spaces
provided below.
1st PARTICIPANT NUMBER

________________
2nd PARTICIPANT NUMBER

________________
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[SCREEN 2]
YOUR GROUP HAS NOW BEEN PROVIDED WITH 20,000 FRANCS
Your task is to decide as a group how much of the 20,000 Francs your group would like to
report.
The 20,000 Francs will belong to your group, and your two member group will make the
reporting decision together for your entire group. Payouts will be divided equally between group
members.
Please feel free to refer back to your paper hardcopy of the Task Instructions.
The following chart has been provided to help your group decide how much of the 20,000 Francs
you want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs
that may be possible, given the Francs your group decides to report.
Possible Net Francs
Francs You
Could Choose
to Report
Maximum
Possible Net
Francs
Minimum
Possible Net
Francs

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

20,000

20,000

19,000

18,000

17,000

16,000

15,000

14,000

13,000

12,000

11,000

10,000

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

Please do not comment out loud. Rather, to keep your conversation private, please take turns
typing in the textbox provided below to share your thought process to reach a group decision
about how much of the 20,000 Francs to report.

How much of the 20,000 Francs would your group like to report?
0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000
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12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

20,000

[SCREEN 3]
Please open Envelope 1 and complete the contents individually on your own. Only open
“Envelope 1” at this time. Once complete, place materials back inside the envelope and
wait for further instruction.

WAIT Do not click on the computer until the person administering the study tells you to proceed
in the computer survey.

Please remain quiet. After everyone is ready, you will be instructed to continue.
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[SCREEN 4]
INSPECTION PERIOD
Reports will now be randomly selected for inspection. On the next screen, you will be
notified whether or not your report was selected for inspection.
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[SCREEN 5]
Your report was selected for inspection.
[Your report was not selected for inspection.]
Net Francs = [Insert Net Francs]
Please click “>>” below to proceed.
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[SCREEN 6 – Custom Final Qualtrics Screen]

Please WAIT here for further instruction.
As a reminder, please remain quiet while you are waiting.
After everyone is ready, you will be instructed how to proceed.
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[End of Qualtrics Study – Blank page intentional spacer]
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ENVELOPE 1
[Contains Covariate Questionnaire]
[Envelope 1 Outside Label (Label color matches group name color)]
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so.

YOUR PARTICIPANT NUMBER IS: 000000
You are a member of a two person group. YOUR GROUP IS BLUE
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[Covariate Questionnaire]
Please enter your GROUP NAME in the space provided below.
GROUP NAME: __________
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below.
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________

ADDITIONAL RESPONSE QUESTIONS: Please respond to the following questions.
There are no right or wrong answers. Therefore, please respond as honestly and accurately
as possible.
Regarding the reporting decision that you just made, please indicate your agreement or
disagreement with the following statements:
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

It was hard for me to care very much
about whether or not a good reporting
decision was made.
I felt a very high degree of personal
responsibility for the decision about
how much to report.
I feel I should personally take the credit
or blame for the results of the reporting
decision.
Whether or not a good reporting
decision was made is clearly my
responsibility.

318

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

When deciding how many Francs to report on the form, how concerned were you about the
possibility that the report would be inspected?
Extremely Concerned
Moderately Concerned
Somewhat Concerned
Slightly Concerned
Not at all Concerned

Compared to the average person, how risky was the decision you just made?
Much more risky than average
More risky than average
Somewhat more risky than average
Neither more or less risky than average
Somewhat less risky than average
Less risky than average
Much less risky than average

Which best describes how your payment is determined for this study?
Based on a reporting decision I made
Based on a reporting decision that someone else made
Based on a reporting decision that my group made
Based on a reporting decision that another group made

319

[End of Envelope 1 Covariate Questionnaire– Blank page intentional spacer]

320

ENVELOPE 2
[Contains Demographics Questionnaire]
[Envelope 2 Outside Label (Label color matches group name color)]
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so.

YOUR PARTICIPANT IS: 000000
You are a member of a two person group. YOUR GROUP IS BLUE
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[Demographics Questionnaire]
Please enter your GROUP NAME in the space provided below.
GROUP NAME: __________
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below.
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS: Please tell us a little about yourself to help categorize
your responses. All responses to this survey are anonymous and confidential.

What is your age?
18 - 20
21 - 25
26 - 30
31 - 35
36 and over
I would prefer not to answer

What is your gender?
Male
Female

How many tax classes have you taken? Include the current semester.
0
1-2
3-4
5 or more

How much total work experience have you had in public accounting?
No experience in public accounting
Less than 6 months
6 – 12 months
More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________

How much work experience have you had in public accounting, specifically in tax?
No tax experience in public accounting
Less than 6 months
6 – 12 months
More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________
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What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply.
Big 4
International/National (does not include Big 4)
Regional/Local
Sole Proprietorship
Other (Please specify)_________
No experience in public accounting

What is your status regarding becoming a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)?
Currently a licensed CPA
Passed the CPA exam but not yet licensed
Plan to take CPA exam in the future
Do not plan to be a CPA

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return, how certain would
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return and engaged a paid
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax
position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

Who prepared your most recent individual income tax return?
I prepared my own tax return
I hired a paid preparer
A friend or relative prepared my tax return
I do not file a tax return
Other (Please specify)_________

For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity
or behavior.
Very
Unlikely

Unlikely

Somewhat
Unlikely

Admitting that your tastes are
different from those of your friends.
Betting a day’s income at the horse
races.
Investing 10% of your annual income
in a moderate growth mutual fund.
Disagreeing with your father on a
major issue.
Betting a day’s income at a high stake
poker game.
Arguing with a friend about an issue
on which he or she has a very
different opinion.
Investing 5% of your annual income
in a very speculative stock.
Approaching your boss to ask for a
raise.
Betting a day’s income on the
outcome of a sporting event (e.g.
baseball, soccer, or football).
Telling a friend if his or her significant
other has made a pass at you.
Investing 5% of your annual income
in a conservative stock.
Wearing shocking or unconventional
clothes on occasion.
Investing 10% of your annual income
in government bonds (treasury bills).
Gambling a week’s income at a
casino.
Taking a job that you enjoy over one
that is prestigious but less enjoyable.
Defending an unpopular issue that
you believe in at a social occasion.
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Neither
Likely
nor
Unlikely

Somewhat
Likely

Likely

Very
Likely

Thank you for participating in this study! Please place this questionnaire back into Envelope 2
and remain seated until the person administering the study instructs you to line up for payout.
To ensure that you receive your payout, please have the following materials ready to bring with
you:
 Envelope 1 containing completed questions
 Envelope 2 containing completed questions
 Acknowledgement of Payment form – print your name, sign your name, and leave the
“amount received” blank
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[End of Envelope 2 Demographics Questionnaire – Blank page intentional spacer]
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PAYMENT
Thank you for participating in this study on reporting decisions conducted by Bonnie Brown.
Please sign below to acknowledge receipt of payment for your participation in this study.
In addition, by signing below you acknowledge that you will NOT discuss the study with
other students. To get valid and useful results, we need each participant’s honest and unfiltered
reactions to his/her experiences in the study. Thank you very much for your cooperation.
Session Date and Time: [Insert Date] ([Insert Day of the Week]) [Insert Time]

______________________________________________
Amount Received (in U.S. dollars)

______________________________________________
Printed Name

______________________________________________
Signed Name

Thank you very much for your participation!
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Condition 4: Group / Other
[Paper format]
Explanation of Research
Title of Project: Decision Making and Reporting
Principal Investigator: Bonnie Brown
Faculty Supervisor: Vicky Arnold
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you. Your
professor has agreed to award you extra credit for your participation. If you wish to earn extra
credit in your class, but do not wish to participate in the research study or are under 18 years of
age, your professor will provide you with an alternate assignment of comparable time and effort.
If you have decided to participate in this project, please understand that your participation is
voluntary and that you have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at
any time without penalty. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to
which you are otherwise entitled. The purpose of this research is to examine individual decision
making and reporting. You will be asked to read instructions for a decision involving reporting.
You will then be asked to make your decision and answer some questions about your opinions
and demographic questions. This research study will be conducted in a behavioral lab. The
estimated time to complete this study is approximately 30 minutes.
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions,
concerns, or complaints: Bonnie Brown, Doctoral Candidate, Kenneth G. Dixon School of
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-1478 or by email at
bonnie.brown@ucf.edu or Dr. Vicky Arnold, Faculty Supervisor, Kenneth G. Dixon School of
Accounting, College of Business Administration, (407) 823-3192 or by email at
vicky.arnold@ucf.edu.
IRB contact about your rights in the study or to report a complaint: Research at the University
of Central Florida involving human participants is carried out under the oversight of the
Institutional Review Board (UCF IRB). This research has been reviewed and approved by the
IRB. For information about the rights of people who take part in research, please contact:
Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office of Research &
Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by
telephone at (407) 823-2901.
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TASK INSTRUCTIONS [Paper format]
You will be participating in a task in which your group is provided with Francs and then is asked
to make a reporting decision. Note that Francs are the experimental currency, and there are no
right or wrong answers.
The Francs will belong to another group, and your two member group will make the reporting
decision for that other group. At the conclusion of the task, Francs will be converted into dollars
using a positive conversion rate and the other group will be paid based upon the net Francs from
your group’s decision. In other words, your group’s decision affects the payout that another
group will receive. Your group’s own payout will be based upon the net Francs of another group
deciding on your behalf. Assignment is completely random – you should assume the group
deciding on your group’s behalf is not the same group for whom you are deciding. Payouts will
be divided equally between group members.
After being provided with Francs, your group will decide how much of the Francs to report on a
form, ranging from zero Francs to all of the Francs. Francs reported on the form are subject to a
50% fee. Francs that you decide not to report on the form are not subject to a fee unless the form
is selected for inspection. If the form is selected for inspection, the amount of Francs reported is
compared to the initial amount of Francs provided, and any Francs not reported on the form are
subject to a 100% fee. The form has a 50% chance of being selected for inspection. Inspections
are determined completely at random and do not depend on your group’s decisions or the
decisions of other groups.
After your group has decided the amount of Francs to report and has submitted the form on
behalf of another group, you will be notified whether or not the form was selected for inspection.
After the inspection period, net Francs will be calculated as the initial Francs provided, less total
fees (Net Francs = Initial Francs - Total Fees). Thus, any fees assessed reduce the other
group’s payout at the end of the task. Total Fees depend upon both the amount your group
decides to report on the form and whether the form is selected for inspection:
If selected for inspection, Total Fees equal 50% of the Francs reported on the form, plus
100% of the Francs not reported on the form.
If not selected for inspection, Total Fees equal 50% of the amount reported on the form.
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PRACTICE REPORTING DECISION
Just for practice, imagine your group is provided with 4,000 Francs and is asked to decide what
amount to report on a form, ranging from 0 Francs to 4,000 Francs (in 400 Franc increments).
The 4,000 Francs will belong to another group, and your two member group will make the
reporting decision for that other group. Payouts will be divided equally between group members.
The following chart has been provided to help your group decide how much of the 4,000 Francs
you want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs
that may be possible outcomes, given the Francs your group decides to report.
Francs You Could
Choose to Report
Maximum Possible
Net Francs
Minimum Possible
Net Francs

0

400

800

1,200

1,600

2,000

2,400

2,800

3,200

3,600

4,000

4,000

3,800

3,600

3,400

3,200

3,000

2,800

2,600

2,400

2,200

2,000

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

Several amounts are shown on the top row of the chart as “Francs you could choose to report.”
For each reporting option, the chart presents both the maximum (no inspection) and minimum
(inspection) possible net Francs if your group chooses to report that particular amount.
EXAMPLE 1: Note (towards the top right of the chart) if your group decides to report all 4,000
Francs, net Francs would be 2,000 Francs regardless of whether the form is selected for
inspection.
EXAMPLE 2: On the other end of the chart, note that if your group decides to report 0 Francs,
net Francs depend upon whether the form is selected for inspection.
If the form is selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs would
be 0 Francs, calculated as follows:
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, plus 100% of the 4,000 Francs not
reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 4,000. Net Francs are calculated as the 4,000 Initial
Francs, less 4,000 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 0.
If the form is not selected for inspection and you have decided to report 0 Francs, net Francs
would be 4,000 Francs, calculated as follows:
Total fees equal 50% of the 0 Francs reported on the form, so Total Fees equal 0. Net Francs
are calculated as the 4,000 Initial Francs, less 0 Total Fees, so Net Francs equal 4,000.
As shown in the chart, the other reporting options fall between these two examples. Please take a
few minutes to review this chart.
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[End of Task Instructions – Blank page intentional spacer]
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[QUALTRICS PORTION; SCREEN 1]
Your group name and participant number are displayed on the outside of the envelopes
you were given. Do not open the envelopes.
Please locate your GROUP NAME and enter it in the space provided below.

________________

Please locate both of your PARTICIPANT NUMBERS and enter them in the spaces
provided below.
1st PARTICIPANT NUMBER

________________
2nd PARTICIPANT NUMBER

________________
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[SCREEN 2]
YOUR GROUP HAS NOW BEEN PROVIDED WITH 20,000 FRANCS
Your task is to decide as a group how much of the 20,000 Francs your group would like to
report.
The 20,000 Francs will belong to another group, and your two member group will make the
reporting decision for that other group. Payouts will be divided equally between group members.
Please feel free to refer back to your paper hardcopy of the Task Instructions.
The following chart has been provided to help your group decide how much of the 20,000 Francs
you want to report. The chart presents examples of both the maximum and minimum Net Francs
that may be possible, given the Francs your group decides to report.
Possible Net Francs
Francs You
Could Choose
to Report
Maximum
Possible Net
Francs
Minimum
Possible Net
Francs

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

20,000

20,000

19,000

18,000

17,000

16,000

15,000

14,000

13,000

12,000

11,000

10,000

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

Please do not comment out loud. Rather, to keep your conversation private, please take turns
typing in the textbox provided below to share your thought process to reach a group decision
about how much of the 20,000 Francs to report.

How much of the 20,000 Francs would your group like to report?
0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

334

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

20,000

[SCREEN 3]
Please open Envelope 1 and complete the contents individually on your own. Only open
“Envelope 1” at this time. Once complete, place materials back inside the envelope and
wait for further instruction.

WAIT Do not click on the computer until the person administering the study tells you to proceed
in the computer survey.

Please remain quiet. After everyone is ready, you will be instructed to continue.
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[SCREEN 4]
INSPECTION PERIOD
Reports will now be randomly selected for inspection. On the next screen, you will be
notified whether or not your report was selected for inspection.

336

[SCREEN 5]
Your report was selected for inspection.
[Your report was not selected for inspection.]
Net Francs = [Insert Net Francs]
Please click “>>” below to proceed.

337

[SCREEN 6 – Custom Final Qualtrics Screen]

Please WAIT here for further instruction.
As a reminder, please remain quiet while you are waiting.
After everyone is ready, you will be instructed how to proceed.
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[End of Qualtrics Study – Blank page intentional spacer]
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ENVELOPE 1
[Contains Covariate Questionnaire]
[Envelope 1 Outside Label (Label color matches group name color)]
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so.

YOUR PARTICIPANT NUMBER IS: 000000
You are a member of a two person group. YOUR GROUP IS BLUE
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[Covariate Questionnaire]
Please enter your GROUP NAME in the space provided below.
GROUP NAME: __________
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below.
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________

ADDITIONAL RESPONSE QUESTIONS: Please respond to the following questions.
There are no right or wrong answers. Therefore, please respond as honestly and accurately
as possible.
Regarding the reporting decision that you just made, please indicate your agreement or
disagreement with the following statements:
Strongly
Disagree

Disagree

Somewhat
Disagree

It was hard for me to care very much
about whether or not a good reporting
decision was made.
I felt a very high degree of personal
responsibility for the decision about
how much to report.
I feel I should personally take the credit
or blame for the results of the reporting
decision.
Whether or not a good reporting
decision was made is clearly my
responsibility.

341

Neither
Agree nor
Disagree

Somewhat
Agree

Agree

Strongly
Agree

When deciding how many Francs to report on the form, how concerned were you about the
possibility that the report would be inspected?
Extremely Concerned
Moderately Concerned
Somewhat Concerned
Slightly Concerned
Not at all Concerned

Compared to the average person, how risky was the decision you just made?
Much more risky than average
More risky than average
Somewhat more risky than average
Neither more or less risky than average
Somewhat less risky than average
Less risky than average
Much less risky than average

Which best describes how your payment is determined for this study?
Based on a reporting decision I made
Based on a reporting decision that someone else made
Based on a reporting decision that my group made
Based on a reporting decision that another group made

342

[End of Envelope 1 Covariate Questionnaire– Blank page intentional spacer]
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ENVELOPE 2
[Contains Demographics Questionnaire]
[Envelope 2 Outside Label (Label color matches group name color)]
IMPORTANT – Do not open this envelope until instructed to do so.

YOUR PARTICIPANT IS: 000000
You are a member of a two person group. YOUR GROUP IS BLUE

344

[Demographics Questionnaire]
Please enter your GROUP NAME in the space provided below.
GROUP NAME: __________
Please enter your PARTICIPANT NUMBER in the space provided below.
PARTICIPANT NUMBER: __________
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DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS: Please tell us a little about yourself to help categorize
your responses. All responses to this survey are anonymous and confidential.

What is your age?
18 - 20
21 - 25
26 - 30
31 - 35
36 and over
I would prefer not to answer

What is your gender?
Male
Female

How many tax classes have you taken? Include the current semester.
0
1-2
3-4
5 or more

How much total work experience have you had in public accounting?
No experience in public accounting
Less than 6 months
6 – 12 months
More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________

How much work experience have you had in public accounting, specifically in tax?
No tax experience in public accounting
Less than 6 months
6 – 12 months
More than a year (Please specify how many years)_________
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What size public accounting firm did you work for? Check all that apply.
Big 4
International/National (does not include Big 4)
Regional/Local
Sole Proprietorship
Other (Please specify)_________
No experience in public accounting

What is your status regarding becoming a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)?
Currently a licensed CPA
Passed the CPA exam but not yet licensed
Plan to take CPA exam in the future
Do not plan to be a CPA

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return, how certain would
you want to be of your tax position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

If you were evaluating a potential tax deduction for your personal tax return and engaged a paid
tax preparer for assistance, how certain would you want your paid preparer to be of your tax
position before taking a deduction?
Not
At All
Certain
0%

Extremely
Certain
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%
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70%

80%

90%

100%

Who prepared your most recent individual income tax return?
I prepared my own tax return
I hired a paid preparer
A friend or relative prepared my tax return
I do not file a tax return
Other (Please specify)_________

For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in each activity
or behavior.
Very
Unlikely

Unlikely

Somewhat
Unlikely

Admitting that your tastes are
different from those of your friends.
Betting a day’s income at the horse
races.
Investing 10% of your annual income
in a moderate growth mutual fund.
Disagreeing with your father on a
major issue.
Betting a day’s income at a high stake
poker game.
Arguing with a friend about an issue
on which he or she has a very
different opinion.
Investing 5% of your annual income
in a very speculative stock.
Approaching your boss to ask for a
raise.
Betting a day’s income on the
outcome of a sporting event (e.g.
baseball, soccer, or football).
Telling a friend if his or her significant
other has made a pass at you.
Investing 5% of your annual income
in a conservative stock.
Wearing shocking or unconventional
clothes on occasion.
Investing 10% of your annual income
in government bonds (treasury bills).
Gambling a week’s income at a
casino.
Taking a job that you enjoy over one
that is prestigious but less enjoyable.
Defending an unpopular issue that
you believe in at a social occasion.
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Neither
Likely
nor
Unlikely

Somewhat
Likely

Likely

Very
Likely

Thank you for participating in this study! Please place this questionnaire back into Envelope 2
and remain seated until the person administering the study instructs you to line up for payout.
To ensure that you receive your payout, please have the following materials ready to bring with
you:
 Envelope 1 containing completed questions
 Envelope 2 containing completed questions
 Acknowledgement of Payment form – print your name, sign your name, and leave the
“amount received” blank
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[End of Envelope 2 Demographics Questionnaire – Blank page intentional spacer]
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PAYMENT
Thank you for participating in this study on reporting decisions conducted by Bonnie Brown.
Please sign below to acknowledge receipt of payment for your participation in this study.
In addition, by signing below you acknowledge that you will NOT discuss the study with
other students. To get valid and useful results, we need each participant’s honest and unfiltered
reactions to his/her experiences in the study. Thank you very much for your cooperation.
Session Date and Time: [Insert Date] ([Insert Day of the Week]) [Insert Time]

______________________________________________
Amount Received (in U.S. dollars)

______________________________________________
Printed Name

______________________________________________
Signed Name

Thank you very much for your participation!
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APPENDIX G: STUDY 3 ADDITIONAL MEASURES
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Felt Responsibility
Instructions: Please respond to the following questions. There are no right or wrong answers.
Therefore, please respond as honestly and accurately as possible. Regarding the reporting
decision that you just made, please indicate your agreement or disagreement with the following
statements:
(Measured on a seven-point scale with labeled points ranging from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 7
“Strongly Agree”)
1) It was hard for me to care very much about whether or not a good reporting decision was
made.
2) I felt a very high degree of personal responsibility for the decision about how much to report.
3) I feel I should personally take the credit or blame for the results of the reporting decision.
4) Whether or not a good reporting decision was made is clearly my responsibility.
Adapted from Hackman and Oldham (1974)
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Risk Attitude
Instructions: For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging in
each activity or behavior.
(Measured on a seven-point scale with labeled points ranging from 1 “Very Unlikely” to 7 “Very
Likely”)
1)
2)
3)
4)

Betting a day’s income at the horse races.
Betting a day’s income at a high stake poker game.
Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event (e.g. baseball, soccer, or football).
Gambling a week’s income at a casino.

Adopted from Weber et al. (2002) Domain-specific risk-attitude scale, gambling subscale
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APPENDIX H: IRB APPROVALS
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